United States v. Akinmukomi ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4557
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
AMBROSE AKINMUKOMI,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior
District Judge. (1:08-cr-00487-CMH-1)
Submitted: February 23, 2010 Decided: March 12, 2010
Before GREGORY and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Kevin R. Brehm,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, Research
and Writing Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant.
Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Jenny C. Ellickson,
Special Assistant United States Attorney, Gene Rossi, Assistant
United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Ambrose Akinmukomi of bulk cash
smuggling, in violation of 31 U.S.C.A. § 5332 (2006 & West Supp.
2009), and knowingly making a false statement to a government
agent, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006). The district
court sentenced Akinmukomi to two years of probation and ordered
that he forfeit the $15,561 involved in the offense, and
Akinmukomi now appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.
Akinmukomi first challenges the district court’s order
denying his motion to suppress statements he made to United
States Customs and Border Protection agents. “In reviewing a
district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we review the
court’s factual findings for clear error, and its legal
conclusions de novo.” United States v. Cain, 524 F.3d 477, 481
(4th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). When the district court
denies a defendant’s suppression motion, we construe “the
evidence in the light most favorable to the [G]overnment.”
United States v. Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2005)
(citation omitted).
Akinmukomi argues that the district court should have
suppressed the statements he made because he was subjected to
custodial interrogation without being informed of his rights
pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Statements
obtained from a defendant during custodial interrogation are
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presumptively compelled in violation of the Fifth Amendment,
unless the Government shows that law enforcement officers
adequately informed the defendant of his Miranda rights and
obtained a waiver of those rights. United States v. Cardwell,
433 F.3d 378, 388-89 (4th Cir. 2005). To determine whether a
defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda, courts
determine “first, what were the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a
reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to
terminate the interrogation and leave.” Thompson v. Keohane,
516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).
We have reviewed the record and find that a reasonable
person in Akinmukomi’s position would not have felt that his
freedom of action was limited to a degree associated with a
formal arrest. See United States v. Colonna, 511 F.3d 431, 435
(4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Accordingly, we conclude that Akinmukomi was not in custody at
the time he made the statements and, therefore, the agents were
not required to inform Akinmukomi of his Miranda rights. Thus,
the district court did not err in denying Akinmukomi’s
suppression motion.
Akinmukomi next challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to convict him of both counts. This court reviews a
district court’s decision to deny a Rule 29 motion for a
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judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d
209, 216 (4th Cir. 2006). A defendant challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence faces a heavy burden. United
States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997). The
verdict of a jury must be sustained “if, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, the verdict is
supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Smith, 451 F.3d at 216(citations omitted). Substantial evidence is “evidence that a
reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and
sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Furthermore, “[t]he jury, not the reviewing court,
weighs the credibility of the evidence and resolves any
conflicts in the evidence presented.” Beidler, 110 F.3d at 1067(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Reversal for
insufficient evidence is reserved for the rare case where the
prosecution’s failure is clear.” Id. (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
Akinmukomi argues that there was insufficient evidence
to demonstrate that he knowingly, and with the intent to evade
reporting requirements, attempted to smuggle currency, in
violation of § 5332(a). We have thoroughly reviewed the record,
however, and conclude that the Government provided substantial
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evidence from which the jury could conclude that Akinmukomi
acted with the requisite intent and state of mind.
To establish a violation of § 1001(a)(2), the
Government must demonstrate that “(1) the defendant made a false
statement to a governmental agency . . . , (2) the defendant
acted ‘knowingly and willfully,’ and (3) the false statement
. . . was material to a matter within the jurisdiction of the
agency.” United States v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d 1087, 1095
(4th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). Akinmukomi argues that the
Government failed to prove that he acted knowingly and willfully
when he made the materially false statement to the government
agents. Our review of the record, however, leads us to conclude
that there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate that
Akinmukomi made the false statement knowingly and willfully.
Finally, Akinmukomi challenges the district court’s
order that he forfeit the entire amount involved in the offense.
Section 5332(b)(2) provides that when a defendant is convicted
of violating § 5332(a), the district court “shall order that the
defendant forfeit to the United States, any property, real or
personal, involved in the offense, and any property traceable to
such property.” 31 U.S.C.A. § 5332(b)(2). However, “[t]he
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
[G]overnment from imposing excessive fines as punishment.”
Korangy v. U.S. F.D.A., 498 F.3d 272, 277 (4th Cir. 2007).
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“This court considers de novo whether a forfeiture is a
constitutionally excessive fine.” United States v. Bollin, 264
F.3d 391, 417 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v.
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336-37 (1998)).
A forfeiture violates the Eighth Amendment “if it is
grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the defendant’s
offense.” Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334. In determining the
proportionality of a forfeiture, the court should consider “the
nature and extent of the criminal activity, its relation to
other crimes, its penalties, and the harm it caused.” Bollin,
264 F.3d at 417 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). We have carefully reviewed the record and the
relevant legal authorities and conclude that the district
court’s forfeiture order did not violate the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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