United States v. James Daughtie ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4014
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMES THURMAN DAUGHTIE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (7:04-cr-00006-F-1)
Submitted: September 30, 2015 Decided: October 2, 2015
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Eric J. Brignac,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Yvonne V. Watford-McKinney, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
James Thurman Daughtie appeals the 60–month sentence
imposed following the revocation of his supervised release term.
Daughtie argues that this sentence is plainly substantively
unreasonable because it was ordered to run consecutively to a
previously imposed state sentence of life plus 60 months. We
affirm.
A district court “has broad discretion when imposing a
sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States
v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). A revocation
sentence that is both within the applicable statutory maximum
and not “plainly unreasonable” will be affirmed on appeal.
United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437–38 (4th Cir. 2006).
In determining whether a revocation sentence is plainly
unreasonable, we first assess the sentence for reasonableness,
utilizing “the procedural and substantive considerations”
employed in evaluating an original sentence. Id. at 438. A
sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court
states “a proper basis” for concluding that the defendant should
receive the sentence imposed. Id. at 440. Only if we find a
sentence to be procedurally or substantively unreasonable will
we consider whether the sentence is “plainly” so. Id. at 439.
Daughtie does not challenge the procedural reasonableness
of his sentence. Rather, his sole argument on appeal is that
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the sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district
court imposed the sentence to run consecutively to his state
sentence rather than concurrently. The policy statement set
forth in USSG § 7B1.3(f) specifically states that:
Any term of imprisonment imposed upon the revocation
of . . . supervised release shall be ordered to be
served consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment
that the defendant is serving, whether or not the
sentence of imprisonment being served resulted from
the conduct that is the basis of the revocation of
. . . supervised release.
Thus, in imposing a consecutive sentence, the district court
simply deferred to this policy statement; such deference, while
not required, was more than proper. See United States v.
Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Though a district
court must consider the Chapter Seven policy statements and
other statutory provisions applicable to revocation sentences,
the court has broad discretion to impose a particular
sentence.”); see also United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652,
656-57 (4th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that Chapter 7 policy
statements are “‘helpful assistance,’” but that the court has
“broad discretion” in sentencing the defendant up to the
statutory maximum).
Accordingly, we find that Daughtie’s sentence was not
substantively unreasonable and we therefore affirm. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
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adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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