Everett v. Prison Health Services ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-8250
JUNE EVERETT,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES,
Defendant – Appellee,
and
M. A. BENNETT, Major; ROY CHERRY, Superintendent Hampton
Roads Regional Jail; DAVID L. SIMONS, Assistant
Superintendent Hampton Roads Regional Jail; MARK A. GOOCH,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, District
Judge. (2:08-cv-00622-RBS-TEM)
Submitted: November 9, 2010 Decided: February 25, 2011
Before WILKINSON and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Bernard J. DiMuro, Hillary J. Collyer, DIMUROGINSBERG, P.C.,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. John D. McChesney, RAWLS &
MCNELIS, P.C., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
June Everett appeals the district court’s order
affirming the magistrate judge’s ruling denying Everett’s motion
to amend her complaint to add a previously unnamed party,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), (c). We affirm the district
court’s order. 1
The federal government detained Sandra Kenley in two
Virginia regional jails pending her removal from the United
States. On December 18, 2005, Kenley died while awaiting
removal. On December 8, 2007, June Everett, Kenley’s sister and
estate administrator, timely filed the underlying cause of
action in Virginia state court, naming several jail officials
(collectively “named Defendants”), and various unnamed
individuals identified as “John Doe.” Everett alleged wrongful
death, pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-244 (Supp. 2010), and
violation of Kenley’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). Specifically, Everett
alleged that Defendants’ failure to provide Kenley with adequate
medical care proximately caused her death.
1
As the parties agreed in the district court to dismiss
with prejudice Everett’s claims against all other defendants, we
have jurisdiction to review the order in question. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 (2006).
3
The named Defendants removed the case to federal
court. On July 24, 2009, Everett moved for leave to amend her
complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), to add Appellee
Prison Health Services, Inc. (“PHS”) as a defendant based on
information obtained during discovery, and to add a state-law
claim of medical malpractice against PHS. After a hearing, the
magistrate judge denied Everett’s motion. Everett timely
objected, thereby preserving the issue for review by the
district court. 2 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1). The district court
affirmed the order of the magistrate judge.
We review the denial of a motion to amend a pleading
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) for abuse of discretion. Equal
Rights Ctr. v. Niles Bolton Assoc., 602 F.3d 597, 602-03 (4th
Cir. 2010); Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 428 (4th Cir. 2006)
(en banc). “[A] district court has discretion to deny a motion
to amend a complaint, so long as it does not outright refuse ‘to
grant the leave without any justifying reason.’” Equal Rights
Ctr., 602 F.3d at 603 (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 179, 182
(1962)).
2
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), the
district court could not modify or set aside any portion of the
magistrate judge’s order unless the magistrate judge’s decision
was “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(a); 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2010).
4
In this case, Everett could not amend her complaint
without “the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s
leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). This Rule provides that
“[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”
Id. The Supreme Court has emphasized this requirement,
counseling that
[i]n the absence of any apparent or declared reason—
such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on
the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue
prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance
of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.—the
leave sought should, as the rules require, be “freely
given.”
Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. Thus, prejudice to an opposing party
and futility are two grounds for denial of a motion to amend
under Rule 15(a)(2). Where a proposed amendment is made beyond
the statute of limitations and it would not relate back to the
original complaint, such an amendment would be futile. In that
case, a district court does not abuse its discretion under Rule
15(a)(2) in denying a motion to amend. United States v.
Pittman, 209 F.3d 314, 318-19 (4th Cir. 2000).
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in affirming the denial of the motion to amend.
Unless Everett’s proposed amendment relates back to the filing
of the original complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(c)(1)(C), the amendment is barred by the statute of
5
limitations and thus is futile. The record supports the
district court’s decision that PHS did not have sufficient
notice of the action to avoid prejudice in defending it. See
Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 471 (4th Cir. 2007) (en
banc) (the notice requirements of Rule 15(c) ensure fair notice
to newly named party and protect party from improper prejudice
in defending itself). Therefore, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in affirming the magistrate
judge’s denial of leave to amend. 3
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
3
After all briefs were filed, Everett filed a letter
bringing to the court’s attention the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.P.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485(2010). In Krupski, the Supreme Court held that “relation back
under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) depends on what the party to be added
knew or should have known, not on the amending party’s knowledge
or its timeliness in seeking to amend the pleading.” Krupski,
130 S. Ct. at 2490. This court had previously reached the same
result in Goodman, 494 F.3d at 470 (“The Rule [now Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15(c)(1)(C)] does not concern itself with the amending
party’s particular state of mind except insofar as he made a
mistake . . . . The Rule’s description of when such an
amendment relates back to the original pleading focuses on the
notice to the new party and the effect on the new party that the
amendment will have.” (emphasis omitted)). We hold that the
district court properly based its Rule 15(c) ruling on the
inadequacy of notice to PHS, and not on an assessment of the
knowledge possessed by Everett.
6
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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