Erwin Tobar-Barrera v. Eric Holder, Jr. , 549 F. App'x 124 ( 2013 )


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  •                                UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 11-1447
    ERWIN TOBAR-BARRERA,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
    Appeals.
    Argued:   September 17, 2013                 Decided:   October 29, 2013
    Before GREGORY, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
    Petition granted in part and denied in part by unpublished
    opinion. Judge Davis wrote the opinion, in which Judge Gregory
    joined. Judge Keenan wrote a dissenting opinion.
    ARGUED: Timothy William Davis, LAW OFFICE OF TIMOTHY W. DAVIS,
    LLC, Baltimore, Maryland, for Petitioner.         Jonathan Aaron
    Robbins, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.,
    for Respondent.   ON BRIEF: Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant
    Attorney General, William C. Peachey, Assistant Director,
    Matthew Allan Spurlock, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED
    STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    DAVIS, Circuit Judge:
    Petitioner Erwin Tobar-Barrera (“Tobar-Barrera”), a native
    and     citizen    of    Guatemala,    seeks   review     of     the   Board    of
    Immigration Appeals’ (“Board”) order dismissing his appeal of
    the     decision    by    an   Immigration     Judge    (“IJ”)     finding     him
    ineligible for discretionary relief from removal under Section
    203 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act
    (“NACARA”). 1 The IJ found Tobar-Barrera ineligible because he had
    been convicted of a disqualifying aggravated felony and ordered
    him removed. For the reasons that follow, we grant in part and
    deny in part the petition for review. We vacate the Board’s
    order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
    opinion.
    I.
    The record reveals that the then-operative Immigration and
    Naturalization Service (“INS”) initiated removal proceedings on
    April     27,   1990.    But   those   proceedings     were    administratively
    closed on September 6, 1991 to allow Tobar-Barrera to join a
    class of Guatemalans who had been offered special process for
    1
    Pub. L. No. 105-100, 
    111 Stat. 2160
    , 2193-2201 (1997),
    amended by Pub. L. No. 105-139, 
    111 Stat. 2644
    , 2644-45 (1997),
    (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
    2
    seeking asylum in the United States. 2 For the fourteen years that
    followed,   there    was    no    appreciable   change      in   Tobar-Barrera’s
    immigration status. Tobar-Barrera filed his asylum application
    in May 2005. His application remained pending for two years,
    awaiting review by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service
    (“USCIS”), the agency that now reviews such applications. The
    application was denied.
    According      to    USCIS,    Tobar-Barrera     was    not   entitled   to
    relief   because     he     had    a   disqualifying        aggravated   felony
    conviction,   manslaughter.         USCIS   applied      the     definition   of
    aggravated felony found in the Illegal Immigration Reform and
    Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
    2
    While Tobar-Barrera’s removal proceedings were pending,
    the landmark settlement in American Baptist Churches v.
    Thornburgh, 
    760 F. Supp. 796
     (N.D. Cal. 1991) (“ABC Settlement”)
    was reached. The ABC Settlement involved a class action
    settlement among various government agencies (including the INS)
    and a plaintiff class of Salvadorans and Guatemalans who had
    fled their countries. The suit alleged that the United States
    government had politicized its asylum policy by discriminatorily
    denying refugee status to persons fleeing repressive regimes
    supported by the United States.
    The ABC Settlement, entered in January 1991, stipulated
    that the INS would give de novo, unappealable hearings to most
    Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum applicants who were present in
    the United States as of September 19, 1990, for Salvadorans, or
    October 1, 1990, for Guatemalans. 
    Id. at 799-800
    . This right
    extended to all those who had previously been denied asylum, as
    well as those who had not yet filed for asylum or whose cases
    were still pending. 
    Id. at 800
    . The settlement required the INS
    to stay pending deportation proceedings against class members.
    
    Id. at 805
    .
    
