United States v. Samprece Christian ( 2022 )

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4175 Doc: 27 Filed: 12/14/2022 Pg: 1 of 4
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-4175
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SAMPRECE DEVOKIE CHRISTIAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, Chief District Judge. (1:08-cr-00352-TDS-1)
Submitted: November 30, 2022 Decided: December 14, 2022
Before THACKER and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, John A. Dusenbury, Jr., Assistant
Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, United States Attorney,
Julie C. Niemeier, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
In 2009, Samprece Devokie Christian pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced
Christian to 71 months’ imprisonment, followed by a 3-year term of supervised release. In
December 2016, the district court revoked Christian’s supervised release term and
sentenced him to 12 months’ imprisonment, followed by a 2-year term of supervised
release. Christian’s second supervised release term commenced in October 2017 and was
originally set to expire in October 2019. The probation officer filed a revocation petition
in May 2019, an amended revocation petition in July 2019, and a second amended
revocation petition in February 2022. In March 2022, the district court revoked Christian’s
second supervised release term and sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment.
On appeal, Christian’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but
questioning whether Christian’s revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable. Christian
was advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he did not do so. After
reviewing the record, we ordered supplemental briefing to address whether the district
court made the factual findings necessary to conclude that it had the authority in
March 2022 to enter a revocation judgment when Christian’s supervised release term was
originally set to expire in October 2019. We vacate the judgment and remand for further
proceedings.
“We review de novo whether the district court had jurisdiction to rule upon alleged
violations of supervised release,” United States v. Thompson, 924 F.3d 122, 127
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(4th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up), and we have an independent obligation to determine whether
the district court had such jurisdiction, id. at 129. Generally, “a district court’s power to
revoke a term of supervised release or to sanction violations ends when that term expires.”
Id. at 127. A district court’s authority to enter a revocation judgment, however, “extends
beyond the expiration of the term of supervised release for any period reasonably necessary
for the adjudication of matters arising before its expiration if, before its expiration, a
warrant or summons has been issued on the basis of an allegation of such a violation.”
18 U.S.C. § 3583(i). For this provision to apply, “two conditions [must be] met: First, a
warrant or summons must be issued before the term’s expiration, and second, any delay in
adjudicating that summons must be reasonably necessary.” Thompson, 924 F.3d at 132
(cleaned up).
In addition to § 3583(i), which extends the jurisdiction of the district court after the
expiration of the defendant’s supervised release term, another statute provides that a
defendant’s supervised release term is tolled “during any period in which the person is
imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the
imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e). And
the Supreme Court has held “that pretrial detention later credited as time served for a new
conviction is imprisonment in connection with a conviction and thus tolls the supervised-
release term under § 3624(e).” Mont v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1826, 1832 (2019)
(cleaned up).
We have also recognized that, under the fugitive tolling doctrine, “a term of
supervised release is tolled when a defendant absconds from supervision.” Thompson, 9243
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F.3d at 128 (internal quotation marks omitted). The government bears the “burden of
showing that the fugitive tolling doctrine applies” and for how long. Id.; see id. at 130.
Christian recognizes that § 3583(i), § 3624(e), the fugitive tolling doctrine, or some
combination of the three might apply in his case but argues that the district court failed to
make the findings necessary to establish its jurisdiction to adjudicate the alleged violations
over two years after the date on which his supervised release term was originally set to
expire. We agree. Although the district court asked questions regarding the timeline of
events in this case, it did not render findings that clearly establish its jurisdiction to revoke
Christian’s supervised release term.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. See id. at 131-32 (vacating judgment and
remanding for further factfinding on applicability of § 3583(i), § 3624(e), and fugitive
tolling doctrine). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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