United States v. Williams ( 2008 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 07-5041
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    CONSTANZUS MARCEL WILLIAMS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    South Carolina, at Greenville. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., District
    Judge. (6:07-cr-00270-GRA)
    Submitted:    October 16, 2008              Decided:   November 3, 2008
    Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Ryan L. Beasley, PRICE, ASHMORE & BEASLEY, P.A., Greenville, South
    Carolina, for Appellant. Elizabeth Jean Howard, Assistant United
    States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Constanzus Marcel Williams pled guilty pursuant to a
    written plea agreement to one count of possessing a firearm after
    being   convicted      of     a    felony,      in     violation    of   
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(1) and 924(e) (2000).              The court sentenced Williams to
    212 months in prison, and Williams timely appealed.                         Williams’
    attorney filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 739
     (1967), certifying that there are no meritorious grounds
    for appeal, but questioning whether the district court erred in
    calculating   Williams’       criminal         history   points    and   abused    its
    discretion by not imposing a lower sentence.                   The Government did
    not file a reply brief.           Williams submitted a pro se supplemental
    brief   contending     that       the   district      court   improperly      assessed
    certain criminal history points and the district court exhibited
    bias during sentencing.           Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
    Williams argues that the court erred by counting prior
    convictions   as    separate        offenses     in    calculating    his     criminal
    history.   Williams argues that because some of his state sentences
    were run concurrently or because he was sentenced on the same date
    for several offenses, the offenses should not be counted separately
    in calculating his criminal history.                  Pursuant to U.S. Sentencing
    Guidelines    Manual    (U.S.S.G.)         §    4A1.2(a)(2)       (2006),     “[p]rior
    sentences imposed in unrelated cases are to be counted separately”
    in the criminal history calculation.                     The commentary to this
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    guideline provides that “[p]rior sentences are not considered
    related if they were for offenses that were separated by an
    intervening arrest,” but will be considered related if the offenses
    “occurred on the same occasion,” “were part of a single common
    scheme or plan,” or “were consolidated for trial or sentencing.”
    § 4A1.2 comment. (n.3).              Here, there is no contention that the
    offenses actually occurred on the same occasion or were part of a
    common    plan.         Moreover,     the     presentence        report      provides     no
    indication       that     Williams’        convictions     were    consolidated          for
    sentencing;       rather,      he    received      separate      sentences       for   each
    conviction.       See United States v. Allen, 
    50 F.3d 294
    , 296-98 (4th
    Cir.     1995)    (absent      formal       consolidation,        single        sentencing
    proceeding and concurrent sentences do not make convictions related
    for criminal history purposes).                   Thus, our review of the record
    leads us to conclude that the district court did not err in
    calculating Williams’ criminal history.
    Williams    next      suggests      that    the    212-month       term   of
    imprisonment imposed by the district court was unreasonable. After
    United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005), a district court is
    no    longer     bound    by   the    range       prescribed      by   the      sentencing
    guidelines.       However, in imposing a sentence post-Booker, courts
    still must calculate the applicable guidelines range after making
    the    appropriate       findings     of    fact,    and   consider       the    range   in
    conjunction with other relevant factors under the guidelines and 18
    
    3 U.S.C.A. § 3553
    (a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008).                          Gall v. United
    States, 
    128 S. Ct. 586
    , 596 (2007).                      The court must give “both
    parties an opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they deem
    appropriate,” and the district judge “may not presume that the
    Guidelines range is reasonable.”                 Gall, 
    128 S. Ct. at 596-97
    .          This
    court will affirm a post-Booker sentence if it “is within the
    statutorily prescribed range and is reasonable.”                      United States v.
    Moreland, 
    437 F.3d 424
    , 433 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted).            On appellate review, this court may
    presume that a sentence within the properly calculated advisory
    guidelines range is reasonable.              Rita v. United States, 
    127 S. Ct. 2456
    , 2462, 2465 (2007).
    Here,    the    district       court       sentenced    Williams     after
    considering     and     examining      the       sentencing       guidelines    and   the
    §   3553(a)    factors,      as   instructed        by    Booker,    and   applied     the
    guidelines as advisory.           The court correctly sentenced Williams as
    an armed career criminal under 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e) and U.S.S.G.
    §   4B1.1,    finding    that     he   had       the     three    requisite    predicate
    offenses.      The court heard from both Williams and the Government
    regarding     the     calculation      of    his       criminal    history    score   and
    Williams was permitted to argue for a lower sentence.                          The court
    sentenced Williams to 212 months, the middle of the advisory
    guidelines range.
    4
    The   district   court   imposed   a   sentence   within   the
    guideline range and the statutory maximum.       Neither Williams nor
    the record suggests any information to rebut the presumption that
    his sentence was reasonable.       We therefore conclude that the
    sentence was reasonable.
    In his pro se supplemental brief, Williams alleges that
    the court demonstrated judicial bias in fashioning his sentence.
    A judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
    impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” 
    28 U.S.C. § 455
    (a)
    (2000); see United States v. Cherry, 
    330 F.3d 658
    , 665 (4th Cir.
    2003), or in situations in which the judge has a personal bias or
    prejudice against or in favor of an adverse party.       See Liteky v.
    United States, 
    510 U.S. 540
    , 555 (1994).     Williams’ allegations of
    bias stem from the court’s statements about Williams’ extensive
    criminal history, his danger to the community, and his spurious
    objections at sentencing to his past criminal convictions.           The
    record reveals no indication that these comments arose from a
    personal, extrajudicial source. We have concluded that the court’s
    sentence was reasonable. Williams thus fails to establish that the
    judge demonstrated bias or prejudice.
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in
    this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.            We
    therefore affirm Williams’ conviction and sentence.         This court
    requires that counsel inform Williams, in writing, of the right to
    5
    petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
    If Williams requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
    that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
    this court for leave to withdraw from representation.    Counsel’s
    motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Williams.
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
    the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-5041

Judges: Wilkinson, Motz, Gregory

Filed Date: 11/3/2008

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024