United States v. Pyles ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4342
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARCUS DWAYNE PYLES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
Chief District Judge. (1:09-cr-00190-JAB-4)
Submitted: September 28, 2010 Decided: October 15, 2010
Before GREGORY, AGEE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
George E. Crump, III, Rockingham, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Anand P. Ramaswamy, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Marcus Dwayne Pyles appeals the 175-month sentence
imposed following his guilty plea, pursuant to a written plea
agreement, to two counts of interference with commerce by
threats or violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1951 (2006)
(“Counts One and Three”), and one count of brandishing a firearm
during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (West 2000 & Supp. 2010) (“Count Two”).
Counsel for Pyles filed a brief in this court in accordance with
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that there
are no non-frivolous issues for appeal, but questioning whether:
(1) the district court erred in accepting Pyles’ guilty plea;
and (2) whether the court imposed an unreasonable sentence.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm the conviction and the
sentence. Pyles was informed of his right to file a
supplemental brief but elected not to file a brief.
Counsel first questions whether Pyles’ guilty plea was
knowing and voluntary. Prior to accepting a defendant’s guilty
plea, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 requires the
district court to address the defendant in open court and ensure
he understands: the nature of the charge against him; any
mandatory minimum sentence; the maximum possible sentence,
including imprisonment, fine, and terms of supervised release;
the mandatory special assessment; the applicability of the
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Guidelines and their advisory nature; his right to an attorney
at all stages of the proceedings; his right to plead not guilty;
his right to a jury trial with the assistance of counsel; his
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses; his right to
testify on his own behalf as well as his right against self-
incrimination; any waiver provision in the plea agreement; the
court’s authority to order restitution; any applicable
forfeiture; and the government’s right to use any of his
statements under oath in a perjury prosecution. Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11(b)(1). The district court must also inform the defendant
that he may not withdraw his guilty plea once the court accepts
it and imposes a sentence. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e).
Additionally, the district court must “determine that there is a
factual basis for the plea.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3).
Finally, the district court must ensure the defendant’s plea was
voluntary and did not come about as a result of force, threats,
or promises. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2).
Because Pyles did not move to withdraw his guilty plea
in the district court or raise any objections to the Rule 11
colloquy, the colloquy is reviewed for plain error. United
States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 393 (4th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 524-27 (4th Cir. 2002). To
demonstrate plain error, a defendant must show that: (1) there
was an error; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error
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affected his “substantial rights.” United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 732 (1993). A defendant’s substantial rights are
affected if the error “influenced the defendant’s decision to
plead guilty and impaired his ability to evaluate with eyes open
the direct attendant risks of accepting criminal
responsibility.” United States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400, 402-03
(4th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Martinez, 277 F.3d at 532 (holding that a defendant must
demonstrate that he would not have pled guilty but for the
error).
A review of the record reveals that the district court
complied with the requirements of Rule 11. As counsel suggests,
the contention that the district court failed to fully comply
with Rule 11 when it did not inform Pyles of the elements of
each offense is without merit. Rule 11 merely requires that the
district court explain the nature of the charges to the
defendant. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G). In doing so, the
court “must take into account both the complexity of the charge
and the sophistication of the defendant. . . . [T]he trial
court is given a wide degree of discretion in deciding the best
method to inform and ensure the defendant’s understanding.”
United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991).
Here, the district court adequately ensured that Pyles
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understood the charges to which he pled guilty. Therefore, we
hold that Pyles’ guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.
Next, counsel challenges the reasonableness of Pyles’
sentence. We review a sentence imposed by a district court
under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 45 (2007); United States v. Lynn,
592 F.3d 572, 578-79 (4th Cir. 2010) (abuse of discretion
standard of review applicable when defendant properly preserves
a claim of sentencing error in district court “[b]y drawing
arguments from [18 U.S.C.] § 3553 [2006] for a sentence
different than the one ultimately imposed”). We begin by
reviewing the sentence for significant procedural error,
including such errors as “failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as
mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting
a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence  including an
explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines.” Gall, 552
U.S. at 51. If there are no procedural errors, we then consider
the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, taking into
account the totality of the circumstances. United States v.
Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007).
“When rendering a sentence, the district court ‘must
make an individualized assessment based on the facts
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presented.’” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th
Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50). Accordingly, a
sentencing court must apply the relevant § 3553(a) factors to
the particular facts presented and must “state in open court”
the particular reasons that support its chosen sentence. Id.
The court’s explanation need not be exhaustive; it must be
“sufficient ‘to satisfy the appellate court that [the district
court] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned
basis for exercising [its] own legal decicisionmaking
authority.’” United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 837 (4th
Cir. 2010) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356
(2007)).
We conclude that the district court’s sentence was
both procedurally and substantively reasonable. Pyles’ sentence
is at the low end of the applicable Guidelines range for Counts
One and Three and below the mandatory minimum for Count Two.
See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing
table); 18 U.S.C § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The district court used
the correct Guidelines range and understood that it was
advisory. Furthermore, it is apparent from the court’s
discussion with counsel that it considered both parties’
arguments and had a reasoned basis for its decision.
In accordance with Anders, we have examined the entire
record and find no other meritorious issues for appeal. We
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therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Pyles, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Pyles requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Pyles.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid in the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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