    3 Stat. 3009
    -546 (1996) (“IIRIRA”). IIRIRA broadened the kinds of
    offenses       that      qualified      as    “crime       of     violence”    aggravated
    felonies by decreasing the requisite imprisonment term from five
    years to one year. See IIRIRA § 321(a)(3). Under the pre-IIRIRA
    definition,        Tobar-Barrera’s           manslaughter        conviction       is    not    a
    disqualifying aggravated felony.
    Tobar-Barrera’s           immigration            proceedings      languished       for
    another      two   years       until   the     Department        of    Homeland    Security
    (“DHS”)        moved     to     re-calendar        his      removal      proceedings          in
    September 2009 because USCIS had found Tobar-Barrera ineligible
    for     relief.     In    the     interim,        Tobar-Barrera        attacked        USCIS’s
    adverse        ruling     by     filing      an     action       for     declaratory      and
    injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the
    District of Maryland. Tobar-Barrera v. Napolitano, No. 09-3064,
    
    2010 WL 972557
         (D.    Md.   Mar.       12,    2010).    The    district       court
    ordered the government to provide Tobar-Barrera with a de novo
    asylum       adjudication         because         USCIS     erroneously        found       him
    ineligible for relief. Id. at *8. There was no appeal from that
    ruling.
    Tobar-Barrera filed a new application for relief in July
    2010.     He     argued        that    the    record        of    conviction       did     not
    conclusively show that he had committed an aggravated felony and
    asked the IJ to consider new evidence – his own live testimony –
    as further proof that he was not convicted of an aggravated
    4
    felony.    The   IJ   ruled   that     such    testimony     was   inadmissible
    extrinsic evidence, and therefore could not be considered. She
    further ruled that Tobar-Barrera’s conviction was an aggravated
    felony under IIRIRA, making him ineligible for relief. For these
    reasons, she ordered him removed to Guatemala.
    Tobar-Barrera appealed to the Board, asserting that the IJ
    erroneously applied the IIRIRA-amended definition of aggravated
    felony; that she also erred in failing to consider his live
    testimony; and that his due process rights were violated by the
    near twenty-year delay in the Attorney General’s prosecution of
    his removal proceedings. The Board affirmed the IJ’s order and
    dismissed the appeal.
    Tobar-Barrera filed a timely petition for review in this
    Court.    He   contends   that   the   Board    erred   in    concluding   that
    IIRIRA’s definition of “aggravated felony” applied to him. 3
    3
    Tobar Barrera’s second contention, that the Board erred in
    affirming the IJ’s decision to exclude testimonial evidence
    offered to satisfy his burden of proving that his manslaughter
    conviction was not an “aggravated felony,” is no longer at
    issue. We recently held, in Mondragon v. Holder, 
    706 F.3d 535
    (4th Cir. 2013), that when a statute of conviction is divisible,
    an alien is limited to presenting Shepard-approved sources to
    resolve any “ambiguity of his conviction.” 
    Id.
     at 547 (citing
    Shepard v. United States, 
    544 U.S. 13
     (2005)). In the absence of
    such documents, the non-citizen is prohibited from relying on
    “extrinsic evidence about his conduct” to establish that his
    conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony. Mondragon,
    706 F.3d at 548. As Tobar-Barrera concedes, in light of
    Mondragon, the exclusion of his testimony is not a ground for
    relief.
    5
    We have carefully reviewed the record and fully considered
    the oral arguments of counsel.
    II.
    Because the Board adopted the findings and reasoning of the
    IJ, we review her decision as supplemented by the Board. Niang
    v. Gonzales, 
    492 F.3d 505
    , 511 n.8 (4th Cir. 2007). The Board’s
    determination that Tobar-Barrera’s conviction is an aggravated
    felony is a legal issue we review de novo. See Mbea v. Gonzales,
    
    482 F.3d 276
    , 279 (4th Cir. 2004). For reasons that follow, we
    grant, in part, the petition for review, finding as we do that
    the Board erroneously applied the IIRIRA-amended definition to
    the particular facts and circumstances of Tobar-Barrera’s case.
    A.
    There is no question that the definition of “aggravated
    felony” changed while Tobar-Barrera’s case was pending before
    the   agency.   In   1996,   Congress,   through   IIRIRA,   amended   the
    definition of “aggravated felony” set forth in the Immigration
    and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C § 1101 (a)(43)(F) (2013).
    IIRIRA modified the INA’s definition of aggravated felony in a
    way that would make it more difficult for an alien to obtain
    relief in future removal proceedings. 4 In enacting the IIRIRA
    4
    Members of the ABC Settlement class were particularly
    affected   because  IIRIRA   replaced  the   process  previously
    available to class members with a more restrictive scheme. Solis
    (Continued)
    6
    amendments,     Congress   provided    that       “[t]he     amendments     made    by
    this section shall apply to actions taken on or after the date
    of the enactment of this Act [September 30, 1996], regardless of
    when the conviction occurred.” IIRIRA § 321(c) (emphasis added).
    Thus, the interpretation of IIRIRA section 321(c) is the
    source of the present dispute. See Garrido-Morato v. Gonzales,
    
