United States v. Pankey ( 2011 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 10-4854
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    SHARITA PANKEY,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    No. 10-4855
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    SHARITA LASHAWN PANKEY,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern
    District of West Virginia, at Beckley.        Irene C. Berger,
    District Judge. (5:09-cr-00240-2; 5:05-cr-00094-1)
    Submitted:   January 27, 2011               Decided:   March 3, 2011
    Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
    No. 10-4854 dismissed; No. 10-4855 affirmed by unpublished per
    curiam opinion.
    Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne,
    Appellate Counsel, Edward H. Weis, Assistant Federal Public
    Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant.      R. Booth
    Goodwin, II, United States Attorney, Miller Bushong, Assistant
    United States Attorney, Beckley, West Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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    PER CURIAM:
    In these consolidated appeals, Sharita LaShawn Pankey
    appeals the judgment of conviction entered after her guilty plea
    to one count of aiding and abetting in the distribution of a
    quantity of cocaine base, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1)
    & 
    18 U.S.C. § 2
     (2006), and the judgment entered after the court
    revoked her supervised release and imposed a sentence.                          Pankey’s
    sole     challenge       is    whether    the        district    court     abused     its
    discretion by ordering the two sentences to run consecutively.
    Based on the appeal waiver in the plea agreement, we dismiss
    Appeal No. 10-4854, while we affirm Appeal No. 10-4855.
    Pankey pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement in
    which    she    agreed    to    waive    her      right   to    appeal   the    sentence
    except    for     any     preserved      challenge        she    may     have   to    the
    determination of her Sentencing Guidelines sentence.
    A defendant may, in a valid plea agreement, waive the
    right to appeal under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
     (2006).                       United States v.
    Manigan, 
    592 F.3d 621
    , 627 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v.
    Wiggins, 
    905 F.2d 51
    , 53 (4th Cir. 1990).                        This court reviews
    the validity of an appellate waiver de novo, and will enforce
    the waiver if it is valid and the issue appealed is within the
    scope thereof.          United States v. Blick, 
    408 F.3d 162
    , 168 (4th
    Cir.    2005).     Pankey       does    not       challenge    the   validity    of   the
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    appeal    waiver.        She    argues     that    her     appellate        issue   is   not
    within the scope of the agreement.
    We conclude that the question of whether the district
    court    abused    its    discretion       by     ordering      the   sentence      to   run
    consecutively to the sentence imposed based on the revocation
    of supervised release is within the scope of the appeal waiver
    and   not    within      the    exceptions        to    the    waiver.        See    United
    States v. Calderon-Pacheco, 
    564 F.3d 55
    , 59 (1st Cir. 2009) (a
    challenge to consecutive sentences “is a garden-variety claim”
    that is within the scope of an appeal waiver);                        United States v.
    Trobee,     
    551 F.3d 835
    ,       838-39   (8th      Cir.   2009).        Accordingly,
    based on the appeal waiver, which we will enforce, we dismiss
    Appeal No. 10-4854.
    Pankey’s appeal waiver had no effect on the court’s
    judgment      revoking         her    supervised         release      and    ordering     a
    consecutive fifteen month sentence.                      This court will affirm a
    sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release if it is
    within      the   prescribed         statutory         range   and    is     not    plainly
    unreasonable.         United States v. Crudup, 
    461 F.3d 433
    , 437-39
    (4th Cir. 2006).          In making this determination, the court first
    considers whether the sentence is unreasonable.                              
    Id. at 438
    .
    “This initial inquiry takes a more deferential appellate posture
    concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion than
    reasonableness        review         for   guidelines          sentences.”           United
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    States v. Moulden, 
    478 F.3d 652
    , 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    The       district        court’s         discretion       is     not   unlimited,
    however.     United States v. Thompson, 
    595 F.3d 544
    , 547 (4th Cir.
    2010).      For    instance,          the     district        court    commits      procedural
    error by failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence or by
    not providing an individualized assessment based on the facts.
    Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007).                                 Although “[a]
    court    need     not      be   as    detailed         or     specific      when    imposing   a
    revocation       sentence        as    it     must       be     when     imposing     a     post-
    conviction sentence, . . . it still must provide a statement of
    reasons for the sentence imposed.”                          Thompson, 
    595 F.3d at 547
    (internal quotation marks omitted).                           The judge also must “set
    forth    enough       to    satisfy         the       appellate       court    that    he    has
    considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for
    exercising      his     own     legal       decisionmaking         authority.”            United
    States v. Carter, 
    564 F.3d 325
    , 328 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    We      conclude           that       the       district        court     provided
    sufficient reasons for the consecutive sentences and adequately
    addressed        Pankey’s            arguments          for      concurrent         sentences.
    Accordingly, we affirm Appeal No. 10-4855.
    We dismiss Appeal No. 10-4854 and affirm Appeal No.
    10-4855.     We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
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    legal    contentions   are   adequately   presented      in   the    materials
    before   the   court   and   argument   would   not    aid    the   decisional
    process.
    No. 10-4854 DISMISSED
    No. 10-4855 AFFIRMED
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