United States v. Jones , 367 F. App'x 482 ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4173
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TRAVIS DELL JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, Chief
District Judge. (1:08-cr-00040-JPJ-1)
Submitted: February 2, 2010 Decided: February 26, 2010
Before MICHAEL, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Paul G. Beers, GLENN, FELDMANN, DARBY & GOODLATTE, Roanoke,
Virginia, for Appellant. Julia C. Dudley, United States
Attorney, Zachary T. Lee, Assistant United States Attorney,
Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Travis Dell Jones was convicted after a jury trial of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribute
cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). The
district court sentenced Jones to 156 months of imprisonment and
Jones now appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.
Jones first argues that the district court erred in
dismissing the first indictment without prejudice, rather than
with prejudice, after federal authorities violated the
anti-shuttling provision of the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers (“IAD”), 18 U.S.C. app. 2 (2006). When a district
court has dismissed an indictment for violation of the IAD, an
appellate court reviews the district court‟s legal conclusions
de novo, factual findings for clear error, and the ultimate
decision for abuse of discretion. United States v. Kelley, 402
F.3d 39, 41 (1st Cir. 2005).
The IAD “is a compact entered into by [forty-eight]
States, the United States, and the District of Columbia to
establish procedures for resolution of one State‟s outstanding
charges against a prisoner of another State.” New York v. Hill,
528 U.S. 110, 111 (2000) (citation omitted); see 18 U.S.C. app.
2, § 2. Moreover, because the IAD is “a congressionally
sanctioned interstate compact within the Compact Clause of the
United States Constitution, art. I, § 10, cl. 3, the IAD is a
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federal law subject to federal construction.” Hill, 528 U.S. at
111 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Pursuant
to § 7, when the United States entered into the agreement, it
reserved the right to alter, amend, or repeal the act by which
the IAD was enacted as federal law. 18 U.S.C. app. 2, § 7.
Under the anti-shuttling provision of the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”), a receiving state is not to
return a prisoner to the custody of the sending state until the
charges lodged by the receiving state have been fully resolved.
See 18 U.S.C. app. 2, § 2. Except as described below, the
compact further provides that if the charges are not disposed of
before a prisoner is returned to the sending state, the court
must dismiss the indictment with prejudice. Id. However, after
entering into the IAD on behalf of the United States and the
District of Columbia, Congress amended the agreement, as
authorized by § 7, by adding § 9, which allows a district court
to dismiss an indictment with or without prejudice when the
United States is the receiving state. 18 U.S.C. app. 2, § 9.
Here, there is no dispute that the Government violated the
anti-shuttling provision of the IAD when it returned Jones to
state custody prior to his trial on this charge.
Jones argues that §§ 7 and 9 of the federal version of
the IAD are unconstitutional because Congress has no authority
to amend or repeal an interstate compact after it has consented
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to the compact‟s creation. We have previously held in Bush v.
Muncy, 659 F.2d 402, 411-12 & n.5 (4th Cir. 1981), however, that
while the United States is a party to the agreement, it is not a
“party” to the constitutional compact. Therefore, while the
states that are parties to the constitutional compact may not
fundamentally alter or amend the compact through state
legislation by reason of the Supremacy Clause, there is no such
restriction on the United States. See Bush, 659 F.3d at 411-12
and n.5 (as constitutional compact is federal law, states may
not amend compact because of Supremacy Clause); U.S. Const. art.
VI (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme
law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound
thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to
the contrary notwithstanding.”). We conclude, therefore, that
the district court‟s determination that §§ 7 and 9 of the
federal version of the IAD are constitutional was not error.
Jones next argues that the district court nonetheless
should have dismissed the first indictment with prejudice. We
have reviewed the record, however, and conclude that the
district court properly and thoroughly weighed the relevant
considerations and did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
the first indictment without prejudice.
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Jones also challenges the district court‟s denial of
his motion to dismiss the second indictment for lack of
jurisdiction because Jones had filed a notice of appeal of the
dismissal of the first indictment. However, while the filing of
a notice of appeal “confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals
and divests the district court of control over those aspects of
the case involved in the appeal[,]” Griggs v. Provident Consumer
Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (citation omitted), the
district court does not lose jurisdiction when the litigant
takes an appeal from an unappealable order. Id. (citing Ruby v.
Sec‟y of United States Navy, 365 F.2d 385, 389 (9th Cir. 1996)
(en banc)). The district court‟s dismissal of the first
indictment without prejudice was not a final order, nor a
collateral order that could be immediately appealed by a
defendant, and this court ultimately dismissed Jones‟ appeal for
lack of jurisdiction. Therefore, the filing of the notice of
appeal did not divest the district court of jurisdiction over
this case.
Jones next challenges the district court‟s denial of
his motion to suppress statements he made to state and federal
authorities during a meeting set up by his counsel while he was
in jail awaiting trial on state charges. “In reviewing a
district court‟s ruling on a motion to suppress, [this court]
review[s] the court‟s factual findings for clear error, and its
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legal conclusions de novo.” United States v. Cain, 524 F.3d
477, 481 (4th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). When the district
court denies a defendant‟s suppression motion, we construe “the
evidence in the light most favorable to the [G]overnment.”
