United States v. Davis , 383 F. App'x 269 ( 2010 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 08-5160
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    MOSES LIRAN DAVIS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
    District Judge. (5:07-cr-00343-F-1)
    Argued:   May 14, 2010                    Decided:   June 15, 2010
    Before MOTZ, KING, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    ARGUED: William Lee Davis, III, Lumberton, North Carolina, for
    Appellant. William Miller Gilmore, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.     ON BRIEF:
    George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes,
    Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorneys,
    OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina,
    for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    A    jury    convicted      Moses     Liran      Davis    of    narcotics        and
    firearms offenses.          On appeal, Davis challenges the denial of
    his motion to suppress, certain evidentiary rulings, the jury
    instructions, and the sufficiency of the evidence.                       We affirm.
    I.
    Davis’s      arrest       resulted    from      an     undercover       operation
    designed to apprehend Christian Angel McDuffie, a suspected drug
    dealer.        Detective     Chad      Hines   of    the    Wake    County       Special
    Response Team (“SRT”), working undercover, had purchased drugs
    from McDuffie on two prior occasions.                  McDuffie agreed to meet
    Detective Hines at a BP gas station in Raleigh, North Carolina,
    for a third drug transaction on May 19, 2007.                       The SRT planned
    to arrest McDuffie after the drugs and money changed hands, and
    several SRT officers waited in a van parked close to Detective
    Hines’s vehicle, ready to effectuate the “takedown.”
    The situation grew more dangerous than the officers had
    anticipated when McDuffie told Detective Hines that, because his
    regular   supplier      could    not    provide     him    with    drugs,    he   would
    arrive    at   the     BP   station     with   his    “boys.”        McDuffie       told
    Detective      Hines    that    his     friends      “didn’t      deal    with    white
    people,” but would come to the station with him and wait to
    collect their share of the proceeds.                      At 7:22 p.m., McDuffie
    2
    called to inform Detective Hines that he was on his way “with
    his boys.”      Detective Hines relayed all of this information to
    the other officers at the scene.
    A few minutes later, Detective Hines saw McDuffie’s white
    Acura pull into the BP station parking lot.                      Detective Wade
    Allen, who was sitting in the car with Detective Hines, saw
    another car pull in “almost at the exact same time as the white
    Acura.”      Detective Hines communicated to the officers waiting in
    the SRT van that the suspect had arrived, at which point those
    officers also saw the second car pull into the parking lot.
    Davis, the driver of the second car, backed his car into
    the space next to the SRT van.               (Davis’s car faced Detective
    Hines’s vehicle, and the SRT van faced the opposite direction.)
    From   his    parking   spot,   Davis       had    an   unobstructed     view   of
    Detective Hines’s car, where the drug sale between McDuffie and
    Detective Hines would take place.                 Detective Aldolphus McGhee,
    one of the SRT members waiting in the van, watched Davis for
    approximately forty-five seconds, during which time Davis did
    not “make any effort to pump gas or get services from the gas
    station.”       Detective   McGhee   testified          that   Davis’s   behavior
    struck him as unusual:      “I found it peculiar and strange that he
    was sitting in the car.         He wasn’t going into the store.                 He
    wasn’t motioning for his wallet or phone.                 He was just sitting
    in the car observing the undercover vehicle, looking in that
    3
    direction.”       Because of McDuffie’s statements about his friends’
    impending arrival, the close proximity in time of the two cars’
    entry     into      the     station,        Davis’s       post-parking            behavior,
    McDuffie’s statement that his friends would not deal with white
    people, and Davis’s non-white race, the officers suspected that
    the Davis was one of McDuffie’s drug-dealing “boys.”
    While the SRT officers observed Davis, McDuffie left his
    vehicle    and    walked     to    Detective       Hines’s      car,    where      he   sold
    Detective     Hines       $120    worth   of     powder    cocaine.          After      they
    completed the sale, some SRT officers emerged from the van to
    arrest McDuffie, Detective Hines, and Detective Allen.                              Others
    went to Davis’s car and, with their weapons drawn, “ordered him
    out of the car and onto the ground.”                      Detective McGhee opened
    the car door, pulled Davis out, placed him in handcuffs, and
    then    “looked     back”    at    Davis’s       car,   where    he    saw    a    “bag   of
    marijuana in the [car] door.”
