United States v. Galvez-Del Cid ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-5182
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
VIRGILIO ARNOLDO GALVEZ-DEL CID, a/k/a Arnoldo Del Cid,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District
Judge. (8:07-cr-00265-AW-4)
Submitted: February 25, 2011 Decided: March 17, 2011
Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary E. Davis, DAVIS & DAVIS, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.
Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Andrea L. Smith,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Virgilio Arnoldo Galvez-Del Cid pled guilty, pursuant
to a written plea agreement, to conspiracy to launder money, 18
U.S.C. § 1956(h) (2006), and was sentenced to 46 months of
imprisonment. Galvez-Del Cid’s attorney has filed a brief in
accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in
which she asserts that there are no meritorious issues for
appeal but questions whether the district court complied with
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 when it accepted Galvez-Del Cid’s guilty
plea. Galvez Del-Cid filed a supplemental pro se brief in which
he claims that the district court erred in applying the two-
level enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG)
§ 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) (2007). For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.
Prior to accepting a guilty plea, a district court
must conduct a plea colloquy in which the court informs the
defendant of the nature of the charge; any mandatory minimum
sentence and the maximum possible sentence; the applicability of
the Sentencing Guidelines; and the constitutional rights that he
forfeits by pleading guilty. The court must also ascertain that
there is a factual basis for the plea and that the defendant’s
plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(b); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir.
1991). We have thoroughly reviewed the record in this case, and
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conclude that the district court complied with the mandates of
Rule 11 in accepting Galvez-Del Cid’s guilty plea.
In his supplemental pro se brief, Galvez-Del Cid
challenges the two-level enhancement he received under USSG
§ 2S1.1(b)(2)(B), which provides for an increase in the base
offense level where, as here, the defendant was convicted under
18 U.S.C. § 1956. However, Application Note 3(C) to the
guideline provides that the § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) enhancement does
not apply “if the defendant was convicted of a conspiracy under
18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) and the sole object of that conspiracy was
to commit an offense set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1957.” USSG
§ 2S1.1, comment. (n.3(C)). Here, the indictment charged, and
Galvez-Del Cid pled guilty to, a conspiracy in violation of
§ 1956(h) where the object of the conspiracy was a violation of
§ 1956. Accordingly, we find that the district court did not
err in applying the two-level enhancement. See United States v.
Torres-Velazquez, 480 F.3d 100, 103-104 (1st Cir. 2007)
(concluding that Application Note 3(C) did not apply because the
object of the conspiracy with which defendant was charged was
not a violation of § 1957, but a violation of the money
laundering provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and
(a)(1)(B)(i)); see also United States v. Adargas, 366 F.3d 879,
882-83 (10th Cir. 2004).
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Galvez-Del Cid, in writing, of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Galvez-Del Cid requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a
copy thereof was served on Galvez-Del Cid.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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