United States v. Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2005)
(citation omitted).
Jones argues that the statements were inadmissible
because he was not informed of his rights pursuant to Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), before being questioned by law
enforcement officials. Statements obtained from a defendant
during custodial interrogation are presumptively compelled in
violation of the Fifth Amendment, unless the government shows
that law enforcement officers adequately informed the defendant
of his Miranda rights and obtained a wavier of those rights.
United States v. Cardwell, 433 F.3d 378, 388-89 (4th Cir. 2005).
To determine whether a defendant was in custody for purposes of
Miranda where the defendant is already incarcerated, the court
must determine whether there is “an added imposition on his
freedom of movement.” United States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970,
973 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424,
428 (9th Cir. 1978)). In doing so, the district court must
consider “whether the inmate was subjected to more than the
usual restraint on a prisoner‟s liberty to depart.” Conley, 779
F.2d at 973.
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In determining whether an inmate was in custody during
an interrogation, the district court should look to “the
language used to summon the individual, the physical
surroundings of the interrogation, the extent to which he is
confronted with evidence of his guilt, and the additional
pressure exerted on him . . . .” Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 428.
Having thoroughly reviewed the record and the relevant legal
authorities, we conclude that the district court did not err in
finding that Jones was not in custody for purposes of Miranda
when he made the incriminating statements.
Jones also argues that his statements were
inadmissible because they were involuntary. To be admissible, a
defendant‟s statements to law enforcement must be voluntary
under the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Braxton, 112 F.3d
777, 780 (4th Cir. 1997). The test to determine the
voluntariness of a confession “is whether the confession was
extracted by any sort of threats or violence, [or] obtained by
any direct or implied promises, however slight, [or] by the
exertion of any improper influence.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). Moreover, “„coercive police
activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a
confession is not „voluntary‟ within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause.” Id. (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157(1986)). To determine whether police activity was coercive, the
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court must ask “whether the defendant‟s will has been overborne
or his capacity for self-determination critically impaired.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This
determination requires a consideration of “the totality of the
circumstances, including the characteristics of the defendant,
the setting of the interview, and the details of the
interrogation.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
We review a district court‟s determination regarding
voluntariness de novo but accept the district court‟s findings
on the circumstances surrounding a confession absent clear
error. Id. at 781. Here, we have thoroughly reviewed the
record and conclude that there is no evidence of coercive police
activity demonstrating that Jones‟ will was overcome.
Critically, Jones and his counsel actually initiated the meeting
at which the statements were made, Jones‟ counsel was present,
the interview took place in the prison library, Jones was not in
restraints, and the questioning lasted no longer than thirty
minutes. Accordingly, we find that Jones‟ statements were
voluntary and admissible.
Jones next argues that there was insufficient evidence
to demonstrate that he was a member of the conspiracy. We
review a district court‟s decision to deny a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29
motion for a judgment of acquittal de novo and the denial of a
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Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 motion for a new trial for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir.
2006). A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
faces a heavy burden. United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064,
1067 (4th Cir. 1997). The verdict of a jury must be sustained
“if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, the verdict is supported by „substantial
evidence.‟” Smith, 451 F.3d at 216 (citations omitted).
Substantial evidence is “evidence that a reasonable finder of
fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a
conclusion of a defendant‟s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Furthermore, “[t]he jury, not the reviewing court, weighs the
credibility of the evidence and resolves any conflicts in the
evidence presented.” Beidler, 110 F.3d at 1067 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “Reversal for
insufficient evidence is reserved for the rare case where the
prosecution‟s failure is clear.” Id. (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
In order to prove conspiracy to distribute and possess
with intent to distribute crack cocaine, the Government was
required to establish that: “(1) an agreement to [distribute
and] possess cocaine [base] with intent to distribute existed
between two or more persons, (2) the defendant knew of the
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conspiracy, and (3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily
became a part of the conspiracy.” United States v. Burgos, 94
F.3d 849, 857 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (citations omitted).
The Government may meet its burden of proof “wholly by
circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 858. We have reviewed the
evidence in this case and conclude that the Government produced
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that
Jones was a member of the conspiracy.
Finally, Jones challenges the district court‟s denial
of his proposed jury instruction on a buyer-seller relationship.
“„The decision to give or not to give a jury instruction is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.‟” United States v.
Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 474 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting United
States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 398 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc)).
Furthermore, “„[w]e review a jury instruction to determine
whether, taken as a whole, the instruction fairly states the
controlling law.‟” Id. (quoting Moye, 454 F.3d at 398). If
this court determines that the district court erred in refusing
an instruction, such error “warrant[s] reversal of the
conviction only if the error is prejudicial based on a review of
the record as a whole.” Moye, 454 F.3d at 399 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Jones requested the court instruct the jury that
evidence of a buyer-seller relationship alone is insufficient to
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support a conspiracy conviction, even if the purchases were made
with the intent to resell the narcotics. Having reviewed the
relevant legal authorities, we conclude that the district court
did not err in refusing to give this instruction. Further,
based on the record as a whole, even if we assume the
instruction should have been given, Jones has failed to
demonstrate he suffered prejudice as a result.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid in the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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