United States v. Miller , 243 F. App'x 769 ( 2007 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 06-5015
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    MITCHELL RAY MILLER,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    South Carolina, at Columbia.     Matthew J. Perry, Jr., Senior
    District Judge. (3:06-cr-00191-MJP)
    Submitted:   May 30, 2007                  Decided:       July 11, 2007
    Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge,      NIEMEYER,    Circuit    Judge,   and
    HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Langdon D. Long, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia, South
    Carolina, for Appellant.    Robert Claude Jendron, Jr., Assistant
    United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Mitchell Ray Miller appeals his conviction for possession
    of a firearm after having been convicted of a crime punishable by
    more than one year of imprisonment, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
    § 922(g) (2000).       On appeal, counsel filed an Anders* brief, in
    which he states there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but
    questions whether the district court erred in denying the motion to
    suppress the firearm discovered during the search of Miller’s car.
    Miller has filed a pro se supplemental brief in which he asserts
    that the district court erred in not finding his wife’s consent to
    search involuntary, erred in not suppressing the evidence because
    he was a suspect and therefore his consent was required, erred in
    failing to suppress his post-arrest statements, erred in failing to
    inform    him   of   his   right   to    address   the   jury,   and   erred   in
    instructing the jury on constructive possession.                  Miller also
    asserts that his arrest was unlawful, the evidence was insufficient
    to link him to the firearm, and that counsel was ineffective.                  We
    affirm.
    The factual findings underlying a motion to suppress are
    reviewed for clear error, while the legal determinations are
    reviewed de novo.      See Ornelas v. United States, 
    517 U.S. 690
    , 691
    (1996); United States v. Rusher, 
    966 F.2d 868
    , 873 (4th Cir. 1992).
    When a suppression motion has been denied, this court reviews the
    *
    Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967).
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    evidence in the light most favorable to the government. See United
    States v. Seidman, 
    156 F.3d 542
    , 547 (4th Cir. 1998).             Whether
    consent to a search is voluntary is a factual question determined
    under the totality of the circumstances and reviewed under the
    clearly erroneous standard.      Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
    412 U.S. 218
    , 248-49 (1973); United States v. Jones, 
    356 F.3d 529
    , 533 n.*
    (4th Cir. 2004).     The government has the burden of proving that
    consent was freely and voluntarily given. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at
    222.     “Written   consent   supports   a   finding   that   consent   was
    voluntary.”    United States v. Boone, 
    245 F.3d 352
    , 362 (4th Cir.
    2001).      This court gives due regard to the district court’s
    opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses and does not
    review credibility determinations.       See United States v. Lowe, 
    65 F.3d 1137
    , 1142 (4th Cir. 1995).    Our review of the record leads us
    to conclude that the district court correctly denied the motion to
    suppress.
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in
    this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.        We have
    considered the arguments raised in Miller’s pro se supplemental
    brief, and find them to be without merit.          We therefore affirm
    Miller’s conviction and sentence. This court requires that counsel
    inform Miller, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme
    Court of the United States for further review.         If Miller requests
    that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
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    would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave
    to withdraw from representation.   Counsel’s motion must state that
    a copy thereof was served on Miller.
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
    the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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