    The officers then searched the car.                      They found marijuana
    in the driver’s side door, a loaded .38 caliber pistol under the
    driver’s side floor mat, cocaine and plastic baggies in a Crown
    Royal bag in the glove compartment, crack cocaine and a Tanita
    digital scale in the console, $320 in cash between the driver’s
    seat    and   the   pull-up       parking      brake,     and    a    9mm    pistol     with
    obliterated serial numbers in the trunk.
    4
    On   November          20,    2007,      a    grand   jury    charged    Davis       with
    possessing cocaine, cocaine base, and marijuana with intent to
    distribute, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) (2006); being
    a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(1) and 924; and using and carrying a firearm during
    and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 
    id.
    § 924 (c)(1)(A).
    Prior to trial, Davis moved to suppress the evidence found
    in   the    car,       contending        that       it   constituted   the     fruit    of    an
    illegal     search.           At     the   suppression        hearing,    the       Government
    presented testimony from officers at the scene.                              The Government
    also moved to admit into evidence the written reports of some
    officers         who    did    not       testify.         Davis     objected    on     hearsay
    grounds.
    Without relying on the written reports or admitting them
    into   evidence,         the    court         denied     Davis’s    motion     to    suppress.
    Although the court found that the police officers did not have
    probable cause to arrest Davis at the moment they pulled him out
    of his car, it concluded that they did have reasonable suspicion
    to conduct an investigatory stop “in order to assure officer
    safety      in    the    wake       of   an    executed      drug    transaction       on    the
    scene.”      The court further reasoned that this investigatory stop
    permitted the officers to view “a bag of marijuana in plain
    5
    sight in the door of Davis’s car” and thus provided “probable
    cause to search the remainder of Davis’s car.”
    At trial, the Government presented testimony describing the
    McDuffie-Hines transaction, Davis’s appearance on the scene, the
    investigative stop of Davis, and the evidence found in Davis’s
    car.     The defense presented no evidence.
    The jury found Davis guilty on all counts, and the court
    sentenced him to 420 months in prison.
    Davis timely noted this appeal.
    II.
    Davis first challenges the district court’s order denying
    his motion to suppress.           “[W]e review a district court’s factual
    findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo.”
    United States v. Perkins, 
    363 F.3d 317
    , 320 (4th Cir. 2004).
    When,    as   here,   the    district    court   has   denied   a   motion   to
    suppress, we “construe the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the government.”         
    Id.
    A.
    Generally, “a search or seizure without probable cause is
    unreasonable    and,   thus,      unconstitutional.”      United    States   v.
    Neely, 
    564 F.3d 346
    , 349 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).                       The
    district court did not find, and the Government does not argue,
    that the police officers had probable cause to arrest Davis when
    6
    they pulled him from his car.                      Rather, the Government contends,
    and    the   district       court       found,         that     the       officers    conducted   a
    legal investigatory stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    (1968).
    Under Terry, “an officer may conduct a brief investigatory
    stop    where       the   officer           has        reasonable          suspicion    [but    not
    probable cause to believe] that criminal activity may be afoot.”
    Perkins, 
    363 F.3d at 321
    .                    To satisfy the Fourth Amendment, a
    temporary       stop      must     be       “justified           at       its     inception”    and
    “reasonably         related        in    scope           to     the       circumstances        which
    justified the interference in the first place.”                                   Terry, 
    392 U.S. at 20
    .       The police may stop a suspect when they can “point to
    specific      and      articulable          facts        which,           taken    together     with
    rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
    intrusion.”         
    Id. at 21
    .          Courts must judge those facts “against
    an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer
    at the moment of the seizure or the search warrant a man of
    reasonable      caution       in      the    belief           that    the    action     taken    was
    appropriate?”        
    Id. at 21-22
     (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Applying      that     standard            to    this     case,       the     officers    had
    reasonable      suspicion        to     stop       Davis.            We    have    explained    that
    “factors which by themselves suggest only innocent conduct may
    amount to reasonable suspicion when taken together,” and “our
    determination of reasonable suspicion must give due weight to
    7
    common sense judgments reached by officers in light of their
    experience and training.”               Perkins, 
    363 F.3d at 321
    .                In this
    case, the police knew that McDuffie planned to bring his “boys”
    to    the    drug   sale,   that     those       “boys”    had    provided      drugs   to
    McDuffie and did not like white people, that a car had arrived
    at roughly the same time as McDuffie’s car and been positioned
    in viewing distance of the anticipated drug sale, and that the
    car was driven by a non-white man who did not buy gas or enter
    the gas station store.             A reasonable police officer would also
    have understood the close relationship between drugs and guns
    and    the    possible      danger      inherent      in    a      drug      transaction.
