United States v. Clifton Locklear ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4200
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CLIFTON KELLY LOCKLEAR,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (7:13-cr-00043-FL-1)
Submitted: October 8, 2014 Decided: October 21, 2014
Before SHEDD, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Yvonne V. Watford-McKinney, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Clifton Kelly Locklear pled guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement to possession of a stolen firearm, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(j), 924 (2012). The district court sentenced him
to 100 months of imprisonment — a sentence resulting from an
upward variance * from his advisory Guidelines range of forty-six
to fifty-seven months. Locklear appeals, challenging the
substantive reasonableness of his sentence. Finding no error,
we affirm.
We review a sentence for procedural and substantive
reasonableness under a deferential abuse of discretion standard.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The same
standard applies whether the sentence is “inside, just outside,
or significantly outside the Guidelines range.” United
States v. Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 100-01 (4th Cir. 2012)
*
Although the district court’s judgment indicates that it
imposed an upward departure pursuant to U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 4A1.3, p.s. (2013), and neither party
disputes this characterization on appeal, it appears from the
record that the district court imposed an upward variance from
the Guidelines range under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
Regardless of the district court’s basis for the above-
Guidelines sentence in this case, our review in this case
remains the same. See United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 164
(4th Cir. 2008) (“[R]egardless of whether the court deviates
from the advisory Guidelines range because of a Guidelines-
sanctioned departure, or because of one or more § 3553(a)
factors . . . we review the resulting sentence only for
reasonableness.”).
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(internal quotation marks omitted). In determining procedural
reasonableness, we consider whether the district court properly
calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range, gave the
parties an opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence,
considered the § 3553(a) factors, selected a sentence based on
clearly erroneous facts, or failed to explain sufficiently the
selected sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-51. If the sentence is
free of significant procedural error, we review it for
substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing] into account the totality
of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from
the Guidelines range.” Id. at 51.
When a district court imposes a sentence that falls
outside of the applicable Guidelines range, we consider “whether
the sentencing court acted reasonably both with respect to its
decision to impose such a sentence and with respect to the
extent of the divergence from the sentencing range.” United
States v. Hernandez–Villanueva, 473 F.3d 118, 123 (4th Cir.
2007). In conducting this review, we must give due deference to
the sentencing court’s decision because it has “flexibility in
fashioning a sentence outside of the Guidelines range,” and need
only “set forth enough to satisfy [this] . . . court that it has
considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis” for
its decision. United States v. Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d 359, 364
(4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and alterations
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omitted); see also United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328
(4th Cir. 2009) (providing that sentencing court “must make an
individualized assessment based on the facts presented”)
(internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
Based on our review of the record and the parties’
briefs, we conclude that Locklear’s above-Guidelines sentence is
substantively reasonable. Although the sentence is forty-three
months above the high end of the Guidelines range, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that such a
deviation was justified by the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)
factors, including Locklear’s history and characteristics; the
need to promote respect for the law; the compelling need to
protect the public; and the need to afford adequate deterrence.
See § 3553(a)(1), (2). See Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d at 366-67
(affirming substantive reasonableness of variance sentence six
years greater than Guidelines range because sentence was based
on the district court’s examination of relevant § 3553(a)
factors); United States v. McNeill, 598 F.3d 161, 167 (4th Cir.
2010) (affirming the district court’s upward departure based on,
among other factors, the seriousness of the offense, McNeill’s
extensive criminal history and lack of work history, and the
need to deter McNeill from future crimes).
While Locklear argues that the 100-month sentence is
substantively unreasonable in light of his mental health issues,
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we reject this argument because it essentially asks this court
to substitute its judgment for that of the district court.
While this court may have weighed the § 3553(a) factors
differently had it imposed sentence in the first instance, we
defer to the district court’s decision that a 100-month sentence
achieved the purposes of sentencing in Locklear’s case. See
United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 2011)
(“[D]istrict courts have extremely broad discretion when
determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a)
factors.”).
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately expressed in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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