United States v. Bostick , 237 F. App'x 856 ( 2007 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 06-4205
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    DARRELL LAMONT BOSTICK,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, Senior
    District Judge. (1:05-cr-00200-WLO)
    Submitted:   May 21, 2007                 Decided:   August 10, 2007
    Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Ross Hall Richardson, LAW OFFICES OF ROSS HALL RICHARDSON,
    Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.      Anna Mills Wagoner,
    United States Attorney, Sandra J. Hairston, Assistant United States
    Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    A jury convicted Darrell Lamont Bostick of possession of
    a   firearm    after     previously        being    convicted      of   a   felony,    in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1) (2000).                   Bostick appeals.         His
    counsel has filed a brief challenging the sufficiency of the
    evidence   to      convict    and    the    reasonableness         of   his   sentence.
    Bostick has filed a motion to submit a pro se supplemental brief.
    We grant Bostick’s motion, and we affirm the judgment of the
    district court.
    In   reviewing     a   claim     of    insufficient       evidence,     we
    consider whether there is substantial evidence, viewed in the light
    most favorable to the government, to support the verdict.                      Glasser
    v. United States, 
    315 U.S. 60
    , 80 (1942).                    We do not review the
    credibility of witnesses, and we assume the jury resolved all
    evidentiary contradictions in favor of the government.                          United
    States v. Sun, 
    278 F.3d 302
    , 313 (4th Cir.2002).                   Our review of the
    trial transcript convinces us that there was sufficient evidence to
    support the conviction.
    Finally,       Bostick       argues     that    his       sentence      was
    unreasonable       because     the   district       court    did    not     provide    an
    explanation of its reasons for selecting the sentence and because
    it did not address his sentencing arguments.                    After United States
    v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005), a sentencing court is no longer
    bound by the range prescribed by the sentencing guidelines, but
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    still must calculate and consider the guideline range as well as
    the factors set forth in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) (2000).                   United States
    v. Hughes, 
    401 F.3d 540
    , 546 (4th Cir.2005).                    We will affirm a
    post-Booker sentence if it is both reasonable and within the
    statutorily prescribed range. 
    Id.
    A   sentence        within      a    properly    calculated       advisory
    guideline range is presumptively reasonable.                    United States v.
    Green, 
    436 F.3d 449
    , 457 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 2309
    (2006).   This presumption can only be rebutted by a showing that
    the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the factors
    under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) (2000).              United States v. Montes-Pineda,
    
    445 F.3d 375
    , 379 (4th Cir. 2006), petition for cert. filed, ___
    U.S.L.W. ___ (July 21, 2006) (No. 06-5439).                         Procedurally, a
    district court must:       (1) properly calculate the sentencing range;
    (2) determine whether a sentence within the range adequately serves
    the   §   3553(a)    factors;        (3)       implement    mandatory     statutory
    limitations;   and       (4)   explain     its    reasons     for     selecting   the
    sentence, especially a sentence outside the range. Green, 
    436 F.3d at 455-56
    .
    While     a    district      court     must     consider    the   various
    § 3553(a) factors and explain its sentence, it need not explicitly
    reference § 3553 or discuss every factor on the record.                       United
    States v. Johnson, 
    445 F.3d 339
    , 345 (4th Cir. 2006).                        This is
    particularly the case when the court imposes a sentence within the
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    applicable guideline range.        
    Id.
       In determining whether there has
    been   an   adequate   explanation,      we    do   not   “evaluate      a   court's
    sentencing statements in a vacuum”; rather, the context surrounding
    a court's explanation “may imbue it with enough content for [the
    Court] to evaluate both whether the court considered the § 3553(a)
    factors and whether it did so properly.”                Montes-Pineda, 
    445 F.3d at 381
    .     However, “a district court’s explanation should provide
    some indication (1) that the court considered the § 3553(a) factors
    with respect to the particular defendant; and (2) that it has also
    considered the potentially meritorious arguments raised by both
    parties     about   sentencing.”      Montes-Pineda,            
    445 F.3d at 380
    (citations omitted). We find the record reflects that the district
    court here adequately and properly considered all of the sentencing
    factors and considered all the arguments raised by the parties. We
    therefore find Bostick's sentence was reasonable.
    Finally, we have reviewed Bostick’s pro se supplemental
    brief and find the claims therein without merit.
    Accordingly, we grant Bostick’s motion to file a pro se
    supplemental brief, and affirm the judgment of the district court.
    We   dispense   with   oral   argument        because     the    facts   and    legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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