United States v. Robinson ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4083
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JERRY WAYNE ROBINSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:00-cr-137-1-F)
Submitted: August 30, 2006 Decided: September 29, 2006
Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Frank D. Whitney, United States Attorney, Anne M.
Hayes, Christine Witcover Dean, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Jerry Wayne Robinson appeals the district court’s order
revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to twenty-four
months of imprisonment. On appeal, Robinson argues that, because
the district court sentenced him above the Chapter 7 advisory
policy statement range to the statutory maximum without
explanation, his sentence is procedurally unreasonable. We affirm.
This court recently held in United States v. Crudup,
F.3d , 2006 WL 2243586 (4th Cir. Aug. 7, 2006), that it reviews
sentences imposed upon the revocation of supervised release to
determine whether the sentence is “plainly unreasonable.” If the
court determines that a revocation sentence is procedurally or
substantively unreasonable, it must then decide whether the
sentence is plainly unreasonable. Crudup at *5.
In this case, Robinson’s sentence was within the
applicable statutory maximum and the court expressly stated that it
considered the Chapter 7 advisory policy statement range of eight
to fourteen months. The district court questioned Robinson and
heard from defense counsel, as well as the probation officer. The
district court, however, did not explicitly state any reasons for
its decision to sentence Robinson above the policy statement range
to the statutory maximum.
In Crudup, we reiterated that, although a district court
must consider the Chapter 7 policy statements and the 18 U.S.C.A.
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§ 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006) factors applicable to revocation
sentences, the court has broad discretion to revoke its previous
sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory
maximum. Crudup at *4. We further reaffirmed that “‘a court’s
statement of its reasons for going beyond non-binding policy
statements in imposing a sentence after revoking a defendant’s
supervised release term need not be as specific as has been
required when courts departed from guidelines that were, before
[United States v.]Booker, [543 U.S. 220 (2005),] considered to be
mandatory.’” Id. at *4 (quoting United States v. Lewis, 424 F.3d
239, 245 (2d Cir. 2005)) (emphasis in original).
Although the district court did not articulate at the
hearing its reasons for sentencing Robinson beyond the policy
statement range, we find that the sentence is not plainly
unreasonable. The record indicates that Robinson received two
downward departures on his original sentence based on his
substantial assistance. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 7B1.4, p.s., comment. (n.4) (2005). Furthermore, the probation
officer stated to the court that Robinson has an “appalling” record
and is “nothing less than a professional criminal.” Given the
broad latitude afforded the district court to impose statutory
maximum revocation sentences, the court’s consideration of the
relevant policy statement range, and substantial support for the
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court’s decision in the record, we find that the sentence is not
plainly unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order
revoking Robinson’s supervised release and imposing a twenty-four-
month sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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