    Ultimately, “[a] determination that reasonable suspicion exists
    . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.”
    United States v. Arvizu, 
    534 U.S. 266
    , 277 (2002).                               Although
    Davis might have arrived at the BP gas station without nefarious
    purpose, the officers reasonably could have suspected otherwise
    from    the    circumstances       of    his      arrival        and   his    subsequent
    actions.
    Furthermore, the officers’ conduct in detaining Davis did
    not transform the encounter from a Terry stop (requiring only
    reasonable suspicion) to a full-scale arrest (requiring probable
    cause).       We have held that a Terry stop becomes a custodial
    arrest not because of the degree to which officers restrict the
    suspect’s liberty, or the means they employ to do so, but rather
    8
    as a result of the duration of the stop.                          See United States v.
    Leshuk, 
    65 F.3d 1105
    , 1109-10 (4th Cir. 1995).                         Terry permits a
    “brief   but     complete       restriction       of    liberty”      so   long    as   the
    restriction lasts “no longer than necessary to verify or dispel
    the officer’s suspicion.”               
    Id. at 1109
     (emphasis added).                    We
    have explicitly recognized that valid Terry stops may involve
    “drawing weapons, handcuffing a suspect, placing a suspect in a
    patrol   car     for    questioning,        or    using      or    threatening     to   use
    force,” particularly if the officers “reasonably suspect[] that
    [the   detainee        is]    armed   and    dangerous.”            United    States     v.
    Elston, 
    479 F.3d 314
    , 320 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation
    marks omitted).              The specific circumstances of the detention
    dictate whether the officers “exceed[ed] the limits of a Terry
    stop.”    
    Id.
    Davis’s       detention    occurred        during     a    dangerous     take-down
    operation in which the arresting officers had to ensure not only
    their own safety, but also that of two undercover officers, the
    many patrons at the busy BP station, and the suspected drug
    dealers.        To    minimize    the      risk    of    a   shoot-out     or     physical
    confrontation, they needed to restrain any potentially dangerous
    persons until they could “verify or dispel” their suspicions
    about them.       Based on Davis’s behavior, the officers could have
    reasonably      suspected       him   of    being       McDuffie’s     drug     supplier.
    They could have reasonably believed that Davis was dangerous,
    9
    had a gun at the ready (as indeed he did), and was in an ideal
    location to use that gun to attack them.                  The officers were
    entitled to restrain Davis for the brief period necessary to
    ascertain whether he actually posed a threat.
    B.
    The SRT officers legally searched Davis’s vehicle.                   The
    police “may search a car without a warrant as long as there is
    probable cause to believe the car contains contraband.”               United
    States   v.    Carter,   
    300 F.3d 415
    ,   422   (4th    Cir.   2002)   (per
    curiam).      After seeing the marijuana in the door, the police had
    probable cause to search the passenger compartment.                 Cf. 
    id.
     1
    The district court did not err in admitting the evidence the
    police gathered from their search.
    1
    The police also searched the trunk of the car and found a
    gun inside. Although probable cause to search one area of a car
    does not necessarily extend to the rest of the car, see Carter,
    
    300 F.3d at 422
    , the district court held -- without explanation
    -- that the marijuana bag in the car door gave the police
    probable cause to search the entire car, including the trunk.
    Davis did not (and does not) specifically challenge the search
    of the trunk.   We need not now decide whether the officers had
    probable cause to search the trunk. After finding a gun, drugs,
    a digital scale, and cash in the passenger compartment, clearly
    the police would have inevitably discovered the gun in the
    trunk.   See United States v. Lynn, 
    592 F.3d 572
    , 583 n.7 (4th
    Cir. 2010) (upholding a trunk search because after the police
    found drugs and drug paraphernalia in the passenger compartment,
    they had probable cause to arrest the defendant and perform an
    inventory search of the vehicle, which would “inevitably have
    led the officers to discover the [contraband] in the trunk”).
    10
    III.
    Davis also argues that the district court erred in several
    of its evidentiary rulings.           We “review the district court’s
    evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.”             United States v.
