United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza , 413 F. App'x 600 ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4556
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DARIO MENDOZA-MENDOZA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (4:08-cr-00032-BR-1)
Submitted: January 28, 2011 Decided: February 18, 2011
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, James E. Todd, Jr., Research
and Writing Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-
Parker, Sebastian Kielmanovich, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
In July 2008, Dario Mendoza-Mendoza pled guilty to
illegally reentering the United States after being removed, in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2) (2006). Mendoza-Mendoza
was sentenced to forty-six months’ imprisonment. On appeal,
this court vacated his sentence and remanded the case to the
district court for resentencing. See United States v. Mendoza-
Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 2010).
At resentencing, the district court restated Mendoza-
Mendoza’s Guidelines calculations: his total offense level of
twenty-one, combined with a criminal history category III,
yielded an advisory sentencing range of forty-six to fifty-seven
months’ imprisonment. Although Mendoza-Mendoza’s base offense
level was eight, it was increased sixteen levels because of his
prior North Carolina convictions for taking indecent liberties
with a child, which qualified as a crime of violence. See U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 2L1.2(a), (b)(1)(A)
(2007). After analyzing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)
sentencing factors and considering Mendoza-Mendoza’s arguments
for a below-Guidelines sentence, the district court again
sentenced Mendoza-Mendoza to forty-six months’ imprisonment.
This appeal timely followed.
On appeal, Mendoza-Mendoza challenges the
reasonableness of his sentence. With regard to the procedural
2
reasonableness component, Mendoza-Mendoza argues the district
court failed to properly consider the unique mitigating
circumstances involved in this case in conducting its analysis
of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. As to the substantive
reasonableness issue, Mendoza-Mendoza first argues USSG
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) is not entitled to deference because it was
enacted without deliberation or empirical justification, and
results in a sentence greater than necessary. Mendoza-Mendoza
next contends the forty-six-month sentence over-punishes his
offense conduct. For the reasons that follow, we reject these
contentions and affirm.
This court reviews a sentence for reasonableness,
applying an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also United States v.
Llamas, 599 F.3d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2010). This review requires
appellate consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of a sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
In determining procedural reasonableness, we consider
whether the district court properly calculated the defendant’s
advisory Guidelines range, considered the § 3553(a) factors,
analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and
sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. “Regardless
of whether the district court imposes an above, below, or
within-Guidelines sentence, it must place on the record an
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individualized assessment based on the particular facts of the
case before it.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330
(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the
court finds “no significant procedural error,” it next assesses
the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, taking “‘into
account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent
of any variance from the Guidelines range.’” United States v.
Morace, 594 F.3d 340, 346-47 (4th Cir.) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S.
at 51), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 307 (2010).
In his sole argument pertaining to the procedural
reasonableness of his sentence, 1 Mendoza-Mendoza argues the
district court erred in its analysis of the § 3553(a) sentencing
factors. Specifically, Mendoza-Mendoza asserts the district
court should have afforded more mitigatory weight to the fact
that he has maintained a long-term relationship with the victim
of his prior criminal conduct, Heather Rowe.
The record establishes that the district court
considered the relationship between Mendoza-Mendoza and Rowe in
rendering its sentencing decision, but ultimately determined it
was an insufficient basis for sentencing Mendoza-Mendoza below
his properly calculated Guidelines range. At its core, Mendoza-
1
Mendoza-Mendoza does not contest the calculation of his
advisory Guidelines range.
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Mendoza’s argument asks this court to substitute its judgment
for that of the district court. This we will not do.
Accordingly, we hold Mendoza-Mendoza’s sentence is procedurally
reasonable.
We next consider the substantive reasonableness of the
imposed sentence. In conducting substantive reasonableness
review, this court must “take into account the totality of the
circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the
Guidelines range. If the sentence is within the Guidelines
range, the appellate court may, but is not required to, apply a
presumption of reasonableness.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; see also
United States v. Raby, 575 F.3d 376, 381 (4th Cir. 2009).
Mendoza-Mendoza first contends this court should not
afford a presumption of reasonableness to the within-Guidelines
sentence he received, because the sixteen-level enhancement
authorized by USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) is an arbitrary guideline,
enacted without deliberation or empirical justification, that
should not be afforded deference. This argument amounts to a
policy attack on the applicable enhancement provision, and we
conclude it is without merit. 2 Accord United States v.
2
This court has previously rejected this very argument in
several unpublished, non-binding decisions. See United States
v. Ibarra-Zelaya, 278 F. App’x 290, 290-91 (4th Cir. 2008)
(holding presumption of reasonableness not overcome simply
because district court failed to reject policy of guideline);
(Continued)
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Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 365-67 (5th Cir.) (explaining
that, although “district courts certainly may disagree with the
Guidelines for policy reasons and may adjust a sentence
accordingly[,] . . . if they do not, we will not second-guess
their decisions under a more lenient standard simply because the
particular Guideline is not empirically-based”), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 192 (2009).
Finally, Mendoza-Mendoza argues the forty-six-month
sentence over-punishes his conduct — his third illegal entry
into the United States — and thus is substantively unreasonable.
Mendoza-Mendoza’s argument asks this court to overlook the fact
that his sentencing range was impacted, primarily, by his status
of having been removed following a conviction for a crime of
violence, and instead to view his offense conduct in isolation.
We decline this request. Further, we hold that Mendoza-
Mendoza’s arguments do not overcome the presumption of
reasonableness afforded his within-Guidelines sentence.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district
court’s amended criminal judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
see also United States v. Palacios-Herrera, No. 10-4138, 2010 WL
4950000 (4th Cir. Dec. 3, 2010) (same); United States v.
Jimenez-Hernandez, 311 F. App’x 578, 579 (4th Cir. 2008) (same),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1598 (2009).
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presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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