United States v. Kinlaw , 204 F. App'x 254 ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4328
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
RICHARD MONTEZ KINLAW,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, District
Judge. (2:01-cr-00010-PMD-8)
Submitted: September 29, 2006 Decided: October 26, 2006
Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Robert Haley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Carlton R. Bourne, Jr., Assistant
United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
In July 2001, Richard Montez Kinlaw pled guilty to drug-
related charges and received a forty-month sentence of
imprisonment, followed by four years supervised release. In 2005,
Kinlaw’s probation officer filed a petition to revoke Kinlaw’s
supervised release based on new criminal conduct and other
violations of the supervised released conditions. At his
revocation hearing, Kinlaw did not contest the allegations in the
petitions. The district court found that Kinlaw committed the
charged violations and revoked his supervised release. The court
sentenced Kinlaw to thirty months in prison, six months below the
statutory maximum.
On appeal, Kinlaw’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), stating that there
are no meritorious issues to raise on appeal, but contending that
the district court erred when it imposed a sentence outside the
range recommended by the Chapter 7 advisory policy statement.
Although informed of his right to do so, Kinlaw has not filed a pro
se brief. We affirm.
We recently held in United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433(4th Cir. 2006), that we review sentences imposed upon the
revocation of supervised release to determine whether the sentence
is “plainly unreasonable.” In this case, Kinlaw’s sentence was
within the applicable statutory maximum, the court considered the
- 2 -
Chapter 7 advisory guideline range of twelve to eighteen months,
and the court stated a proper basis for its decision to sentence
Kinlaw to thirty months in prison. See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
Specifically, the court noted the dangerous situation created when
Kinlaw attempted to resist arrest in the middle median of a busy
highway at night. The court balanced the gravity of this situation
with the manner in which Kinlaw admitted his guilt and claimed that
his life had been changed. Because Kinlaw’s sentence was neither
procedurally nor substantively unreasonable, we find that his
sentence is not plainly unreasonable.
As required by Anders, we have reviewed the entire record
and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s order revoking Kinlaw’s supervised
release and imposing a thirty-month sentence. This court requires
that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
If the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may
move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the
client. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
- 3 -
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
- 4 -