United States v. Matthews , 404 F. App'x 749 ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-7223
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL F. MATTHEWS,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:07-cr-00226-REP-1)
Submitted: November 10, 2010 Decided: December 10, 2010
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael F. Matthews, Appellant Pro Se. Peter Sinclair Duffey,
Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Matthews appeals the district court’s denial
of his motion to compel specific performance and motion for
reconsideration. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Matthews pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute more
than fifty grams of cocaine base and was sentenced to 480
months’ imprisonment. The Government filed a motion for a
reduction of sentence pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 35(b) (“Rule 35”), which the district court granted,
reducing Matthews’s sentence to 300 months’ imprisonment.
Matthews filed a Motion to Compel Specific Performance, asking
the court to compel the Government to consider additional
instances of Matthews’s substantial assistance. The district
court denied the motion as moot. Matthews then filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, arguing that his original motion was not
moot because it outlined different facts than the Government’s
Rule 35 motion. The district court denied the motion on the
ground that Matthews lacked standing to seek a reduction in
sentence under Rule 35.
On appeal, Matthews argues that the district court
erred when it declined to compel the Government to consider
additional instances of cooperation that it did not include in
its original Rule 35 motion. We review a district court’s
denial of a motion to compel under an abuse of discretion
2
standard. Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 518 n.12 (4th Cir.
1999). Plea agreements are grounded in contract law, and both
parties should receive the benefit of their bargain. United
States v. Bowe, 257 F.3d 336, 345 (4th Cir. 2001). Because of
constitutional and supervisory concerns, the Government is held
to a greater degree of responsibility for imprecision or
ambiguities in plea agreements. United States v. Harvey, 791
F.2d 294, 300-01 (4th Cir. 1986). Where an agreement is
ambiguous in its terms, the terms must be construed against the
Government. Id. at 300, 303. However, “[w]hile the government
must be held to the promises it made, it will not be bound to
those it did not make.” United States v. Fentress, 792 F.2d
461, 464-65 (4th Cir. 1986).
Here, the Government was under no enforceable
obligation pursuant to the plea agreement. The agreement merely
states that the Government “reserves the right to seek . . . any
reduction of sentence pursuant to Rule 35(b) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, if, in its sole discretion, the
United States determines that such a departure or reduction of
sentence is appropriate.” Thus, the decision of what
constituted substantial assistance for purposes of the Rule 35
motion fell squarely within the Government’s discretion.
3
Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Matthews’s motions. * We
therefore affirm the district court’s orders. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
*
See MM ex rel. DM v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cnty., 303
F.3d 532, 536 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e are entitled to affirm the
court’s judgment on alternate grounds, if such grounds are
apparent from the record.”).
4