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 2011-05

United States v. Cabrera , 426 F. App'x 204 ( 2011 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4628
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SALVADOR SANTANA CABRERA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., District Judge. (1:09-cr-00323-WO-1)
Submitted:   April 20, 2011                   Decided:   May 2, 2011
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
George E. Crump, III, Rockingham, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Ripley E. Rand, United States Attorney, Michael F. Joseph,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A jury found Salvador Santana Cabrera 1 guilty of misuse
of     a   social    security        number        in    violation     of
    42 U.S.C. § 408
    (a)(7)(B)       (2006)       and   identity         theft   in   violation          of   18
U.S.C.      § 1028A(a)(1)         (2006).        Santana     appeals        the      district
court’s denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal under
Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.              Santana claims that he was convicted upon
insufficient evidence and that the Government’s theory of the
case       fails    to     meet     the     legal        elements      of
    42 U.S.C. § 408
    (a)(7)(B). 2         We affirm.
This court reviews a district court’s denial of a Rule
29 motion for a judgment of acquittal de novo.                        United States v.
Smith,
    451 F.3d 209
    ,     216     (4th    Cir.     2006).         A     defendant
challenging        the    sufficiency       of     the    evidence     faces         a   heavy
burden.      United States v. Beidler,
    110 F.3d 1064
    , 1067 (4th Cir.
1997).      The verdict of a jury must be sustained “if, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the
verdict is supported by ‘substantial evidence.’”                                Smith, 451
1
Although he was indicted under the name “Salvador Santana
Cabrera,” the record indicates that the defendant is known by
the surname of “Santana” and we will therefore refer to him as
such.
2
Because   Santana’s   conviction  under
    42 U.S.C. § 408
    (a)(7)(B) is necessary to sustain his conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), a reversal of the former would dictate a
reversal of the latter.
2
F.3d   at   216     (citations     omitted).           Substantial         evidence     is
“evidence    that    a    reasonable   finder         of    fact    could     accept    as
adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”               Id. (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).          An appellate court must be mindful that
“[t]he jury, not the reviewing court, weighs the credibility of
the    evidence     and    resolves    any      conflicts          in   the     evidence
presented.”       Beidler,
    110 F.3d at 1067
     (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).           “Reversal for insufficient evidence is
reserved for the rare case where the prosecution’s failure is
clear.”
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Viewing     the   evidence    in    the       light    most        favorable      to   the
prosecution, we conclude that substantial evidence sustains the
verdict below.
Santana’s      legal   argument       is       that    using    the    social
security number assigned to another person in the other person’s
true name does not violate
    42 U.S.C. § 408
    (a)(7)(B).                              We have
previously stated that “[t]he elements of that offense are that
the defendant (1) falsely represented a number to be her social
security number (2) with the intent to deceive another person
(3) for the purpose of obtaining something of value.”                              United
States v. Sparks,
    67 F.3d 1145
    , 1152 (4th Cir. 1995).
Under    the    Government’s       theory       of    the   case,     Santana
represented himself at a bank as Miguel Santiago, applied for a
3
loan naming Santiago as the personal guarantor, and furnished
Santiago’s       social   security     number         in   conjunction      with     the
application.        Thus,   Santana,       with      the   intent   to    deceive    the
bank, falsely represented that the social security number was
assigned to him (that is, his physical person), when in fact it
was assigned to Santiago, in order to obtain a loan.                                Such
conduct    satisfies      the    elements       of
    42 U.S.C. § 408
    (a)(7)(B).
See, e.g., United States v. Hines,
    472 F.3d 1038
    , 1039-40 (8th
Cir. 2007) (per curiam); United States v. Soape,
    169 F.3d 257
    ,
260-61, 269 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Teitloff,
    55 F.3d 391
     (8th Cir. 1995).
We      therefore      affirm       Santana’s        convictions.         We
dispense     with    oral       argument    because        the    facts    and     legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4