United States v. Blevins , 242 F. App'x 62 ( 2007 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 06-5123
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    CARROLL EDGAR BLEVINS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    No. 06-5124
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    CARROLL EDGAR BLEVINS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    No. 06-5125
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    CARROLL EDGAR BLEVINS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, Chief District
    Judge. (1:06-cr-00016-jpj; 1:95-cr-00030-jct; 1:96-cr-00009-jpj)
    Submitted: May 25, 2007                        Decided:   July 5, 2007
    Before NIEMEYER and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    David L. Harmon, Bristol, Virginia, for Appellant. John L.
    Brownlee, United States Attorney, Jennifer R. Bockhorst, Assistant
    United States Attorney, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    - 2 -
    PER CURIAM:
    Caroll Edgar Blevins pleaded guilty to two counts of
    distribution     of   methamphetamine     in   violation    of   21    U.S.C
    §§ 841(a)(1), 851 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006), and was sentenced to
    188 months of imprisonment.           (No. 06-5123).       At the time he
    committed the offenses, Blevins was serving two terms of supervised
    release for 1996 convictions.           Based on the district court’s
    finding that Blevins violated conditions of his release, the
    district court revoked Blevins’ supervised release and imposed
    concurrent sentences of twenty-four months (No. 06-5124), and
    fifty-one months (No. 06-5125).           On appeal, counsel filed an
    Anders1 brief, certifying that there are no meritorious issues for
    appeal, but raising two sentencing issues: (1) whether Blevins’
    1991 distribution conviction properly served as basis to classify
    him as a career offender, and (2) whether the court erred in
    denying Blevins’ motion for a downward departure.          Blevins has not
    filed a pro se brief although he has been advised of his right to
    do   so.    We   affirm   Blevins’    convictions,   supervised       release
    revocations, and sentences.
    In the Presentence Report (PSR), prepared for sentencing
    on the distribution charges, the probation officer classified
    Blevins as a career offender under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
    Manual (USSG) § 4B1.1 (2005).        Blevins’ career offender status was
    1
    Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967).
    - 3 -
    based on a 1991 conviction for distribution of cocaine and his 1996
    conviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine.               Based on
    a base offense level of thirty-four and a three-level adjustment
    for acceptance of responsibility under USSG § 3E1.1, Blevins’ total
    offense level was thirty-one.               With this offense level and a
    criminal history category of VI, Blevins’ advisory sentencing range
    was 188 to 235 months of imprisonment.
    At sentencing on the distribution counts, Blevins argued
    that    the    court   should      depart   from    the   advisory   sentencing
    guidelines range.        The   district denied the request and imposed a
    188-month sentence.        Also, upon its finding that Blevins violated
    the conditions of his supervised release, the court imposed an
    aggregate 51-month sentence, to be served consecutively to the
    sentence imposed on the distribution violations, for a total
    sentence of 239 months of imprisonment.
    Career Offender Status
    Pursuant to USSG § 4B1.1 (2005), a defendant is a career
    offender if “(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at
    the time the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction;
    (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a
    crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the
    defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a
    crime   of    violence    or   a   controlled      substance   offense.”   USSG
    § 4B1.1(a).       Blevins claims that the district court erred in
    - 4 -
    treating his 1991 conviction as a predicate offense for purposes of
    classifying him as a career offender because the interval between
    his August 6, 1991, guilty plea on the cocaine distribution charge
    and his August 16, 2006, guilty plea to the current charges, was
    greater than fifteen years.2   However, for the purpose of counting
    a defendant’s prior felony convictions under § 4B1.1 (career
    offender provision), the guidelines direct a sentencing court to
    look to the provisions of § 4A1.2.      See USSG § 4B1.2. comment
    (n.3).   Under USSG § 4A1.2(e)(1), a sentence of imprisonment
    exceeding one year and one month is counted for purposes of
    criminal history calculations if the prior sentence was imposed
    within fifteen years of the current offense or if the prior
    sentence “resulted in the defendant being incarcerated during any
    part of the fifteen-year period.”      In this case, Blevins was
    incarerated pursuant to the 1991 distribution conviction until
    September 24, 1993 and his present offenses occurred in October and
    December of 2005.    Therefore, because the sentence imposed on
    Blevins’ 1991 conviction extended into the fifteen-year period
    preceding the instant offense, the 1991 conviction properly served
    a basis for the career offender enhancement.
    2
    While Blevins uses his 2006 guilty plea date for purposes of
    calculating the fifteen-year window, USSG 4A1.2(e) refers to the
    “commencement of the instant offense.” In this case, the offenses
    occurred on October 25, 2005, and December 15, 2005.
    - 5 -
    Downward Departure
    Counsel also argues that the district court should have
    granted his motion for a downward departure based on the relatively
    small quantity of drugs involved in the offenses and also because
    application       of    the   enhancement     had    an     unwarranted      Draconian
    effect.3    This court lacks the authority to review the denial of a
    motion     for    a     downward   departure       unless    the    district        court
    mistakenly       believed     it   lacked    the    power    to    depart.      United
    States v. Cooper, 
    437 F.3d 324
    , 333 (3d Cir. 2006) (collecting
    cases from five circuits discussing rule post-Booker); United
    States v. Quinn, 
    359 F.3d 666
     , 682 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing United
    States v. Bayerle, 
    898 F.2d 28
    , 30 (4th Cir. 1990), and stating
    rule in this Circuit pre-Booker). Here, the district court did not
    express     any       doubt   about    its   ability        to    depart     from    the
    guideline—indeed, the court considered these very arguments as to
    why a downward departure was appropriate and denied the request.
    This claim is, therefore, unreviewable.
    In accordance with Anders, we have thoroughly examined
    the entire record for any potentially meritorious issues and have
    found none.            Accordingly, we affirm Blevins’ convictions and
    sentence.        This court requires that counsel inform Blevins, in
    writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United
    States for further review.            If Blevins requests that a petition be
    3
    In the absence of the career offender provisions, Blevins
    would have had an advisory guidelines range of eighteen to twenty-
    four months of imprisonment on the methamphetamine distribution
    conviction.
    - 6 -
    filed,   but   counsel   believes    that   such   a   petition   would   be
    frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
    withdraw from representation.       Counsel’s motion must state that a
    copy thereof was served on Blevins. We dispense with oral argument
    because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
    the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
    decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    - 7 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-5123, 06-5124, 06-5125

Citation Numbers: 242 F. App'x 62

Judges: Niemeyer, Traxler, Hamilton

Filed Date: 7/5/2007

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024