United States v. Vines , 381 F. App'x 291 ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4646
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
FLOYD VINES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior
District Judge. (3:08-cr-00488-RLW-3)
Submitted: April 12, 2010 Decided: June 7, 2010
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and DUNCAN, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David R. Lett, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Michael Arlen
Jagels, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Floyd Vines pled guilty
to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fifty grams
or more of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846(2006). The district court sentenced Vines to 172 months’
imprisonment.
Vines’ attorney has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that, in his
view, there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but
presenting two challenges to Vines’ conviction. Though advised
of his right to do so, Vines has not filed a pro se supplemental
brief. The Government declined to file a brief.
Counsel first challenges the enforceability of Vines’
appellate waiver. However, the Government has not filed a
motion to dismiss asserting the waiver, and we do not sua sponte
enforce appellate waivers. See generally United States v.
Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing United
States v. Brock, 211 F.3d 88, 90 n.1 (4th Cir. 2000)).
Accordingly, we find this issue is moot.
Counsel next argues that there was an insufficient
factual basis for Vines’ guilty plea because there was no expert
evidence to establish that the substance involved in the
conspiracy was in fact crack cocaine. However, in pleading
guilty to conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, Vines admitted
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“all the elements of [the] formal criminal charge,” McCarthy v.
United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969), and waived his right to
contest “all nonjurisdictional defects, including the right to
contest the factual merits of the charges.” United States v.
Willis, 992 F.2d 489, 490 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Moreover, the statement of facts
proffered by the Government at Vines’ plea hearing expressly
identified that the conspiracy involved crack cocaine, and Vines
testified that this statement accurately reflected his criminal
conduct. Adoption of counsel’s suggestion that further evidence
was needed would undermine the legal significance imported to
Vines’ inculpating statements. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431
U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (“Solemn declarations in open court carry a
strong presumption of verity.”). Accordingly, we reject this
argument.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record for any meritorious issues and have found none. The
district court substantially complied with the mandates of
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 in accepting Vines’ guilty
plea. Moreover, Vines’ sentence is procedurally and
substantively reasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s judgment. Further, we deny counsel’s pending motion to
withdraw from representation. This court requires that counsel
inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the
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Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the
client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
the client. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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