Jose Medrano-Gaytan v. Loretta Lynch , 641 F. App'x 255 ( 2016 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 15-1912
    JOSE RODOLFO MEDRANO-GAYTAN, a/k/a Rodolfo Medrano-Gaytan,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
    Appeals.
    Submitted:   February 23, 2016              Decided:   March 18, 2016
    Before WILKINSON, KING, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
    Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Randall L. Johnson, JOHNSON & ASSOCIATES, P.C., Arlington,
    Virginia, for Petitioner. Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
    Assistant Attorney General, Emily Anne Radford, Assistant
    Director, Brett F. Kinney, Office of Immigration Litigation,
    UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for
    Respondent.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Jose Rodolfo Medrano-Gaytan, a native and citizen of El
    Salvador,     petitions     for   review      of    an   order   of   the    Board     of
    Immigration     Appeals     (Board)      dismissing       his    appeal     from     the
    immigration judge’s (IJ) order denying his motion to reopen.                          We
    deny the petition for review.
    An alien may file one motion to reopen within 90 days of
    the   entry     of    a     final      order        of   removal.           8    U.S.C.
    § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C) (2012); 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.23
    (b)(1) (2015).
    This time limit does not apply if the basis for the motion is to
    seek asylum or withholding of removal “based on changed country
    conditions, . . . if such evidence is material and was not
    available and would not have been discovered or presented at the
    previous    proceeding.”          8   U.S.C.       § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)         (2012);
    accord 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.23
    (c)(4)(i) (2015).                   The alien bears the
    burden of establishing changed country conditions.                      See Wanrong
    Lin v. Holder, 
    771 F.3d 177
    , 185 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting that
    alien’s    burden    “was   to    show   that      country   conditions         in   [his
    country] were materially different from those conditions at the
    time of his original removal proceedings”);                  In re S-Y-G-, 
    24 I. & N. Dec. 247
    , 253 (B.I.A. 2007).
    We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of
    discretion.     
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.23
    (b); Mosere v. Mukasey, 
    552 F.3d 397
    , 400 (4th Cir. 2009).             The “denial of a motion to reopen is
    2
    reviewed with extreme deference, given that motions to reopen
    are disfavored because every delay works to the advantage of the
    deportable     alien     who      wishes    merely    to    remain    in    the    United
    States.”      Sadhvani v. Holder, 
    596 F.3d 180
    , 182 (4th Cir. 2009)
    (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).                           The motion
    “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to
    be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by
    affidavits         and      other     evidentiary          material.”           
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.23
    (b)(3) (2015).
    We    also    recognize       three   independent       grounds      on     which    a
    motion to reopen removal proceedings may be denied:                             “(1) the
    alien has not established a prima facie case for the underlying
    substantive        relief    sought;    (2)     the   alien    has   not    introduced
    previously unavailable, material evidence; and (3) where relief
    is    discretionary,        the     alien   would     not     be   entitled       to   the
    discretionary grant of relief.”                  Onyeme v. INS, 
    146 F.3d 227
    ,
    234 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing INS v. Abudu, 
    485 U.S. 94
    , 104-05
    (1988)).      We will “reverse the denial of such a motion only if
    the   [Board]      acted     arbitrarily,       irrationally,        or    contrary       to
    law.”      Prasad v. Holder, 
    776 F.3d 222
    , 225 (4th Cir. 2015).                        Our
    review is limited to “the administrative record on which the
    order of removal is based.”                 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(A) (2012);
    Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 
    632 F.3d 117
    , 123 n.3 (4th Cir.
    2011).
    3
    We conclude that substantial evidence supports the finding
    that   Medrano-Gaytan       did    not   establish    a     change    in     country
    conditions that would warrant excusing the 90-day time limit for
    motions to reopen.         Accordingly, because Medrano-Gaytan’s motion
    to reopen was untimely, and he did not show a material change in
    country    conditions,      we    deny   the   petition      for    review.      We
    dispense    with    oral     argument     because     the    facts     and    legal
    contentions   are   adequately       presented   in    the    materials       before
    this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    PETITION DENIED
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-1912

Citation Numbers: 641 F. App'x 255

Judges: Wilkinson, King, Diaz

Filed Date: 3/18/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024