United States v. Schnippel , 371 F. App'x 418 ( 2010 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 09-4710
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    SKYLAR MARTI SCHNIPPEL,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Alexandria.     Leonie M. Brinkema,
    District Judge. (1:09-cr-00072-LMB-1)
    Submitted:   February 25, 2010            Decided:   March 25, 2010
    Before KING and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
    per curiam opinion.
    Thomas M. Dawson, Leavenworth, Kansas, for Appellant.     Neil H.
    MacBride, United States Attorney, Daniel J. Grooms, Assistant
    United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    After    a     bench    trial,        Skylar      Marti    Schnippel         was
    convicted of conspiracy to distribute heroin, the use of which
    resulted in death and serious bodily injury, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1),           (b)(1)(A)          and   846    (2006)       (Count       1),
    possession with intent to distribute heroin resulting in death,
    in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (Count 2), and
    obstruction     of    justice,       in     violation     of    
    18 U.S.C. § 1503
    (a)
    (2006) (Count 4).          The judgment reflects that Schnippel also was
    convicted     of     distribution          of   heroin    resulting      in     death,      in
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (Count 3).                                    On
    appeal, Schnippel argues that the evidence was insufficient to
    show his involvement in the conspiracy and his distribution of
    heroin resulting in serious bodily injury and death to another.
    He also claims the twenty-year minimum statutory sentence for
    the drug convictions is unconstitutional in light of Spears v.
    United   States,       
    129 S. Ct. 840
         (2009);     Kimbrough       v.    United
    States, 
    552 U.S. 85
     (2007); and United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005).           Finding no error, we affirm the convictions.
    We also find no merit to the claim that the minimum statutory
    sentence is unconstitutional.                   However, because the judgment is
    inconsistent with the oral findings made at the conclusion of
    the   bench    trial,      we    vacate     the     sentence     and    remand       for   the
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    limited purpose of having the district court enter a revised
    judgment that reflects the oral findings.
    When    a    defendant     challenges         the    sufficiency         of    the
    evidence, this court considers whether the evidence, when viewed
    in the light most favorable to the Government, was sufficient
    for   a   rational         trier    of    fact     to     have     found    the       essential
    elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.                                     Glasser v.
    United States, 
    315 U.S. 60
    , 80 (1942); United States v. Stewart,
    
    256 F.3d 231
    , 250 (4th Cir. 2001).                           If substantial evidence
    exists    to    support      a     verdict,    the      verdict     must     be      sustained.
    Glasser,       
    315 U.S. at 80
    .       This      court    does      not    review      the
    credibility of witnesses and assumes the factfinder resolved all
    contradictions         in    the    testimony        in    favor    of     the    Government.
    United States v. Sun, 
    278 F.3d 302
    , 313 (4th Cir. 2002).                                  “[A]n
    appellate       court’s      reversal       of     a      conviction       on     grounds      of
    insufficient         evidence      should     be     confined      to    cases       where    the
    prosecution’s failure is clear.”                       United States v. Jones, 
    735 F.2d 785
    , 791 (4th Cir. 1984) (citation and internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    Under 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(A), if it is found that
    death or serious bodily injury resulted from the use of the
    heroin during the course of the conspiracy, the defendant is
    subjected       to    a    twenty-year      minimum        sentence.            In    order    to
    establish beyond a reasonable doubt the final element of the
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    offense, the Government must show that the victim’s use of the
    heroin received from Schnippel was a but for cause of her death.
    See   United     States    v.    Hatfield,        
    591 F.3d 945
    ,    948    (7th     Cir.
    2010).     It is not necessary to show that the serious injury or
    death be foreseeable to the defendant.                             
    Id.
            If a defendant
    supplies the drugs the use of which results in the victim’s
    death, then the element is proven and the defendant is subject
    to an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence.                             See United States v.
    De La Cruz, 
    514 F.3d 121
    , 137 (1st Cir. 2008).
    We    find     the    evidence        is    more           than       sufficient    to
    establish that Schnippel’s involvement in the drug conspiracy on
    March 4, 2008, led to the victim dying of a heroin overdose.                                    He
    was actively involved in procuring the heroin and making sure it
    got into the victim’s hands the night she died.
    We further find Schnippel’s sentencing argument to be
    without    merit.         The    Supreme      Court         held        in    Kimbrough        that
    “sentencing      courts     remain       bound         by     the       mandatory         minimum
    sentences      prescribed       [by   the    Anti-Drug         Abuse          Act    of   1986].”
    Kimbrough, 
    552 U.S. at 107
    .                  Other circuits have held that,
    after Kimbrough, district courts are generally not authorized to
    sentence    a    defendant       below      the    statutory             minimum.          United
    States v. Harris, 
    531 F.3d 507
    , 516 (7th Cir. 2008) (“because
    Harris’s sentence of 240 months reflects the statutory mandatory
    minimum,    there    is     no    need      to     remand          .     .    .     pursuant     to
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    Kimbrough”); United States v. Black, 
    523 F.3d 892
    , 892-93 (8th
    Cir. 2008) (“Kimbrough . . . does not authorize district courts
    to sentence below the Congressionally-mandated statutory minimum
    sentences.”).
    However,         because         the     judgment       of      conviction     is
    inconsistent with the oral findings made at the conclusion of
    the   bench      trial,       we     vacate     the    judgment       and   remand    for    the
    limited purpose of having the district court enter a revised
    judgment that reflects the oral findings.                             At the close of the
    bench trial, the district court specifically declined to rule on
    Count Three, finding it should merge with Count Two, of which
    Schnippel was found by the court to be guilty.                              The court stated
    “there’s       no     sense     in      finding       the    defendant      guilty   of     both
    counts.        I’m going to find him guilty of Count 2 . . . .                                 I
    think     that      that   is      more    than       sufficient.”          (J.A.    at   441).
    Subsequently, the court stated “in my view, [Counts] 2 and 3
    should merge so that the final judgment order would indicate
    conspiracy, Count 1, and the conviction on Count 2.”                                 (J.A. at
    442).     The judgment indicates Schnippel was guilty of Counts 1,
    2   and   3,     as    well     as      Count    4.         Because   the    district     court
    specifically did not find Schnippel guilty of Count 3, on remand
    the   judgment        should       be    revised       to    reflect     the    court’s     oral
    findings in this regard.
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    At the conclusion of the bench trial, the district
    court also found beyond a reasonable doubt that Schnippel was
    responsible for 1000 grams, or one kilogram, of heroin.                          The
    judgment, however, indicates Schnippel was guilty of conspiracy
    to distribute 100 grams of heroin, the use of which resulted in
    death   and    serious     bodily    injury,     in   violation    of    
    21 U.S.C. §§ 846
     and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A).                 A finding of 100 grams of
    heroin exposes a defendant to being sentenced under 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(B).       On remand, this typographical error should be
    corrected      to   show     Schnippel     was    guilty   of     conspiracy      to
    distribute 1000 grams of heroin.
    Accordingly, we affirm the convictions and vacate the
    sentence      and   remand   for    the   limited     purpose     of    having   the
    district court enter a revised judgment that reflects the oral
    findings made at the conclusion of the bench trial.                     We dispense
    with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
    adequately     presented      in    the   materials    before     the    court   and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED IN PART,
    VACATED IN PART,
    AND REMANDED
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