    485 F.3d 319
    , 323 (5th Cir. 2007) (“‘Actions taken,’ . . . is
    not   defined   anywhere   in   IIRIRA      and    it   is    thus   unclear     what
    actions   are   contemplated    by    the    statute,        and   who    must   take
    them.”). The Board, in affirming the IJ’s ruling, found that the
    IJ properly applied the IIRIRA-amended definition of aggravated
    felony to conclude that Tobar-Barrera’s conviction rendered him
    ineligible for NACARA relief. The Attorney General agrees, of
    course, relying primarily on Third and Fifth Circuit rulings
    that the term “actions taken” under section 321(c) refers to the
    Attorney General’s efforts to give effect to that particular
    section of IIRIRA (i.e., determining the meaning of “aggravated
    felony”   to     assess    whether    an      ex-felon        is     eligible      for
    discretionary     relief).      Garrido-Morato,            
    485 F.3d at 324
    ;
    Biskupski v. Att’y Gen., 
    503 F.3d 274
    , 283 (3d Cir. 2007). In
    v. Holder, 
    490 F. App'x 744
    , 746 (6th Cir. 2012) (unpublished).
    Congress repealed these restrictions through NACARA and returned
    to class members the less restrictive, pre-IIRIRA conditions for
    relief. 
    Id.
    7
    effect, these circuits found that Congress intended that section
    321(c) apply retroactively to all adjudications occurring on and
    after the date of enactment. Garrido-Morato, 
    485 F.3d at 324
    ;
    Biskupski, 
    503 F.3d at 281-283
    . See also Valderrama-Fonseca v.
    I.N.S., 
    116 F.3d 853
    , 856-57 (9th Cir. 1997); Xiong v. I.N.S.,
    
