United States v. Bennette , 208 F. App'x 219 ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4898
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JOHN MICHAEL BENNETTE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (CR-05-4)
Submitted: October 31, 2006 Decided: December 6, 2006
Before TRAXLER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Devon L. Donahue,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. George E. B. Holding, Acting United States Attorney,
Anne M. Hayes, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Following a jury trial, John Michael Bennette was
convicted of possession of a firearm by a fugitive from justice, in
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 922(g)(1), 924 (West 2000 & Supp.
2006). The district court sentenced Bennette to forty-two months
in prison. Bennette timely appeals.
Bennette asserts on appeal that the district court erred
in denying his motions for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule
29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure because the evidence
was insufficient to support his conviction. We review the district
court’s decision to deny a motion for judgment of acquittal de
novo. United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 127 S. Ct. 197 (2006). Where, as here, the motion was
based on a claim of insufficient evidence, “[t]he verdict of a jury
must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view
most favorable to the Government, to support it.” Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). This court “ha[s] defined
‘substantial evidence,’ in the context of a criminal action, as
that evidence which ‘a reasonable finder of fact could accept as
adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Newsome, 322
F.3d 328, 333 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Burgos, 94
F.3d 849, 862-63 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)). In evaluating the
sufficiency of the evidence, the court considers circumstantial and
direct evidence, and allows the government the benefit of all
reasonable inferences from the facts proven to those sought to be
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established. United States v. Tresvant 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th
Cir. 1982).
Section 922(g)(2) prohibits “any person . . . who is a
fugitive from justice . . . [from] posess[ing] in or affecting
commerce . . . any firearm or ammunition.”1 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(2).
A “fugitive from justice” is defined under the statute as “any
person who has fled from any State to avoid prosecution for a
crime.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(15) (2000). In United States v.
Spillane, 913 F.2d 1079 (4th Cir. 1990), in the context of a
§ 922(g)(2) conviction, this court defined a “fugitive from
justice” as “[a]ny person who, knowing that charges are pending,
purposely (1) leaves the jurisdiction of prosecution and (2)
refuses to answer those charges by way of appearance before the
prosecuting tribunal.” Id. at 1081-82. Bennette argues that the
government failed to show that he deliberately left Maine knowing
there were charges pending against him.
Although this court has not directly addressed the issue,
other circuits have distinguished between a defendant’s
classification as a “fugitive,” which is necessary for a
§ 922(g)(2) conviction, and a defendant’s actual knowledge that he
was classified as a fugitive when he left the state where charges
were pending, which is not required for a § 922(g)(2) conviction.
See United States v. Ballentine, 4 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir. 1993)
(collecting cases). The Seventh Circuit explained in Ballentine,
1
The parties stipulated that the firearm at issue in this case
traveled in interstate commerce. (J.A. 238).
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“[F]ugitive” status . . . involves a defendant’s
knowledge that charges are pending against him. It is
not necessary for him to understand that he carries the
name or status of “fugitive.” Instead, a defendant need
only know that charges are pending against him, that he
has refused to answer to those charges and that he has
left the jurisdiction where the charges are pending.
Id.Here, the evidence presented at trial showed that at the
time he possessed the firearm in 2004, Bennette knew that there was
an outstanding warrant for his arrest in Maine for obtaining goods
by false pretenses. The government also presented the testimony of
Bennette’s friend who stated that Bennette had told him that when
Bennette was young, he left a company and created his own
“severance package” by charging “some stuff” from the supply house
and then leaving. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the government, we find that this evidence was sufficient to
show that Bennette knew he had committed a crime when he “created”
his “severance package” in Maine and thus it supported the jury’s
finding that Bennette left Maine with the knowledge that there were
charges pending against him in that state.2
Accordingly, we affirm Bennette’s conviction. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
2
Bennette does not assert on appeal that the government failed
to meet the second prong of Spillane; namely, that he refused to
answer the charges by appearing before the tribunal in Maine.
Further, he does not dispute that he possessed a firearm.
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