Surrendra Mangru v. Eric Holder, Jr. , 592 F. App'x 209 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1691
SURRENDRA JAI PRAKASH LALL MANGRU, a/k/a Jay Mangru,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: January 13, 2015 Decided: February 5, 2015
Before NIEMEYER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Randall L. Johnson, JOHNSON & ASSOCIATES, P.C., Arlington,
Virginia, for Petitioner. Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant
Attorney General, Anthony Payne, Senior Litigation Counsel,
Jennifer Paisner Williams, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of
Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Surrendra Jai Prakash Lall Mangru, a native of Guyana
and a citizen of Canada, petitions for review of an order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing his appeal
from the immigration judge’s decision denying Mangru’s request
to terminate proceedings and denying his application for
adjustment of status.
We review legal issues de novo, “affording appropriate
deference to the [Board]’s interpretation of the INA
[Immigration and Nationality Act] and any attendant
regulations.” Li Fang Lin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 685, 691-92 (4th
Cir. 2008). Administrative findings of fact are conclusive
unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude
to the contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012). We defer to
the Board’s factual findings under the substantial evidence
rule. Anim v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 243, 252 (4th Cir. 2008).
Upon review, we agree with the Board that Mangru was
admitted to the United States on February 17, 2006, and was
properly found removable as an alien who, at the time of entry,
was inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(6)(E)(i), codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i) (2012). 1 Further, substantial evidence
1
In addition to the entry stamps for February 17, 2006, on
Mangru’s passport and Form I-94, we note that his passport
indicates that he had previously departed the United States
(Continued)
2
supports the determination that Mangru failed to qualify for a
waiver of this ground of inadmissibility under INA § 212(d)(11),
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(11) (2012). 2
Accordingly, we uphold the agency’s decision and deny
the petition for review for the reasons stated by the Board.
See In re: Mangru (B.I.A. June 13, 2014). We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
after being granted parole pursuant to INA § 212(d)(5), codified
at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (2012). Pursuant to 8 C.F.R.
§ 212.5(e)(1) (2014), “[p]arole shall be automatically
terminated without written notice . . . upon the departure from
the United States of the alien.”
2
Section 212(h), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012),
does not serve to waive this ground of inadmissibility and thus
Mangru’s claims that he qualifies for an INA § 212(h) waiver are
misplaced.
3