United States v. James McLean, Jr. , 678 F. App'x 123 ( 2017 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 16-4097
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    JAMES MARSHALL MCLEAN, JR.,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
    Senior District Judge. (1:15-cr-00188-JAB-1)
    Submitted:   February 10, 2017              Decided:   February 28, 2017
    Before NIEMEYER, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
    Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    John Carlyle Sherrill, III, SHERRILL & CAMERON, PLLC, Salisbury,
    North Carolina, for Appellant.        JoAnna Gibson McFadden,
    Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina,
    for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    James Marshall McLean, Jr., seeks to appeal his conviction
    and sentence after pleading guilty.                  McLean’s attorney first
    filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    (1967), concluding there were no meritorious grounds for appeal
    but raising sentencing issues.            McLean was notified of his right
    to file a pro se supplemental brief but has not done so.                          We
    previously     ordered    the    parties       to   file    supplemental       briefs
    addressing an additional sentencing issue, and McLean’s attorney
    has done so.      The Government now moves to dismiss the appeal,
    contending these sentencing issues are barred by McLean’s waiver
    of the right to appeal included in the plea agreement.                    McLean’s
    attorney has filed a response in opposition to the motion.
    “Plea    bargains   rest    on     contractual       principles,    and    each
    party should receive the benefit of its bargain.”                   United States
    v. Blick, 
    408 F.3d 162
    , 173 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted).             “A defendant may waive the right
    to appeal his conviction and sentence so long as the waiver is
    knowing and voluntary.”           United States v. Copeland, 
    707 F.3d 522
    , 528 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted).     “We review the validity of an appeal waiver de novo,
    and   will    enforce    the    waiver    if   it   is     valid   and   the    issue
    appealed is within the scope of the waiver.”                        
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks and citations omitted).
    2
    Upon review of the plea agreement and the transcript of the
    Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing, we conclude that McLean knowingly
    and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his conviction and
    sentence, and his sentencing claims are within the scope of the
    waiver.   Moreover, in accordance with Anders, we have reviewed
    the record for any potentially meritorious issues that might
    fall outside the scope of the waiver and have found none.
    Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion to dismiss
    the appeal.     This court requires that counsel inform his or her
    client, in writing, of his or her right to petition the Supreme
    Court of the United States for further review.             If the client
    requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
    such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
    this court for leave to withdraw from representation.            Counsel’s
    motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the client.
    We   dispense   with   oral   argument   because   the   facts   and   legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    DISMISSED
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-4097

Citation Numbers: 678 F. App'x 123

Judges: Diaz, Keenan, Niemeyer, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 2/28/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024