United States v. Mansanares ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5261
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOSE HERNANDEZ MANSANARES, a/k/a Jose Hernandez Manzanarez,
a/k/a Fabian Mansanares, a/k/a Jorge Fabian Manzanares
Hernandez,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, Chief District
Judge. (2:05-cr-00986-DCN-1)
Submitted: April 28, 2011 Decided: May 2, 2011
Before DAVIS, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Cameron J. Blazer, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. Peter Thomas
Phillips, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jose Hernandez Mansanares appeals the eighteen-month
sentence of imprisonment imposed by the district court upon
revocation of supervised release. The district court ordered
the sentence to run consecutive to a fifty-seven month sentence
imposed following Mansanares’s guilty plea to a separately
charged drug offense. On appeal, Mansanares’s counsel has filed
a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
stating that, in her opinion, there are no meritorious issues
for appeal. Counsel questions whether the eighteen-month
sentence is unreasonable, but concludes that the sentence is
reasonable because it is within the proscribed statutory range
and based on appropriate considerations. In his pro se
supplemental brief, Mansanares asserts that his sentence is
excessive. The Government declined to file a brief.
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory
range and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In determining whether a
sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first consider whether the
sentence imposed is unreasonable. Id. at 438. In making this
determination, we follow “the procedural and substantive
considerations that we employ in our review of original
sentences.” Id. at 438. In this inquiry, we take a more
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deferential posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise
of discretion than reasonableness review of Guidelines
sentences. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th
Cir. 2007). Only if we find the sentence procedurally or
substantively unreasonable, must we decide whether it is
“plainly” so. Id. at 657.
While a district court must consider Chapter Seven’s
policy statements and the statutory provisions applicable to
revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2006),
the district court need not robotically tick through every
subsection, and it has broad discretion to revoke the previous
sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory
maximum provided by § 3583(e)(3). Moulden, 478 F.3d at 656-57(4th Cir. 2007); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. Moreover, while a
district court must provide a statement of the reasons for the
sentence imposed, the court “need not be as detailed or specific
when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing
a post-conviction sentence.” United States v. Thompson, 595
F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). The eighteen-month sentence
imposed by the district court was within the advisory Guidelines
range and the prescribed statutory range. The district court
did not abuse its discretion in ordering the sentence to run
consecutive to the sentence imposed for Mansanares’s other
conviction, and the sentence is not unreasonable.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Mansanares in writing of
his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Mansanares requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Mansanares. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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