    173 F.3d 601
    , 607 (7th Cir. 1999); Choeum v. I.N.S., 
    129 F.3d 29
    , 36-37 (1st Cir. 1997).
    Tobar-Barrera,         however,        argues    for         a     more    narrow
    interpretation of the term and contends that “actions taken”
    refers to the point at which the Attorney General began its
    initial removal proceedings which, in this case, was in April
    1990. For support, Tobar-Barrera cites to the Sixth Circuit’s
    decision    in   Saqr    v.    Holder,    holding      that    “the       term    ‘action
    taken’ . . . derive[s] from the point at which the removal
    action begins for purposes of determining whether the pre- or
    post-IIRIRA definition of aggravated felony applies.” 
    580 F.3d 414
    , 422 (6th Cir. 2009). Tobar-Barrera has the better argument.
    We reject the Attorney General’s contention that we should
    take the approach of the Fifth and Third Circuits in this case.
    This   is   because     we    decline    to    interpret      the       statute   to   say
    something that Congress chose not to say. There is no question
    that   Congress   intended       the    amended    definition           of   “aggravated
    felony” to have some retroactive effect, in the sense that the
    new definition of “aggravated felony” would apply no matter when
    8
    such convictions become final. But Congress did not say, as it
    well    knows      how     to    say    when       it        chooses,     that    the    amended
    definition would apply in all proceedings “‘pending on or after
    the    date   of     enactment         of    the       Act.’”     Cf.,    e.g.,       Mueller    v.
    Angelone, 
    181 F.3d 557
    , 566 n.4 (4th Cir. 1999)(discussing §
    107(c) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
    1996, Pub. L. No. 104–132, § 105, 
    110 Stat. 1214
    , 1220); Sanders
    v.    Allison      Engine       Co.,    Inc.,          
    703 F.3d 930
    ,     934     (6th     Cir.
    2012)(discussing § 4(f)(1) of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery
    Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–21, 
    123 Stat. 1617
    , 1625). Rather,
    Congress      limited      the     retroactive            application       of    the    amended
    definition of “aggravated felony” by saying, instead, that the
    new definition would apply to “actions taken” on and after the
    date of enactment. The question posed, then, is what does the
    limitation enacted by Congress mean?
    If we give conclusive effect to post-enactment decisions of
    an IJ or of the Board as “actions taken” to long-pending removal
    proceedings, as in this case, then we would be reading out of
    the    statute       the    very       limitation            on    retroactivity        Congress
    intended.       We    simply       do       not        believe     that     is    a    plausible
    interpretation        of    Congress’s            manifest        intention      to    limit    the
    application of the expanded definition of “aggravated felony” so
    that the new definition applies to fewer than all proceedings
    “pending on . . . the date of enactment,” Mueller, 
    181 F.3d at
                               9
    566 n.4, a provision that Congress could have mandated but chose
    not to mandate. Surely Congress was aware that its failure to do
    so would be of consequence. Cf. I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 
    480 U.S. 421
    , 449 (1987) (affirming, before IIRIRA’s 1996 effective
    date, “the longstanding principle of construing any lingering
    ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien”).
    We   find    the     Sixth    Circuit’s      interpretation    to   be   the
    better-reasoned         approach.   It   accounts     for   the   statutory    and
    regulatory scheme that governs removal proceedings. Saqr, 
    580 F.3d at 421-22
    . And, it makes section 321(c) analysis consistent
    with the approach that other circuits have used to determine
    eligibility       for     other     discretionary       relief      provided    by
    immigration officers. 
    Id. at 422
    ; see also Tran v. Gonzales, 
    447 F.3d 937
    , 941 (6th Cir. 2006) (“We need not go through a lengthy
    statutory analysis to conclude that § 321(c) is not retroactive
    since the language of the section speaks for itself. Section
    321(c) explicitly limits the expanded definition of ‘aggravated
    felony’ to prospective deportation proceedings.”).
    Further, this interpretation aligns with the basic notions
    of fairness that are implicated when the rules concerning relief
    are   changed     in     the   middle    of   an    alien’s   ongoing     removal
    proceedings. We have previously explained the importance of this
    principle to preserving the intended function of NACARA itself,
    and its attendant provisions for relief.               Appiah v. U.S. I.N.S.,
    10
    
