United States v. Daniel Chavez-Nevarez , 583 F. App'x 283 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4233
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DANIEL CHAVEZ-NEVAREZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., District Judge. (3:12-cr-00387-RJC-1)
Submitted: September 25, 2014 Decided: September 29, 2014
Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Rafael Rodriguez, Miami, Florida, for Appellant. William A.
Brafford, Steven R. Kaufman, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Charlotte, North Carolina; Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United
States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Daniel Chavez-Nevarez pled guilty without a plea
agreement to one count each of conspiracy to distribute at least
five kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846(2012), and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in
violation 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2012), and was sentenced to
168 months in prison. Chavez-Nevarez’s counsel filed a brief in
accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
stating that, in counsel’s view, there are no meritorious issues
for appeal, but questioning whether the district court complied
with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Chavez-Nevarez’s plea, and
whether it followed proper sentencing procedures in imposing
Chavez-Nevarez’s sentence. Chavez-Nevarez has not filed a pro
se supplemental brief, despite receiving notice of his right to
do so, and the Government has declined to file a responsive
brief. We affirm.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for review.
The record reveals that the district court fully complied with
the Rule 11 requirements during the plea colloquy, ensuring that
Chavez-Nevarez’s plea was knowing and voluntary, that he
understood the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty and
the sentence he faced, and that he committed the offenses to
which he was pleading guilty. Chavez-Nevarez also attested
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during the hearing that he fully understood the ramifications of
his guilty plea, and that no one made promises of leniency to
him if he pled guilty. Because no reversible error was
committed during the Rule 11 hearing, and since Chavez-Nevarez’s
plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by a sufficient
factual basis, we affirm Chavez-Nevarez’s convictions.
We also affirm Chavez-Nevarez’s sentence. We review a
sentence for reasonableness, applying an abuse of discretion
standard. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007);
see also United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330, 335 (4th Cir.
2009). This review requires consideration of both the
procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence.
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We first assess whether the district
court properly calculated the advisory Guidelines range,
considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012),
analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and
sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at49–51; United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575–76 (4th Cir.
2010). If the sentence is free of significant procedural error,
we review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence,
“examin[ing] the totality of the circumstances to see whether
the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that
the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in
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§ 3553(a).” United States v. Mendoza–Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216
(4th Cir. 2010).
In this case, the district court properly calculated
Chavez-Nevarez’s Guidelines range, treated the Guidelines as
advisory, and considered the applicable § 3553(a) factors.
Moreover, the record establishes that the district court based
Chavez-Nevarez’s sentence on its “individualized assessment” of
the facts of the case and imposed the sentence recommended by
the parties. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th
Cir. 2009) (emphasis omitted). Accordingly, we conclude that
Chavez-Nevarez’s sentence is procedurally reasonable. In the
absence of any evidence or argument suggesting that the sentence
is substantively unreasonable, we presume on appeal that Chavez-
Nevarez’s sentence is reasonable. See United States v. Susi,
674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Chavez-Nevarez, in writing, of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Chavez-Nevarez requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
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a copy thereof was served on Chavez-Nevarez. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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