Naresh Arora v. Captain James , 689 F. App'x 190 ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-2265
NARESH C. ARORA; SUDHA ARORA,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
CAPTAIN JAMES; REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER OF ORANGEBURG;
DENMARK TECHNICAL COLLEGE, an agency of state of South
Carolina, a governmental entity; CHIEF WILBUR WALLACE;
DONALD WILLIAMS; JOANN BOYD-SCOTLAND; AMBRISH LAVANIA,
individually (at their personal capacity) and as agents and
employees for Denmark Technical College; DOES 1 - 100, et
al,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Orangeburg. J. Michelle Childs, District
Judge. (5:14-cv-00018-JMC)
Submitted: March 31, 2016 Decided: May 12, 2017
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and SHEDD and KEENAN, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Naresh C. Arora; Sudha Arora, Appellants Pro Se. Norma Anne
Turner Jett, NESS & JETT, LLC, Bamberg, South Carolina; Samuel
F. Arthur, III, Carrie Appleton Fox, AIKEN, BRIDGES, NUNN,
ELLIOTT & TYLER, PA, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Naresh and Sudha Arora appeal the district court’s order
(1) adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation, granting
summary judgment to Captain James and The Regional Medical
Center of Orangeburg and Calhoun Counties (“TRMC”), and
dismissing without prejudice * the Aroras’ claims against Denmark
Technical College, Chief Wilbur Wallace, Donald Williams, Joann
Boyd-Scotland, and Ambrish Lavania, and (2) denying the Aroras’
motions for stay and for sanctions. The Aroras also appeal the
district court’s order overruling their objection to the
magistrate judge’s denial of their motion to amend the complaint
to add a medical malpractice claim. We affirm the district
court’s order listed in (1) and (2) for the reasons stated by
the district court. Arora v. James, No. 5:14-cv-00018-JMC
(D.S.C. Apr. 16, 2015; Sept. 24, 2015).
However, we vacate the district court’s order adopting the
magistrate judge’s order and denying the Aroras’ motion to amend
their complaint. While “leave to amend should be freely given
when justice so requires,” a district court may deny a motion to
* Because the Aroras could not cure the defect in their
complaint by amendment, the district court’s order is final and
appealable. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc’y, 807 F.3d
619, 623-26 (4th Cir. 2015) (discussing Domino Sugar Corp. v.
Sugar Workers Local Union 392, 10 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (4th Cir.
1993)).
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amend “when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing
party,” when the moving party has acted in bad faith or with a
dilatory motive, or when the amendment would be futile. Laber
v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Generally, we review a district
court’s denial of a motion for leave to amend for abuse of
discretion, [b]ut where . . . the district court denied such a
motion on grounds of futility, we employ the same standard that
would apply to our review of a motion to dismiss.” United
States ex rel. Ahumada v. NISH, 756 F.3d 268, 274 (4th Cir.
2014).
In their motion to amend, the Aroras sought to add a state-
law claim labeled medical malpractice against TRMC. They
alleged that TRMC had a duty to prevent trespassers from
harassing patients and that TRMC breached that duty when it
allowed Wallace and Williams to trespass in Naresh Arora’s
hospital room. The magistrate judge denied this portion of the
motion to amend as futile because the Aroras had failed to file
an affidavit of an expert witness as required for medical
malpractice claims under S.C. Code Ann. § 15-79-125(A) (Supp.
2015).
The “distinction between medical malpractice and negligence
claims is subtle,” and, thus, “differentiating between the two
types of claims depends heavily on the facts of each individual
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case.” Dawkins v. Union Hosp. Dist., 758 S.E.2d 501, 503-04
(S.C. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Dawkins, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina held that an action against a
hospital related to “nonmedical, administrative, ministerial, or
routine care” sounds in ordinary negligence, not medical
malpractice. Id. at 504. While the Aroras labeled their claim
as one of medical malpractice, the substance of their
allegations sounds in ordinary negligence. We therefore
conclude that the proposed amendment was not futile.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court order adopting the
magistrate judge’s ruling and remand for further proceedings.
We express no opinion on the merits of the Aroras’ claim.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
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