    Delfino, 
    510 F.3d 468
    , 470 (4th Cir. 2007).              “A district court
    abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or irrationally,
    fails to consider judicially recognized factors constraining its
    exercise of discretion, relies on erroneous factual or legal
    premises, or commits an error of law.”         
    Id.
    A.
    Davis    contends   that   the    court    erred    in    allowing   the
    Government to introduce as evidence at the suppression hearing
    written reports prepared by officers who did not testify at the
    hearing.     Petr.’s Br. at 24.        However, the district judge did
    not admit the evidence at the hearing, but rather asked for
    briefing on whether he should do so.           In denying the motion to
    suppress, the court never mentioned these reports.             Instead, the
    court solely relied on “the evidence offered [and] the testimony
    received”    at   the    suppression       hearing,     “and   the   court’s
    determination as to the credibility of the witnesses.”               Because
    nothing in the record indicates that the district court ever
    admitted the written reports, we cannot conclude that it abused
    its discretion in doing so.
    11
    B.
    Davis also, albeit briefly, argues that the court abused
    its discretion in admitting into evidence exhibits regarding the
    McDuffie-Hines       drug     transaction.     He    maintains     that     this
    evidence “was not relevant . . . and was prejudicial.”                   Petr.’s
    Br. at 23.         Specifically, Davis objects to Government Exhibits
    26 and 26A, which consist of photographs of the cocaine from the
    McDuffie-Hines drug sale, and the cocaine itself. 2
    “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to
    make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
    determination of the action more probable or less probable than
    it   would    be    without    the   evidence.”      Fed.   R.     Evid.     401.
    “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
    value    is   substantially      outweighed   by    the   danger    of     unfair
    prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
    by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
    presentation of cumulative evidence.”         Fed. R. Evid. 403.
    The cocaine from the McDuffie transaction placed in context
    the discovery of Davis’s contraband and connected Davis to drug-
    2
    Davis also objects to Government exhibits that consist of
    photographs of the gas station and photographs of the items
    seized from Davis and his car, as well as the actual items. The
    district court did not err in admitting this evidence.     As we
    have explained, the police properly conducted the search and
    seizure, and the court did not err in denying Davis’s motion to
    suppress.
    12
    selling     activity      (thereby          negating       the      argument       that    he
    possessed     the    drugs      in   his     car      merely       for    personal     use).
    Further, the court instructed the jury that the cocaine was “not
    to be attributed to the possession of Mr. Davis for any reason”
    and elaborated that “the charge against Mr. Davis doesn’t relate
    to [the McDuffie] charge.”               We presume that jurors follow the
    instructions    that      the    court       gives     them.         United      States    v.
    Williams, 
    461 F.3d 441
    , 451 (4th Cir. 2006).                             Accordingly, the
    district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this
    evidence.
    IV.
    Davis additionally contends that the district court erred
    in refusing to give a jury instruction on the lesser-included
    offense of simple possession.                     We review “a district court’s
    decision     whether      to    give    a    jury      instruction         for    abuse    of
    discretion.”        United States v. Kennedy, 
    372 F.3d 686
    , 698 (4th
    Cir. 2004).
    Davis argues that the relatively small amount of cocaine
    involved     (4.1    grams)      produces         a    fair      inference       of   simple
    possession     and     therefore       entitles        him    to    a     lesser-included
    offense    instruction.          Petr.’s      Br      at   27-28.        Our     holding    in
    United     States    v.    Wright,       
    131 F.3d 1111
        (4th      Cir.    1997)
    forecloses    his     argument.         In     Wright,        the    police      found     the
    13
    defendant with 3.25 grams of crack cocaine.                 
    Id. at 1112
    .        The
    district     court    denied    the   defendant’s      request    for   a   simple
    possession instruction.         
    Id.
       We affirmed, explaining that
    [a] defendant is not entitled to a lesser-included
    offense instruction as a matter of course.    In order
    to receive a lesser-included offense instruction, the
    proof of the element that differentiates the two
    offenses must be sufficiently in dispute that the jury
    could rationally find the defendant guilty of the
    lesser offense but not guilty of the greater offense.
    . . .    For an element to be placed sufficiently in
    dispute so as to warrant a lesser-included offense
    instruction, one of two conditions must be satisfied.
