United States v. Booher , 201 F. App'x 139 ( 2006 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 03-4788
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    JAMES PHILLIP BOOHER,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States.
    (S. Ct. No. 04-5249)
    ______________
    Submitted:   July 26, 2006            Decided:   September 25, 2006
    Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
    Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Jay H. Steele, Lebanon, Virginia, for Appellant. John L. Brownlee,
    United States Attorney, Jean B. Hudson, Assistant United States
    Attorney, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    PER CURIAM:
    James Phillip Booher pled guilty to possession of a
    firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1)
    (2000).    The district court determined at sentencing that he
    obstructed justice by suborning his girlfriend’s perjury before the
    grand jury, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 (2002), and
    accordingly   denied   him   an     adjustment   for   acceptance   of
    responsibility.   USSG § 3E1.1.     Booher did not object to a two-
    level enhancement recommended in the presentence report under USSG
    § 2K2.1(b)(4) for a stolen firearm.       The district court imposed a
    sentence of 100 months imprisonment.        We affirmed the sentence.
    United States v. Booher, 94 F. App’x 160 (4th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-
    4788).    The Supreme Court later granted Booher’s petition for
    certiorari, vacated this court’s judgment in light of United
    States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005), and remanded the case for
    further proceedings.   For the reasons explained below, we vacate
    the sentence and remand for resentencing.
    On remand, Booher argues that the district court plainly
    erred under Booker in making enhancements for a stolen gun and
    obstruction of justice based on facts which he did not admit, but
    were instead found by the court, thus violating his Sixth Amendment
    rights.   He also asserts that there is nothing in the record that
    indicates the district court would impose the same sentence if his
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    case were remanded for resentencing under an advisory sentencing
    scheme.
    Under Booker, a Sixth Amendment error occurs when the
    district       court   imposes     a    sentence     greater      than   the      maximum
    permitted based on facts found by a jury or admitted by the
    defendant.      Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.            Because Booher did not raise
    a Sixth Amendment challenge or object to the mandatory application
    of the guidelines in the district court, our review is for plain
    error. United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 731-32 (1993); United
    States    v.    Hughes,    
    401 F.3d 540
    ,   547   (4th    Cir.   2005).       To
    demonstrate plain error, an appellant must establish that an error
    occurred, that it was plain, and that it affected his substantial
    rights.    Hughes, 
    401 F.3d at 547-48
    .               If an appellant meets these
    requirements, the court’s “discretion is appropriately exercised
    only when failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of
    justice, such as when the defendant is actually innocent or the
    error     seriously      affects       the    fairness,    integrity         or   public
    reputation       of    judicial    proceedings.”          
    Id. at 555
        (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Here, the district court found that Booher had obstructed
    justice, a fact he contested, and increased the offense level from
    20 to 22.        In doing so, the district court erred by making a
    factual finding that increased Booher’s sentence under a mandatory
    guidelines scheme.         Hughes, 
    401 F.3d at 547
    .              The error was plain
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    because Booker abrogated the previous law of this Circuit.             
    Id. at 547-48
    .
    Further, Booher’s failure to contest the recommended
    enhancement for a stolen firearm (which increased the offense level
    to 24) may not be treated as an admission that the firearm was
    stolen.   In United States v. Milam, 
    443 F.3d 382
     (4th Cir. 2006),
    we held that, for Booker purposes, a defendant’s failure to object
    to the presentence report does not constitute an admission of facts
    set forth in the report on which a sentence enhancement is based.
    Moreover,    the    evidence   that    the   gun    was    stolen   was   not
    overwhelming.      Cf. United States v. Smith, 
    441 F.3d 254
    , 272 (4th
    Cir. 2006) (declining to notice Booker error where the jury, having
    convicted the defendant of various drug offenses, would have found
    the specific drug amounts charged in the indictment by relying on
    the   uncontroverted    testimony     proffered    by   several   witnesses),
    petition for cert. filed, July 10, 2006 (No. 06-5223).               Although
    Booher asserts that he is unaware of what facts were relied on to
    reach the conclusion that the gun was stolen, the record discloses
    that the probation officer recommended the enhancement based on
    information from the FBI’s National Crime Information Center, which
    showed that the gun had been stolen in Newport, Tennessee.                 We
    conclude that this information does not constitute overwhelming
    evidence that the gun was stolen.
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    Without the two enhancements, Booher’s offense level
    would have been 20 and his guideline range would have been 70-87
    months.     Booher’s 100-month sentence thus exceeds the maximum
    authorized based on facts he admitted.               We therefore exercise our
    discretion to correct the error. Because resentencing is warranted
    on   this   ground,     we    need    not    decide     whether     the   mandatory
    application of the guidelines alone constituted plain error that
    would require resentencing.           See United States v. White, 
    405 F.3d 208
    , 223 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 668
     (2005) (holding
    that a defendant who seeks resentencing on this ground must show
    actual prejudice).
    For the reasons discussed, we vacate the sentence imposed
    by the district court and remand for resentencing consistent with
    Booker.*      Although       the    sentencing      guidelines      are   no   longer
    mandatory, Booker makes clear that a sentencing court must still
    “consult    [the]     Guidelines      and    take     them   into    account     when
    sentencing.”    125 S. Ct. at 767.             On remand, the district court
    should first determine the appropriate sentencing range under the
    guidelines,    making    all       factual   findings    appropriate       for   that
    determination. Hughes, 
    401 F.3d at 546
    . The court should consider
    *
    Just as we noted in Hughes, “[w]e of course offer no
    criticism of the district court judge, who followed the law and
    procedure in effect at the time of [Booher]’s sentencing.” Hughes,
    
    401 F.3d at
    545 n.4. See generally Johnson v. United States, 
    520 U.S. 461
    , 468 (1997) (stating that an error is “plain” if “the law
    at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at
    the time of appeal”).
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    this sentencing range along with the other factors described in 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 3553
    (a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006), and then impose a
    sentence.     
    Id.
          If that sentence falls outside the guidelines
    range, the court should explain its reasons for imposing a non-
    guidelines sentence as required by 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 3553
    (c)(2).                 
    Id.
    The sentence must be “within the statutorily prescribed range and
    . . . reasonable.”      
    Id.
       We dispense with oral argument because the
    facts   and   legal    contentions    are     adequately   presented    in   the
    materials     before    the   court   and     argument   would   not   aid   the
    decisional process.
    VACATED AND REMANDED
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