United States v. Rodrequez Carson ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4996
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
DANTONIO RODREQUEZ CARSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Spartanburg. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (7:09-cr-00422-HMH-1)
Submitted: March 4, 2010 Decided: March 31, 2010
Before MOTZ and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Benjamin T. Stepp, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Leesa Washington,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Dantonio Rodrequez Carson pled guilty without a plea
agreement to one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). The
district court calculated Carson’s advisory Guidelines
imprisonment range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
(2008) at 51 to 63 months and sentenced Carson to 62 months’
imprisonment. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that the appeal lacks
merit but questioning whether the district court erred in
failing to consider, for purposes of calculating sentencing
credit, the time Carson spent in state custody from the date of
his initial appearance in the district court. We affirm.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
review. Our review of the transcript of the guilty plea hearing
leads us to conclude that the district court substantially
complied with the mandates of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting
Carson’s guilty plea and that Carson’s substantial rights were
not infringed. Critically, the transcript reveals that the
district court ensured that the plea was supported by an
independent factual basis and that Carson entered the plea
knowingly and voluntarily with an understanding of the
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consequences. See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116,
119-20 (4th Cir. 1991).
Turning to Carson’s sentence, we review it under a
“deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). In conducting this review, we
“must first ensure that the district court committed no
significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or
improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the
Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.]
§ 3553(a) [(2006)] factors, selecting a sentence based on
clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the
chosen sentence.” Id. at 51. “When rendering a sentence, the
district court must make an individualized assessment based on
the facts presented,” applying the “relevant § 3553(a) factors
to the specific circumstances of the case before it.” United
States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks and emphasis omitted). The court must also
“state in open court the particular reasons supporting its
chosen sentence” and “set forth enough to satisfy” this court
that it has “considered the parties’ arguments and has a
reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking
authority.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Once we have determined that the sentence is free of
procedural error, we must consider the substantive
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reasonableness of the sentence, “tak[ing] into account the
totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If the
sentence is within the appropriate Guidelines range, this court
applies a presumption on appeal that the sentence is reasonable.
See United States v. Go, 517 F.3d 216, 218 (4th Cir. 2008).
Here, the district court correctly calculated the
advisory Guidelines range and heard argument from Carson’s
counsel and allocution from Carson. While Anders counsel
correctly concedes that the district court did not err in
failing to consider the time Carson spent in state custody for
purposes of calculating sentencing credit, see United States v.
Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334-35 (1992), the court committed
procedural error in failing to provide an individualized
assessment of Carson’s case. We conclude, however, that the
court’s omission did not affect Carson’s substantial rights.
See United States v. Washington, 404 F.3d 834, 843 (4th Cir.
2005). Further, neither counsel nor Carson put forth any
factors to overcome the appellate presumption of reasonableness
afforded his within-Guidelines sentence.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Carson, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Carson requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
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then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Carson.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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