    202 F.3d 704
    ,    710    (4th    Cir.    2000)    (“NACARA      was     intended   to
    correct a provision in the IIRIRA that would have had the effect
    of ‘changing the rules in the middle of the game for thousands
    of Central Americans and others who came to the United States
    because their lives and families had been torn apart by war and
    oppression.’”). 5 Those concerns are particularly pointed in this
    case because it is unlikely that Tobar-Barrera knew his legal
    rights had changed while his case sat dormant for more than
    twenty years.
    We     are     persuaded       that    the     post-IIRIRA       definition      of
    “aggravated        felony”     was       improperly      invoked      in    the   unique
    circumstances         of     this        case.     Tobar-Barrera’s          deportation
    proceedings commenced in 1990, upon proper service of an order
    to show cause that was also filed with the Immigration Court.
    See Toora v. Holder, 
    603 F.3d 282
    , 286 n.3 (5th Cir. 2010)
    (“Pursuant     to    
    8 U.S.C. § 1229
    (a)(1),       immigration      proceedings
    initiate     on      the    date     the    alien     receives      his     [Notice    to
    Appear].”)     (citations          omitted).     Since     that    time,    the    record
    indicates     that       Tobar-Barrera      has     been    subject    to    a    single,
    5
    See also Saqr, 
    580 F.3d at 422
     (quoting Alanis-Bustamante
    v. Reno, 
    201 F.3d 1303
    , 1310 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Considerations
    of fairness convince us that for purposes of deciding which law
    applies, the removal proceedings in this case should be viewed
    as commencing at least on that date . . . when the show cause
    order had been served and the warrant of detainer lodged.”)).
    11
    ongoing, deportation proceeding. Tobar-Barrera’s case number has
    remained the same; so has the underlying controversy regarding
    his removability and the dispute regarding his eligibility for
    special relief. Although the Immigration Court administratively
    closed this proceeding in 1991, the closure carried no legal
    effect. See Matter of Amico, 
    19 I&N Dec. 652
    , 654 n.1 (BIA 1988)
    (“The administrative closure of a case does not result in a
    final order. It is merely an administrative convenience that
    allows the removal of cases from the calendar in appropriate
    situations.”)). Thus, no triggering “action” was “taken” under
    these circumstances after the statutory amendment. Instead, the
    Attorney       General’s   motion       to     recalendar     merely     terminated      a
    hiatus    in    proceedings       already      underway.      Because      the   relevant
    “action taken” against Tobar-Barrera occurred in 1990, the pre-
    IIRIRA definition must apply.
    B.
    Tobar-Barrera       also       contends     that   review     “of    his    NACARA
    application in the Immigration Court should have been conducted
    under the same eligibility rules that were employed by USCIS.”
    Pet.    Br.    at   20.   To    that    end,      Tobar-Barrera      claims      that   the
    “divergent NACARA eligibility rules in USCIS and the Immigration
    Court” violate due process. Id. at 20-21.
    Under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (d)(1), this Court may review a final
    order    of     removal        only    if    “the     alien    has      exhausted       all
    12
    administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.” Any
    particular claim that is not properly exhausted is barred from
    review by this Court. See Massis v. Mukasey, 
    549 F.3d 631
    , 638
    (4th Cir. 2008). This prohibition against reviewing unexhausted
    claims is jurisdictional. 
    Id.
    The record clearly establishes that Tobar-Barrera did not
    present this particular argument to the Board. 6 Although we have
    recognized    an    exception   to   the    exhaustion   requirement   for
    certain constitutional claims, see Farrokhi v. U.S. I.N.S., 
    900 F.2d 697
    , 700-01 (4th Cir. 1990); Gallanosa v. United States,
    
