United States v. Chapman ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4554
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
NICHOLAS R. CHAPMAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers,
District Judge. (3:08-cr-00164-1)
Submitted: October 4, 2010 Decided: October 21, 2010
Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne,
Appellate Counsel, Edward H. Weis, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth
Goodwin, II, United States Attorney, Lisa G. Johnston, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Nicholas R. Chapman appeals his thirty-six month
sentence imposed on revocation of his probation. We affirm.
Chapman, who requested a variance in this case, makes
a single contention on appeal: the district court imposed a
plainly unreasonable sentence because the court allegedly failed
to offer an individualized explanation for the sentence. We do
not agree.
We “review probation revocation sentences, like
supervised release revocation sentences, to determine if they
are plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d
652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). The first step in this analysis is a
determination of whether the sentence was unreasonable. United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006). In
determining reasonableness, we generally follow the procedural
and substantive considerations employed in reviewing original
sentences. Id. However, “[t]his initial inquiry takes a more
‘deferential appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the
exercise of discretion’ than reasonableness review for
guidelines sentences.” Moulden, 478 F.3d at 656 (quoting
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438).
Although the district court must consider the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual Chapter 7 policy statements and the
requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2006),
2
“the sentencing court retains broad discretion to revoke a
defendant’s probation and impose a term of imprisonment up to
the statutory maximum.” Moulden, 478 F.3d at 657 (citing
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439). In Chapman’s case, the statutory
maximum revocation sentence was ten years.
“The court must provide a statement of reasons for the
sentence imposed, as with the typical sentencing procedure, but
this statement ‘need not be as specific as has been required’
for departing from a traditional guidelines range.” See United
States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing
Moulden, 478 F.3d at 657). If a sentence imposed after a
revocation is not unreasonable, we will not proceed to the
second prong of the analysis--whether the sentence was plainly
unreasonable. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39.
A sentence is procedurally unreasonable only when the
district court commits a “significant procedural error” in
imposing the sentence. United States v. Curry, 523 F.3d 436,
439 (4th Cir. 2008). A district court commits a significant
procedural error by: “failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as
mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting
a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence--including an explanation
for any deviation from the Guidelines.” Gall v. United States,
3
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also United States v. Carter, 564
F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that, while an
“individualized assessment need not be elaborate or lengthy,
. . . it must provide a rationale tailored to the particular
case . . . and [be] adequate to permit meaningful appellate
review”). In this case, Chapman contends that the district
court committed procedural error by failing to include an
adequate statement of reasons justifying the sentence it
imposed.
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the
district court did not impose an unreasonable sentence, let
alone one that is plainly so. The court discussed Chapman’s
initial sentencing (where he was placed on probation), his
attempts to receive substance abuse treatment, and the faith
shown in him by the court and by the Probation Office.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that Chapman’s probation
violations (which included possession with intent to deliver
marijuana) were significantly serious as to justify the term of
imprisonment imposed. This explanation was not inadequate.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
4
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
5