United States v. David Hodges , 590 F. App'x 258 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4442
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DAVID MICHAEL HODGES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:13-cr-00320-CCE-1)
Submitted: January 22, 2015 Decided: January 26, 2015
Before SHEDD, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
William S. Trivette, WILLIAM S. TRIVETTE, ATTORNEY AT LAW, PLLC,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anand P. Ramaswamy,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
David Michael Hodges pled guilty in accordance with a
written plea agreement to possession of child pornography after
a prior conviction involving child pornography, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2) (2012). The parties entered
into an agreement pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
11(c)(1)(C), which stipulated that a sentence of 120 months’
imprisonment would be appropriate. After reviewing the
presentence report, the district court accepted the plea
agreement and imposed the stipulated sentence.
On appeal, Hodges’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant
to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there
are no meritorious appellate issues, but challenging the
sentence’s reasonableness. Hodges filed a pro se supplemental
brief, in which he demands, as a sovereign citizen, that he be
released and his record expunged. The United States moves to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and Hodges does not oppose the
motion. We dismiss in part and affirm in part.
Subject to narrow exceptions, a defendant who agrees
to and receives a particular sentence pursuant to a Rule
11(c)(1)(C) agreement may not appeal that sentence. See 18
U.S.C. § 3742(a), (c) (2012); United States v. Calderon, 428
F.3d 928, 932 (10th Cir. 2005). None of the exceptions to this
rule applies here. Hodges’s sentence was less than the
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applicable statutory maximum of twenty years’ imprisonment, see
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1), and was precisely what he and the
Government agreed was appropriate. Moreover, the sentence was
not imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the
Sentencing Guidelines because it was based on the parties’
agreement rather than the district court’s calculation of the
Guidelines. See United States v. Brown, 653 F.3d 337, 339–40
(4th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, we conclude that review of
Hodges’s sentence is precluded by § 3742(c)(1), and we grant the
motion to dismiss the appeal as to Hodge’s sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm Hodges’s conviction. This court requires that
counsel inform Hodges, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
Hodges requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
Hodges. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
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before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
DISMISSED IN PART;
AFFIRMED IN PART
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