United States v. Woods , 426 F. App'x 157 ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5025
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CALVIN GLENN WOODS, II,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry F. Floyd, District Judge.
(6:10-cr-00126-HFF-1)
Submitted: April 20, 2011 Decided: April 29, 2011
Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James B. Loggins, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William Jacob Watkins, Jr.,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Calvin Glenn Woods, II, appeals the twenty-four-month
sentence imposed following his guilty plea to three counts of
uttering counterfeit securities, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 513(a) (2006). On appeal, counsel filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there
are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether
Woods’s sentence was reasonable. Woods was advised of his right
to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he has not done so.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
The sole issue raised by counsel in the Anders brief
is whether the district court’s sentence was reasonable. In
reviewing a sentence, we must first ensure that the district
court did not commit any “significant procedural error,” such as
failing to properly calculate the applicable Guidelines range,
failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, or
failing to adequately explain the sentence. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The district court is not
required to “robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every
subsection.” United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th
Cir. 2006). However, the district court “must place on the
record an ‘individualized assessment’ based on the particular
facts of the case before it. This individualized assessment
need not be elaborate or lengthy, but it must provide a
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rationale tailored to the particular case at hand and adequate
to permit ‘meaningful appellate review.’” United States v.
Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall, 552
U.S. at 50) (internal footnote omitted).
We review Woods’s claim for abuse of discretion
because he properly preserved his claim of error in the district
court. See United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 578 (4th Cir.
2010) (“By drawing arguments from § 3553 for a sentence
different than the one ultimately imposed, an aggrieved party
sufficiently alerts the district court of its responsibility to
render an individualized explanation addressing those arguments,
and thus preserves its claim.”). Our review of the record leads
us to conclude that the district court did not commit reversible
procedural error in imposing Woods’s sentence.
We next consider the substantive reasonableness of the
sentence, “tak[ing] into account the totality of the
circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If the sentence imposed
is within the appropriate Guidelines range, we may consider it
presumptively reasonable. United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597
F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). The presumption may be rebutted
by a showing “that the sentence is unreasonable when measured
against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda,
445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted). On review, Woods’s within-Guidelines sentence is
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presumptively reasonable, and Woods has not rebutted that
presumption. Therefore, we conclude that the district court
committed no reversible substantive error in sentencing Woods.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Woods, in writing, of his right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Woods requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, counsel may
move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
Woods. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal conclusions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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