United States v. Robert Tinsley , 545 F. App'x 190 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4197
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ROBERT NATHANIEL TINSLEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Charlottesville. Glen E. Conrad, Chief
District Judge. (3:12-cr-00020-GEC-BWC-1)
Submitted: October 16, 2013 Decided: October 29, 2013
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Lloyd Snook, III, SNOOK & HAUGHEY, P.C., Charlottesville,
Virginia, for Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United States
Attorney, Jean B. Hudson, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM
Robert Nathaniel Tinsley pled guilty without a plea
agreement to distribution of cocaine base and possession with
intent to distribute over twenty-eight grams of cocaine base, 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006). He was sentenced to 138 months on
each count; the sentences run concurrently. Tinsley now
appeals, arguing that his sentence is unreasonable.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). As part of this review, we must consider whether
the district court adequately explained the selected sentence.
Id. In this regard, the district court “must place on the
record an individualized assessment based on the particular
facts of the case.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 321, 330
(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Tinsley’s Guidelines range was 262-327 months. In
imposing sentence, the district court granted the Government’s
substantial assistance motion. The chosen sentence was less
than the 150-month sentence the Government argued for but
greater than the sentence of no more than 115 months that
Tinsley requested. The court stated that it considered the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors when imposing sentence. Among
the factors discussed by the court in sentencing Tinsley were
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his need for drug treatment, his age, the need to deter similar
conduct by others, and Tinsley’s extensive criminal history.
Tinsley claims that his sentence is unreasonable
because the court focused too heavily on his criminal record
when discussing the need to promote respect for the law. We
disagree. The weight given to any § 3553(a) factor lies within
the discretion of the trial court. United States v. Barrington,
648 F.3d 1178, 1204 (11th Cir. 2011). In Gall, the Supreme
Court observed that the sentencing court did not commit
reversible error simply because it “attached great[er] weight”
to one sentencing factor. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. at
56-57. However, “unjustified reliance upon any one . . . factor
is a symptom of an unreasonable sentence” warranting reversal if
the court “focused single-mindedly on [that factor] to the
detriment of all of the other sentencing factors.” United
States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 2006); see also
United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006).
Our review of Tinsley’s sentencing proceeding reveals
that the district court did not rely unjustifiably on Tinsley’s
record. Rather, the court simply, in its discretion, gave that
factor greater weight than it did other factors such as
Tinsley’s age, his need for drug treatment, and the need to
deter similar conduct by others. We conclude that the sentence
is procedurally and substantively reasonable, and we affirm.
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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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