United States v. Juan Baca-Arias , 590 F. App'x 221 ( 2015 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 14-4061
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    JUAN ANGEL BACA-ARIAS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of North Carolina, at Greenville. James C. Dever III,
    Chief District Judge. (4:13-cr-00012-D-1)
    Submitted:   December 31, 2014            Decided:   January 12, 2015
    Before NIEMEYER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Deborrah L. Newton, NEWTON LAW, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
    Appellant.   Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
    P. May-Parker, Shailika K. Shah, Assistant United States
    Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Juan Angel Baca-Arias pled guilty to illegal reentry
    of   an   aggravated       felon,        in    violation    of    8    U.S.C.    § 1326(a),
    (b)(2)     (2012),        and    was      sentenced        to    forty-six       months     of
    imprisonment.         On    appeal,           Baca-Arias    challenges        the    sixteen-
    level enhancement to his base offense level, arguing that his
    California conviction for possession of marijuana for sale is
    not a “drug trafficking offense” for purposes of the illegal
    reentry Guideline.              U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”)
    § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i)             (2013).          Baca-Arias      also    challenges        his
    indictment and conviction for illegal reentry on the basis of
    the five-year statute of limitations.                        See 18 U.S.C. § 3282(c)
    (2012).     We affirm.
    When     a    defendant           challenges       the    district      court’s
    calculation of the Sentencing Guidelines range, we review the
    district    court’s        “legal        conclusions       de   novo    and    its   factual
    findings for clear error.”                     United States v. Medina-Campo, 
    714 F.3d 232
    , 234 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 
    134 S. Ct. 280
    (2013).
    To     determine     whether         a    state      conviction        qualifies      as    an
    aggravated     felony       under        the    Immigration      and    Nationality        Act
    (“INA”),     courts       use    a   “categorical          approach,”     comparing        the
    state offense to an offense listed in the INA.                                Moncrieffe v.
    Holder, 
    133 S. Ct. 1678
    , 1684 (2013); 
    Medina-Campo, 714 F.3d at 235
    .      A state drug trafficking crime satisfies the categorical
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    approach when it “‘necessarily’ proscribe[s] conduct that is an
    offense     under      the     CSA,       and     the   CSA    .     .    .     ‘necessarily’
    prescribe[s] felony punishment for that conduct.”                                   Moncrieffe,
    133    S.   Ct.   at     1685.         Baca-Arias’s      conviction            of    possessing
    marijuana     for      sale,      under     California        Health      and       Safety   Code
    § 11359, qualifies categorically as an aggravated felony under
    the INA and, therefore, is a drug trafficking offense within the
    meaning     of    USSG    § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i).                 See       United      States    v.
    Martinez-Rodriguez, 
    472 F.3d 1087
    , 1095 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding
    that    a   conviction         under      California      Health         and     Safety      Code
    § 11359 “categorically qualifies as a ‘drug trafficking offense’
    under the Guidelines”); see also United States v. Maroquin-Bran,
    
    587 F.3d 214
    , 218 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting that a California
    statute that prohibits the sale of marijuana “properly triggers
    the    sixteen-level         sentencing          enhancement”).               Therefore,      the
    district court properly enhanced Baca-Arias’s offense level.
    Turning         to     Baca-Arias’s         statute          of        limitations
    argument, we first note that he did not assert this defense in
    the district court.               It has long been the law in this Circuit
    that a valid guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defenses.
    United States v. Willis, 
    992 F.2d 489
    , 490 (4th Cir. 1993).
    “The statute of limitations set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3282 is not
    jurisdictional.           It      is   an       affirmative     defense         that    may    be
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    waived.”        United States v. Matzkin, 
    14 F.3d 1014
    , 1017 (4th Cir.
    1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    In this case Baca-Arias waived the nonjurisdictional
    statute-of-limitations defense by entering a valid guilty plea.
    See     United     States     v.    Olano,       
    507 U.S. 725
    ,    732-33     (1993)
    (“Deviation from a legal rule is ‘error’ unless the rule has
    been waived.”); United States v. Claridy, 
    601 F.3d 276
    , 284 n.2
    (4th     Cir.     2010)     (noting     that     a     claim    for    relief    is   not
    reviewable on appeal when it is waived).
    Accordingly,           we   affirm       Baca-Arias’s      conviction     and
    sentence.        We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal    contentions        are    adequately        presented    in    the     materials
    before    this     court    and    argument      would    not    aid   the    decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
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