United States v. Strickland , 405 F. App'x 807 ( 2010 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 10-4240
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    JAMES ANTONIO STRICKLAND, a/k/a Stricknine,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
    District Judge. (5:97-cr-00135-F-1)
    Submitted:   December 16, 2010            Decided:   December 27, 2010
    Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
    Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
    Appellant. George E.B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M.
    Hayes,   Jennifer   P.   May-Parker,  Assistant   United States
    Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    James          Strickland          appeals          from        the     sixty-month
    sentence imposed pursuant to the revocation of his supervised
    release.              Strickland        contends         the       sentence           was       plainly
    unreasonable          because        the   court       erred       in    determining            he    had
    committed         a    Grade     A    violation         and      in     considering         a    prior
    reduction     to       his     original     sentence          based       on    the    retroactive
    amendment to the crack cocaine sentencing guideline.                                   We affirm.
    A       sentence       imposed      after       revocation         of     supervised
    release    should        be     affirmed         if    it     is      within    the     applicable
    statutory     maximum          and    is   not        plainly         unreasonable.             United
    States v. Crudup, 
    461 F.3d 433
    , 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006).                                                In
    making     this        determination,            we     first         consider        whether        the
    sentence is unreasonable.                   
    Id. at 438
    .               “This initial inquiry
    takes a more deferential appellate posture concerning issues of
    fact and the exercise of discretion than reasonableness review
    for guideline sentences.”                   United States v. Moulden, 
    478 F.3d 652
    , 656 (4th Cir. 2007).                      In making our review, we “follow
    generally     the       procedural         and    substantive            considerations              that
    [are] employ[ed] in [the] review of original sentences, . . .
    with   some       necessary          modifications          to     take    into       account         the
    unique     nature        of     supervised            release      revocation          sentences.”
    Crudup, 
    461 F.3d at 438-39
    .
    2
    A    sentence      imposed    upon       revocation       of    release         is
    procedurally        reasonable     if    the     district       court    considered        the
    Chapter    Seven     policy      statements      and      the   
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)
    (2006) factors that it is permitted to consider.                            See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (e)       (2006);   Crudup,      
    461 F.3d at 438-40
    .       A       sentence
    imposed upon revocation of release is substantively reasonable
    if the district court stated a proper basis for concluding that
    the defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to the
    statutory maximum.          Crudup, 
    461 F.3d at 440
    .                 We will affirm if
    the    sentence     is    not   unreasonable.            
    Id. at 439
    .       Only     if    a
    sentence      is    found   procedurally         or      substantively       unreasonable
    will we “decide whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable.”
    
    Id.
    Strickland        argues   that      the    district      court      erred      in
    concluding that his most serious new law violation was a Grade A
    violation rather than a Grade B violation.                       A Grade A violation
    results from “conduct constituting a federal, state, or local
    offense punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year
    that      . . .      is     a     controlled          substance         offense.”         USSG
    § 7B1.1(a)(1),        p.s..         A    controlled         substance        offense       for
    purposes      of    § 7B1.1(a)(1),         p.s.,      includes       state    or       federal
    crimes prohibiting the distribution of a controlled substance,
    as well as the possession of a controlled substance with the
    intent to distribute, and that are punishable by more than a
    3
    year in prison.                USSG §§ 4B1.2(b), 7B1.1, p.s., comment. (n.3).
    Any other offense punishable by more than a year in prison is a
    Grade B violation.               USSG § 7B1.1(a)(2), p.s..                     The commentary to
    USSG § 7B1.1, p.s. emphasizes that the “grade of violation does
    not    depend       on    the     conduct      that       is        the   subject      of    criminal
    charges       of       which    the    defendant          is        convicted    in    a     criminal
    proceeding.            Rather, the grade of violation is to be based on
    the defendant’s actual conduct.”                          USSG § 7B1.1, p.s., comment.
    (n.1); see United States v. Jolibois, 
    294 F.3d 1110
    , 1114 (9th
    Cir.     2002)         (violation        of    terms           of     supervised       release         is
    determined based on defendant’s conduct and may be found whether
    defendant          was     ever       convicted         of      any       particular        offense).
    Further,       although           a     conviction             requires        proof        beyond      a
    reasonable doubt, a violation of supervised release need only be
    proved    by       a     preponderance         of    the       evidence.         See        
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (e)(3).
    Strickland             contends          that        his     supervised           release
    violation was a Grade B violation because the drugs he admitted
    to possessing were for his personal use and not intended for
    distribution.            We conclude that Strickland failed to demonstrate
    that    the    court       erred       in     finding        by      a    preponderance          of   the
    evidence that the drugs were intended for distribution and not
    personal       use.         The       court    did       not        err   in   determining            that
    Strickland’s conduct constituted a Grade A violation nor abuse
    4
    its    discretion    in   considering        its   prior   reduction      of    his
    sentence,    and    Strickland    has    not   shown    that    the    sixty-month
    sentence was plainly unreasonable.
    We therefore affirm the sentence.                  We dispense with
    oral   argument     because     the    facts   and     legal    contentions     are
    adequately    presented    in    the    materials      before    the    court   and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-4240

Citation Numbers: 405 F. App'x 807

Judges: Gregory, Duncan, Davis

Filed Date: 12/27/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024