United States v. Bethea ( 2010 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 09-5060
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    ALFRED PAIGE BETHEA, a/k/a Alfred Paige Lucas,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
    (4:08-cr-00377-RBH-1)
    Submitted:   February 25, 2010            Decided:   March 11, 2010
    Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
    opinion.
    Michael A. Meetze, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Florence,
    South Carolina, for Appellant.     Rose Mary Sheppard Parham,
    Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for
    Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Pursuant to a plea agreement, Alfred Paige Bethea pled
    guilty       to        possession      of    a    firearm      and     ammunition         after
    previously having been convicted of a felony, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1) (2006).                   The parties stipulated in the plea
    agreement to a twenty-four-month sentence.                           See Fed. R. Crim. P.
    11(c)(1)(C).             The district court accepted the plea agreement
    and,       therefore,         was    bound   to   sentence      Bethea    to    twenty-four
    months, which it did.
    On    appeal,      Bethea’s     counsel      has    filed    a       brief   in
    accordance         with       Anders    v.   California,       
    386 U.S. 738
          (1967),
    stating that, in his view, there are no meritorious issues for
    appeal in light of Bethea’s waiver of appellate rights. 1                               Counsel
    questions, however, whether the district court fully complied
    with       Rule    11    of    the    Federal     Rules   of    Criminal       Procedure       in
    accepting          Bethea’s         guilty   plea.        Bethea       filed       a    pro    se
    supplemental brief. 2               We affirm in part and dismiss in part.
    1
    Because the Government has not asserted the waiver on
    appeal, we will conduct our review pursuant to Anders.     United
    States v. Poindexter, 
    492 F.3d 263
    , 271 (4th Cir. 2007); see
    United States v. Blick, 
    408 F.3d 162
    , 168 (4th Cir. 2005).
    2
    Bethea notes in his pro se brief that state charges had
    been dismissed against him before the federal charges were
    filed.   However, under the concept of dual sovereignty, state
    prosecution does not bar subsequent federal prosecution of the
    same person for the same act.    United States v. Iaquinta, 
    674 F.2d 260
    , 264 & n.9 (4th Cir. 1982). To the extent Bethea also
    (Continued)
    2
    Our    review        of       the      record      on     appeal       leads    us    to
    conclude       that       the      district           court      fully     complied      with       the
    mandates of Rule 11 in accepting Bethea’s plea.                                      Moreover, the
    district court ensured that Bethea’s guilty plea was knowing and
    voluntary      and     supported         by       a    sufficient        factual      basis.        See
    United States v. DeFusco, 
    949 F.2d 114
    , 116, 119-20 (4th Cir.
    1991).       We therefore affirm Bethea’s conviction.
    With regard to Bethea’s sentence, we find that we do
    not have jurisdiction over this portion of the appeal.                                        Section
    3742(c),       Title       18,     of     the         United      States       Code    limits       the
    circumstances under which a defendant may appeal a sentence to
    which    he    stipulated          in    a    Rule         11(c)(1)(C)        plea    agreement      to
    claims that “his sentence was imposed in violation of law [or]
    was   imposed        as   a     result       of       an   incorrect      application         of    the
    sentencing guidelines[.]”                     United States v. Sanchez, 
    146 F.3d 796
    , 797 & n.1 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Littlefield,
    
    105 F.3d 527
    , 527-28 (9th Cir. 1997).
    Here, Bethea’s sentence was not imposed in violation
    of    law.      His       twenty-four-month                sentence      is    well     within      the
    maximum       sentence        of    ten       years         of   imprisonment          provided      by
    questions whether the district court received all of his
    recommendation letters at sentencing, it appears that the court
    received the correspondence.
    3
    
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (a)(2) (2006).       Nor is his sentence a result of
    an incorrect application of the guidelines.           A sentence imposed
    pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement is contractual and
    not based upon the guidelines.      United States v. Cieslowski, 
    410 F.3d 353
    , 364 (7th Cir. 2005); Littlefield, 
    105 F.3d at 528
    .
    Because § 3742(c) bars review of a sentence imposed pursuant to
    a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement and none of the exceptions
    applies, we dismiss the appeal of Bethea’s sentence.
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
    record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
    appeal.   We   therefore   affirm   the   conviction    and   dismiss   the
    appeal of the sentence.    This court requires that counsel inform
    his client, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme
    Court of the United States for further review.            If the client
    requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
    such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
    this court for leave to withdraw from representation.           Counsel’s
    motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the client.
    We dispense with oral argument because          the     facts and legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED IN PART;
    DISMISSED IN PART
    4