Camara v. Gonzales , 241 F. App'x 161 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-1007
MAIMUNA CAMARA,
Petitioner,
versus
ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals. (A97-1900668)
Submitted: June 27, 2007 Decided: July 30, 2007
Before MICHAEL and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Joshua A. Moses, JOSHUA MOSES & ASSOCIATES, Silver Spring,
Maryland, for Petitioner. Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney
General, Anthony W. Norwood, Senior Litigation Counsel, Wendy
Benner-Leon, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.,
for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Maimuna Camara, a native and citizen of the Gambia,
petitions for review an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“Board”) denying her applications for asylum, withholding from
removal, withholding under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”)
and denial of voluntary departure. Camara makes several challenges
against the immigration judge’s adverse credibility finding. She
also claims the immigration judge failed to review the record prior
to denying her application for voluntary departure. We deny the
petition for review.
The Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) authorizes
the Attorney General to confer asylum on any refugee. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a) (2000). The INA defines a refugee as a person unwilling
or unable to return to her native country “because of persecution
or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2000).
An applicant can establish refugee status based on past
persecution in her native country on account of a protected ground.
8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) (2006). Without regard to past
persecution, an alien can establish a well-founded fear of
persecution on a protected ground. Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d
182, 187 (4th Cir. 2004). An applicant has the burden of
demonstrating her eligibility for asylum. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a)
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(2006); Gandziami-Mickhou v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir.
2006).
Credibility findings are reviewed for substantial
evidence. A trier of fact who rejects an applicant’s testimony on
credibility grounds must offer specific, cogent reasons for doing
so. Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir. 1989). “Examples of
specific and cogent reasons include inconsistent statements,
contradictory evidence, and inherently improbable testimony
. . . .” Tewabe v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir. 2006)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We accord broad,
though not unlimited, deference to credibility findings supported
by substantial evidence. Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 367
(4th Cir. 2004). If the immigration judge’s adverse credibility
finding is based on speculation and conjecture rather than specific
and cogent reasoning, it is not supported by substantial evidence.
Tewabe, 446 F.3d at 538.
A determination regarding eligibility for asylum or
withholding of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Administrative findings
of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to decide to the contrary. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(b)(4)(B)
(West 2005). This Court will reverse the Board “only if the
evidence presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder
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could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” Rusu v.
INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325 n.14 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
We find the record does not compel a different result.
The immigration judge’s adverse credibility finding is supported by
substantial evidence. Because Camara failed to support her claim
that she was an opposition political activist or that she suffered
past persecution, there was no reason to grant her relief under the
CAT.
Furthermore, we lack jurisdiction to review any challenge
to the grant or denial of voluntary departure. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229c(f) (2000) (“No court shall have jurisdiction over an appeal
from denial of a request for an order of voluntary departure
. . . .”); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (2000) (“[N]o court shall
have jurisdiction to review any judgment regarding the granting of
relief under section . . . 1229c [the section governing voluntary
departure].”); see also Ngarurih, 371 F.3d at 193 (“Section 1229c
specifically precludes review of a denial of a request for
voluntary departure . . . . Likewise, the general judicial review
provision precludes review of orders granting voluntary
departure.”).
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
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are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
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