United States v. Adonte Young , 591 F. App'x 214 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4371
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ADONTE YOUNG,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
Chief District Judge. (3:12-cr-00228-FDW-4)
Submitted: January 23, 2015 Decided: January 29, 2015
Before MOTZ and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Randolph M. Lee, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy
Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Adonte Young appeals his conviction and the 120-month
sentence imposed following his guilty plea, pursuant to a
written plea agreement, to discharging a firearm during a crime
of violence and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2012). Young’s counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating
that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning
whether Young’s guilty plea was supported by an adequate factual
basis. After careful review of the record, we affirm.
Prior to accepting a guilty plea, the plea court must
conduct a colloquy in which it informs the defendant of, and
determines he understands, the nature of the charge to which he
is pleading guilty, any mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum
possible penalty he faces, and the various rights he is
relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1);
United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991).
The district court also must ensure that the defendant’s plea is
voluntary; did not result from force, threats, or promises not
contained in the plea agreement; and is supported by an
independent factual basis. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), (b)(3);
DeFusco, 949 F.2d at 119-20. Because Young did not move to
withdraw his guilty plea in the district court or otherwise
preserve any allegation of Rule 11 error, the plea colloquy is
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reviewed for plain error. United States v. General, 278 F.3d
389, 393 (4th Cir. 2002).
The magistrate judge conducted a thorough plea
colloquy, satisfying the requirements of Rule 11 and ensuring
that Young’s plea was knowingly and voluntary. See DeFusco, 949
F.2d at 116. Counsel questions, however, whether Young’s guilty
plea was supported by an adequate and independent factual basis.
The court possesses wide discretion in determining the factual
basis and may rely on anything appearing in the record. United
States v. Ketchum, 550 F.3d 363, 366-67 (4th Cir. 2008). The
court need only be “subjectively satisfied” that the factual
basis is sufficient to establish each element of the offense.
Id. at 366. “The district court must assure itself simply that
the conduct to which the defendant admits is in fact an offense
under the statutory provision under which he is pleading
guilty.” United States v. Carr, 271 F.3d 172, 178-79 n.6 (4th
Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We have reviewed the record in accordance with Anders
and discern no plain error. To establish the aiding and
abetting of a § 924(c) violation, the Government “makes its case
by proving that the defendant actively participated in the
underlying . . . violent crime with advance knowledge that a
confederate would use or carry a gun during the crime’s
commission.” Rosemund v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1243
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(2014); see also United States v. Newman, 755 F.3d 543, 546 (7th
Cir. 2014) (“[A] person aids or abets a firearms crime when he
participates in joint criminal activity, seeks to promote its
objective, and knows that a confederate has a gun, in time to do
something with that knowledge — most notably, opt to walk away.”
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). Here, Young
and a codefendant entered a bank, demanded money from a teller
at gunpoint, received almost $10,000 in cash, and fired two
rounds as they departed. Although he denied firing the shots,
Young admitted he gave the codefendant the gun. Additionally,
Young’s DNA was found on the firearm when it was recovered
following the robbery. The district court thus did not err in
finding a factual basis for the offense.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the
presentence report and the sentencing transcript and have found
no potentially meritorious issues. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel
inform Young, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme
Court of the United States for further review. If Young
requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Young.
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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the material
before this court and argument will not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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