    Either the testimony on the distinguishing element
    must be sharply conflicting, or the conclusion as to
    the lesser offense must be fairly inferable from the
    evidence presented.
    
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Like Wright, Davis did not produce “sharply conflicting”
    testimony as to the “distinguishing element,” Davis’s intent in
    possessing the drugs.           Rather, he “presented no evidence from
    which a reasonable jury could find that [his] intent was to
    possess the cocaine for personal use.”               
    Id.
       No one testified at
    trial that Davis used drugs or possessed the cocaine “for any
    purpose other than distribution.”            
    Id.
    Furthermore, again like Wright, Davis did not demonstrate
    that possession was fairly inferable from the evidence, given
    that the     amount    of   cocaine   “is    simply    insufficient     alone    to
    require the lesser-included offense instruction requested.”                     
    Id. at 1113
    .     In     Wright,   the   police       found   the   defendant    with
    14
    cocaine,       a    razor        blade    with      cocaine        residue,       and    cash;   we
    concluded that “[f]rom none of this evidence could a jury fairly
    infer that [the defendant] possessed his crack for personal use
    only.”      
    Id.
             Similarly, the police found Davis with guns, a
    scale,    plastic          baggies,          cocaine,       and    cash,     and    no    witness
    testified that Davis used cocaine.                          The evidence simply did not
    provide a fair inference of simple possession.
    Thus, the district court did not err in denying the request
    for a lesser-included offense instruction.
    V.
    Finally,         Davis        argues    that       the    district     court      erred    in
    denying his motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal
    Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.                           We consider de novo a district
    court’s denial of a Rule 29 motion.                              United States v. Alerre,
    
    430 F.3d 681
    ,        693    (4th     Cir.       2005).       “In     reviewing         the
    sufficiency of the evidence following a conviction, this court
    views the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn
    therefrom          in   the      light       most    favorable       to     the    Government.”
    United    States          v.    Lomax,       
    293 F.3d 701
    ,     705    (4th    Cir.    2002)
    (internal quotation marks omitted).                             If “any rational trier of
    fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
    a     reasonable        doubt,”        the     appellant’s          sufficiency          challenge
    fails.     
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks omitted).
    15
    The   district         court     did     not    err    in     denying   the    Rule    29
    motion as to Count One -- possessing cocaine, cocaine base, and
    marijuana    with      the      intent    to    distribute,          in   violation    of    
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1).             “To convict a defendant of possession with
    the   intent      to   distribute,           the     government       must    prove:        (1)
    possession of a narcotic controlled substance; (2) knowledge of
    the   possession;         and    (3)     the    intent       to   distribute.”         United
    States v. Collins, 
    412 F.3d 515
    , 519 (4th Cir. 2005).                                       The
    prosecution    presented          evidence         that     Davis    knowingly      possessed
    drugs, drug trafficking paraphernalia including digital scales
    and plastic bags with the corners torn off, $320 in $20 bills,
    and two guns.          Petr.’s Br. at 30.                 Detectives testified as to
    the connection between those items and narcotic distribution.
    That evidence provided a sufficient basis for a reasonable juror
    to find possession with intent to distribute.
    The district court also did not err in denying the Rule 29
    motion as to Count Two -- being a felon in possession of a
    firearm, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(1) and 924.                                Davis
    stipulated     to      being     a     felon,      and    the     prosecution       presented
    evidence that Davis knowingly possessed two firearms.
    Nor   did     the    district       court       err    in     denying   the    Rule    29
    motion as to Count Three -- using and carrying a firearm during
    and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
     (c)(1)(A).                Section 924(c) “requires the government
    16
    to present evidence indicating that the possession of a firearm
    furthered,   advanced,   or   helped   forward   a   drug   trafficking
    crime.”   Lomax, 
    293 F.3d at 705
    .      Although “whether the firearm
    served such a purpose is ultimately a factual question,” this
    court has noted several ways a firearm could further or advance
    drug trafficking, including protection and intimidation.           
    Id.
    In this case, the SRT officers found one of the guns underneath
    the driver’s side floor mat, at Davis’s feet.          The jury could
    reasonably infer that the presence of an illegally possessed and
    easy-to-reach gun alongside indicia of drug distribution showed
    that the gun furthered Davis’s drug trafficking.
    In sum, the district court did not err in denying Davis’s
    Rule 29 motion.
    VI.
    For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district
    court.
    AFFIRMED
    17