United States v. Williams , 203 F. App'x 493 ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4685
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
IDANA ASHA WILLIAMS, a/k/a Donna,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 05-4758
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
IDANA ASHA WILLIAMS, a/k/a Donna,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District
Judge. (CR-04-104)
Submitted: August 21, 2006 Decided: October 25, 2006
Before SHEDD and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and Richard L. VOORHEES,
United States District Judge for the Western District of North
Carolina, sitting by designation.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
William P. Robinson, Jr., Trevor J. Robinson, ASSOCIATED LAW OFFICE
OF ROBINSON, NEELEY & ANDERSON, Norfolk, Virginia, for
Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney,
Laura M. Everhart, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee/Cross-
Appellant.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
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PER CURIAM:
Idana Asha Williams was convicted of conspiracy to distribute
and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. A probation officer prepared a
presentence report, calculating Williams’ total offense level to be
30 and her criminal history category to be I. Although these
calculations established an advisory sentencing guideline range of
97-121 months, the district court varied downward and sentenced
Williams to a 180-day term of imprisonment.* Williams now appeals
her conviction, arguing that the district court erred by granting
the government’s motion in limine and excluding evidence concerning
assaultive behavior committed against her by her live-in boyfriend,
Andre Butler, who was a drug dealer. The government appeals the
sentence, arguing that it is unreasonable. For the following
reasons, we affirm the conviction, vacate the sentence, and remand
for resentencing.
I
Williams does not contest the sufficiency of the trial
evidence, which tended to establish the following. On February 12,
2004, law enforcement officers investigating drug activity in
Virginia Beach, Virginia, searched the trash at the residence of
*
Williams’ sentencing occurred after the Supreme Court decided
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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Andre Butler, who they suspected was a drug dealer. The officers
later determined that the residence was rented to Williams. Among
other things, the officers found a small amount of cocaine in the
trash.
Later that evening, law enforcement officers executed a search
warrant at the residence. Upon their entry, the officers found
Williams alone inside, and they observed in plain view on a kitchen
counter cocaine, scales, and cutting agents for cocaine. The
search ultimately yielded cocaine, crack cocaine, drug
paraphernalia, four firearms, and $5,646 in United States currency.
As the search progressed, Detective James Baker advised
Williams of her rights, and she agreed to speak with him. During
this interrogation, Williams stated that she had been living in the
residence for approximately two years, that Butler also lived
there, and that he paid the rent. Williams further stated that
Butler had been dealing cocaine from the time she began dating him
in 2001, that he kept cocaine in the residence, that she had seen
him convert cocaine into crack cocaine numerous times, that she had
driven him to some of his drug deals, and that she had advised him
not to deal drugs with certain people. Additionally, Williams also
stated that she had seen the guns inside the residence and had
moved them occasionally while cleaning.
Although Williams does not contest the sufficiency of this
evidence, she did deny at trial making these statements. Williams
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also testified that she was unaware of Butler’s drug trafficking
activities until a few hours before the execution of the search
warrant when Butler arrived at the townhouse and left drugs and
paraphernalia there. Williams further testified that Butler was
under a court order to have no contact with her and was in the
process of moving out.
II
Williams’ sole claim on appeal is that the district court
erred by excluding evidence concerning Butler’s alleged assaultive
behavior toward her. This evidence appears primarily to consist of
Williams’ testimony about an alleged assault by Butler and a
photograph of a hole in a wall of Williams’ residence which
corroborates that assault. Williams does not contend that this
evidence establishes duress. Rather, as she explains in her brief:
the district court’s ruling “unduly and inappropriately burdened
[her] ability to support her claim that there was no agreement
between herself and Andre Butler to engage in a drug conspiracy.
A person is not likely to engage in criminal conduct with a person
of whom she is afraid.” Brief of Appellant/Cross Appellee, at 7.
“Decisions regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence
are committed to the sound discretion of the district court and
will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.” United
States v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734, 744 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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Because Williams disavowed a claim of duress, it is questionable
whether her proffered evidence is relevant. Regardless, based on
our review of the record, we find that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by excluding this evidence. Accordingly, we
affirm the conviction.
III
The government argues in its cross appeal that Williams’
sentence is unreasonable. We agree.
In the wake of Booker, we have explained that a district court
must, when sentencing a criminal defendant, (1) properly calculate
the sentencing guideline range; (2) determine whether a sentence
within that range and within statutory limits serves the factors
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and, if not, select a sentence
that does serve those factors; (3) implement mandatory statutory
limitations; and (4) articulate the reasons for selecting the
particular sentence, especially explaining why a sentence outside
of the guideline range better serves the relevant sentencing
purposes set forth in § 3553(a). United States v. Green, 436 F.3d
449, 456 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2309 (2006). We
review a sentence for unreasonableness, and we will find a sentence
to be unreasonable if it is “based on an error in construing or
applying the Guidelines,” or if it “imposed outside the Guideline
range and the district court provides an inadequate statement of
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reasons or relies on improper factors in departing from the
Guidelines’ recommendation.” Green, 436 F.3d at 456-57. Finally,
“when the variance is a substantial one . . . we must more
carefully scrutinize the reasoning offered by the district court in
support of the sentence. The farther the court diverges from the
advisory guideline range, the more compelling the reasons for the
divergence must be.” United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 434
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2054 (2006).
As noted, the district court varied from the guideline range
of 97-121 months and sentenced Williams to six months. In
fashioning this sentence, the district court stated a number of
reasons which it felt justified such an extreme variance from the
guideline range. Among these reasons is the district court’s view
concerning the 100:1 guideline ratio between crack cocaine and
powder cocaine. Specifically, the district court stated:
[T]he guideline calculation, to the extent that any
cocaine is involved, contains a disparity between crack
and powder that is unacceptable, and the sentencing
commission has commented on how that disparity pushes up
the guideline range for any offense involving crack
cocaine.
J.A. 463-64.
After the district court sentenced Williams, we held in United
States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2006), petition for cert.
filed (No. 05-11659), that a district court is not authorized to
consider the sentencing disparity between crack cocaine and cocaine
powder in sentencing a defendant. Based on Eura, we hold that the
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district court erred in sentencing Williams. We therefore vacate
the sentence and remand for resentencing. In light of the extreme
variance made by the district court in its original sentence, we
instruct the district court on remand to resentence Williams in
accord with our post-Booker precedent, and we again note that the
“farther the court diverges from the advisory guideline range, the
more compelling the reasons for the divergence must be.” Moreland,
437 F.3d at 434.
IV
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Williams’ conviction, vacate
her sentence, and remand this case for resentencing. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
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