    785 F.2d 116
    ,   120-21   (4th    Cir.   1986),   Tobar-Barrera’s   due
    process challenge to the allegedly disparate standards does not
    fall within the narrow confines of this exception. Therefore,
    the exception to the general exhaustion rule is inapplicable in
    this instance. See Kurfees v. I.N.S., 
    275 F.3d 332
    , 337 (4th
    Cir. 2001). Because the exhaustion requirement is not excused
    and the issue has not been administratively exhausted, we lack
    jurisdiction to consider this particular argument.
    6
    Tobar-Barrera, however, did raise a different due process
    claim below. That claim related to the more than twenty-year
    delay in prosecuting his removal. J.A. 33-35. Nonetheless,
    Tobar-Barrera has declined to raise that issue before this Court
    on appeal. See generally Pet. Br. at i, 18-21.
    13
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, we grant in part and deny in
    part       the    petition   for   review.     Specifically,     we    vacate   the
    Board’s order and instruct the Board to return this case to the
    IJ   for     de   novo   NACARA    proceedings    that   apply   the    pre-IIRIRA
    definition of aggravated felony. We deny as moot the pending
    motion to remand this case to the Board. 7
    PETITION GRANTED IN PART
    AND DENIED IN PART
    7
    While the petition for review was pending, the Attorney
    General filed a motion to remand this case to the Board for
    reconsideration in light of Salem v. Holder, 
    647 F.3d 111
     (4th
    Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 
    132 S. Ct. 1000
     (2012), and to correct
    a defect in the Certified Administrative Record. The Court
    deferred action on the motion, which, in view of our decision on
    the merits, is denied as moot.
    14
    BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
    I   disagree     with      the    majority’s       interpretation       of    IIRIRA
    § 321(c).     Therefore, I respectfully dissent from Section II(A).
    The   provisions        in      IIRIRA    § 321(b)       make   clear     that   the
    revised     definition      of     the    term     “aggravated        felony”      applies
    “regardless of whether the conviction was entered before, on, or
    after” IIRIRA’s enactment.                See Mondragón v. Holder, 
    706 F.3d 535
    , 542-43 (4th Cir. 2013).                   In IIRIRA § 321(c), the statute
    provides:
    EFFECTIVE DATE. – The amendments made by this section
    shall apply to actions taken on or after the date of
    the enactment of this Act [September 30, 1996],
    regardless of when the conviction occurred.
    (emphasis added).
    The majority acknowledges that the term “actions taken” is
    not   defined    and   is     ambiguous.          Yet,    the   majority      “eschew[s]
    critical analysis of the meaning of the phrase ‘actions taken,’
    instead     substituting         in    its     place     the    phrase    ‘proceedings
    initiated.’”      Biskupski v. Att’y Gen., 
    503 F.3d 274
    , 283 (3d
    Cir. 2007) (discussing the analysis in Tran v. Gonzales, 
    447 F.3d 937
     (6th Cir. 2006)).
    In my view, the majority of circuit courts to consider the
    meaning of “actions taken” have properly concluded that the term
    refers to actions and decisions by the Attorney General acting
    through     an   IJ    or     BIA.        See     generally,      Garrido-Morato        v.
    15
    Gonzales, 
    485 F.3d 319
    , 324 (5th Cir. 2007); Biskupski, 
    503 F.3d at 283
    ; Xiong v. I.N.S., 
    173 F.3d 601
    , 607 (7th Cir. 1999);
    Choeum      v.      I.N.S.,      
    129 F.3d 29
    ,    36-37      (1st      Cir.      1997);
    Valderrama-Fonseca v. I.N.S., 
    116 F.3d 853
    , 856-57 (9th Cir.
    1997).
    I    am      persuaded    by     the     analysis         employed       by   the   Fifth
    Circuit in Garrido-Morato.                    See 
    485 F.3d at 324
    .                   There, the
    court observed that because IIRIRA § 321(c) is “an effective
    date provision for § 321,” the term “‘actions taken’ must refer”
    to actions “taken under the statute, such as determining the
    meaning       of    ‘aggravated        felony’       and    thus    the    availability       of
    discretionary hardship relief to such felons.”                            Id.
    In     the    present     case,    the     IJ       and   BIA   applied       the   INA’s
    definition for “aggravated felony” in the petitioner’s case in
    2010    and      2011,   after    IIRIRA’s       effective         date.         Therefore,    I
    would affirm the decision that the petitioner is ineligible for
    relief under NACARA because he was convicted of a disqualifying
    aggravated felony and would deny the petition for review in this
    case.
    16
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20-1089

Citation Numbers: 549 F. App'x 124

Judges: Gregory, Davis, Keenan

Filed Date: 10/29/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024

Authorities (19)

Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca , 107 S. Ct. 1207 ( 1987 )

Ana Marie Kurfees v. U. S. Immigration & Naturalization ... , 275 F.3d 332 ( 2001 )

Biskupski v. Attorney General of the United States , 503 F.3d 274 ( 2007 )

kristin-rose-gallanosa-an-infant-under-the-age-of-21-years-who-sues-by , 785 F.2d 116 ( 1986 )

Shepard v. United States , 125 S. Ct. 1254 ( 2005 )

American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh , 760 F. Supp. 796 ( 1991 )

Samuel Appiah v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Service , 202 F.3d 704 ( 2000 )

Alanis-Bustamante v. Reno , 201 F.3d 1303 ( 2000 )

Toora v. Holder , 603 F.3d 282 ( 2010 )

Ran Choeum v. Immigration and Naturalization Service , 129 F.3d 29 ( 1997 )

Anvar Farrokhi v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Service , 900 F.2d 697 ( 1990 )

Santiago VALDERRAMA-FONSECA, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION AND ... , 116 F.3d 853 ( 1997 )

Salem v. Holder , 647 F.3d 111 ( 2011 )

Chue Xiong v. Immigration and Naturalization Service , 173 F.3d 601 ( 1999 )

Saqr v. Holder , 580 F.3d 414 ( 2009 )

Quang Ly Tran v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General , 447 F.3d 937 ( 2006 )

Miriam Garrido-Morato v. Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney ... , 485 F.3d 319 ( 2007 )

Massis v. Mukasey , 549 F.3d 631 ( 2008 )

Everett Lee Mueller v. Ronald J. Angelone, Director, ... , 181 F.3d 557 ( 1999 )

View All Authorities »