United States v. Cyrus Ruffin , 585 F. App'x 7 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4405
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CYRUS DEMOND RUFFIN, a/k/a Cyrus Desmond Ruffin, a/k/a Cyrus
Damond Ruffin,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:13-cr-00398-WO-1)
Submitted: October 16, 2014 Decided: October 20, 2014
Before MOTZ, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James B. Craven III, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Kyle David Pousson, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Cyrus Demond Ruffin appeals his conviction and
sentence for possession of firearms by a convicted felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2012). Ruffin
pled guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement and was
sentenced to ninety-two months of imprisonment, followed by
three years of supervised release. On appeal, counsel has filed
a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
asserting that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but
questioning whether Ruffin’s sentence was reasonable. Although
advised of his right to do so, Ruffin has not filed a pro se
supplemental brief. Finding no error, we affirm.
We review a sentence for procedural and substantive
reasonableness under a deferential abuse of discretion standard.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We must first
ensure that the district court did not commit any “significant
procedural error,” such as failing to properly calculate the
applicable Guidelines range, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2012) factors, or failing to adequately explain the
sentence. Id. The district court is not required to
“robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection,” United
States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006), but “must
place on the record an individualized assessment based on the
particular facts of the case before it.” United States v.
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Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Only if we find the sentence procedurally
reasonable can we consider its substantive reasonableness. Id.
at 328.
In assessing substantive reasonableness, we must “take
into account the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S.
at 51. We presume on appeal that a sentence within the properly
calculated Guidelines range is substantively reasonable. United
States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 261 (4th Cir. 2008). Such a
presumption is rebutted only when the defendant shows “that the
sentence is unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a)
factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379
(4th Cir. 2006).
Upon review, we discern no procedural or substantive
sentencing error by the district court. We conclude that the
district court correctly calculated Ruffin’s advisory Guidelines
range, heard argument from counsel, and provided Ruffin an
opportunity to allocute. The court explained that a sentence at
the bottom of the Guidelines range was warranted in light of the
nature and circumstances of the offense and Ruffin’s substantial
and serious criminal history. Ruffin fails to offer any grounds
to rebut the presumption on appeal that the within-Guidelines
sentence is substantively reasonable. Accordingly, we conclude
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that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing Ruffin.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm Ruffin’s conviction and sentence. We deny
counsel’s motion to withdraw. This court requires that counsel
inform Ruffin, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme
Court of the United States for further review. If Ruffin
requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may renew his
motion for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Ruffin. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately expressed in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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