United States v. Steven Williams ( 2015 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 14-4690
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    STEVEN VONDELL WILLIAMS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, Senior District Judge.
    (8:12-cr-00278-RWT-2)
    Submitted:   June 30, 2015                    Decided:   July 9, 2015
    Before MOTZ, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Marc Gregory Hall, LAW OFFICES OF MARC G. HALL, P.C., Greenbelt,
    Maryland, for Appellant.     Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
    Attorney, Leah Jo Bressack, Assistant United States Attorney,
    Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Steven     Vondell     Williams     was    convicted,     following      a   jury
    trial, on four counts: interference, and conspiracy to interfere,
    with interstate commerce by robbery, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1951
       (2012);       possession     and     brandishing     of    a   firearm    in
    furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c) (2012); and possession of a firearm by a felon, in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g) (2012).                        The district court
    sentenced him to an aggregate term of 324 months’ imprisonment.
    On appeal, Williams challenges several evidentiary rulings and the
    reasonableness of his sentence.               We affirm.
    Williams     first     claims   that      the   district       court   erred   by
    admitting       into    evidence   transcripts        from   his     coconspirator’s
    sentencing hearing and thereby violated his rights under the
    Confrontation          Clause.     “[A]   violation      [of    the    Confrontation
    Clause] may be found harmless on appeal if the beneficiary of the
    constitutional error can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
    error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained[.]”
    United States v. Reed, 
    780 F.3d 260
    , 269 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal
    quotation marks omitted), petition for cert. filed, __ U.S.L.W. __
    (U.S. June 11, 2015) (No. 14-10176), and petition for cert. filed,
    __ U.S.L.W. __ (U.S. June 12, 2015) (No. 14-10190); see United
    States     v.   Johnson,     
    400 F.3d 187
    ,     197   (4th      Cir.   2005).     A
    2
    statement’s unconstitutional admission may be “harmless when the
    [G]overnment introduced an abundance of other evidence and proved
    parts of the defendant’s involvement without any use of [the
    challenged] statement.”             United States v. Gillion, 
    704 F.3d 284
    ,
    293    (4th    Cir.    2012)       (emphasis       and    internal     quotation        marks
    omitted).       We can assume the error occurred and “should avoid
    deciding whether there was a violation of the Confrontation Clause
    if any error was harmless.”             Reed, 780 F.3d at 269.
    Viewing the record as a whole, we conclude that it is clear
    beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found Williams
    guilty based solely on the unchallenged evidence presented by the
    Government.       An abundance of unchallenged evidence established
    that Williams was one of the perpetrators of the robbery at issue,
    and further evidence identifying him was unnecessary.                           Thus, even
    if    the   district       court    erred     by    admitting     the    transcript       in
    contravention         of   the     Confrontation          Clause,      such     error    was
    harmless.
    Next,    Williams      claims       that    the    district      court    erred    by
    permitting      hearsay        testimony       and       unqualified      or     otherwise
    impermissible         expert        testimony.             We    will     not      reverse
    nonconstitutional          error,      such       as     this,   if     the     Government
    demonstrates     that       the    error    was    harmless.          United    States    v.
    3
    Ibisevic, 
    675 F.3d 342
    , 349 (4th Cir. 2012).                In the context of
    nonconstitutional error,
    the Government must demonstrate that the error did not
    have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in
    determining the jury’s verdict. An appellate court does
    not inquire into whether absent the error sufficient
    evidence existed to convict, but rather whether we
    believe it highly probable that the error did not affect
    the judgment. Thus, we must be able to say, with fair
    assurance, after pondering all that happened without
    stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the
    judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.
    We have identified three decisive factors in making
    this determination: (1) the centrality of the issue
    affected by the error; (2) the steps taken to mitigate
    the effects of the error; and (3) the closeness of the
    case.
    
    Id. at 349-50
     (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
    Although the first two of these factors weigh in Williams’
    favor, “[t]he final factor—the closeness of the case—is the single
    most    important    factor   in    a   nonconstitutional        harmless-error
    inquiry.”     
    Id. at 352
     (internal quotation marks omitted); see
    United States v. Williams, 
    81 F.3d 1321
    , 1326 (4th Cir. 1996).
    “The     closeness    inquiry       involves       assessing      whether    the
    [unchallenged] evidence is not only sufficient to convict, but
    whether it is sufficiently powerful in relation to the [challenged
    evidence]   to   ensure   the      error    did   not   affect   the   outcome.”
    Ibisevic, 
    675 F.3d at 354
     (ellipsis and internal quotation marks
    omitted).
    4
    We conclude that the Government’s unchallenged evidence was
    not only sufficient to find Williams guilty beyond a reasonable
    doubt, but also sufficiently powerful in relation to the evidence
    Williams challenges that any error in the challenged rulings did
    not affect the outcome.       Thus, it is highly probable that any error
    in admitting the challenged evidence did not sway the jury or
    affect the outcome of the judgment.               Because Williams’ claims of
    erroneous evidentiary rulings necessarily would be only harmless
    error, we affirm his conviction.
    Lastly,   Williams     challenges         the   reasonableness   of     his
    sentence.     We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying “a
    deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”                Gall v. United States,
    
    552 U.S. 38
    , 41 (2007); United States v. Lymas, 
    781 F.3d 106
    , 111
    (4th Cir. 2015).     “First, we must determine whether the district
    court committed any procedural error . . . .”                Lymas, 781 F.3d at
    111.      “Only if we determine that the district court has not
    committed procedural error do we proceed to assess ‘the substantive
    reasonableness of the sentence imposed,’” id. at 112 (quoting Gall,
    
    552 U.S. at 51
    ), under “the totality of the circumstances,” Gall,
    
    552 U.S. at 51
    .
    “[A]   sentence   within        a       properly    calculated   advisory
    [Sentencing]     Guidelines    range       is   presumptively    reasonable”   on
    appeal.    United States v. Dowell, 
    771 F.3d 162
    , 176 (4th Cir. 2014)
    5
    (internal quotation marks omitted).             “A defendant can only rebut
    the presumption by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable
    when measured against the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors.”
    Id.   (alteration     and    internal     quotation     marks    omitted).            In
    evaluating the sentence, we give due deference to the district
    court because the district court need only “set forth enough to
    satisfy the appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’
    arguments and has a reasoned basis for [its decision].”                       Rita v.
    United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 356 (2007).
    Williams    contends      that      the   district        court       committed
    procedural error by failing to consider the application of the
    § 3553 factors to his case.              This contention is belied by the
    record.    The district court specified § 3553 as the controlling
    statute;     stated   that    it   was    obliged     to    impose      a    sentence
    sufficient,    but    not    greater     than   necessary,      to   comply         with
    § 3553(a)’s factors; and specifically referred to each factor
    listed in § 3553(a) that was relevant to the instant case.                          See
    United States v. Helton, 
    782 F.3d 148
    , 153 (4th Cir. 2015); United
    States v. Johnson, 
    445 F.3d 339
    , 345 (4th Cir. 2006).                   In applying
    the § 3553(a) factors, the court individually assessed Williams’
    case and the arguments he raised.                We perceive no procedural
    unreasonableness,      and    we   conclude      that      Williams’        claim    is
    meritless.
    6
    Williams’ claim of substantive unreasonableness is likewise
    without merit.    The district court heard Williams’ arguments
    concerning application of the § 3553(a) factors to his case and
    determined that those factors warranted a sentence at the high end
    of Williams’ Guidelines range that ran consecutively to Williams’
    existing sentence for an unrelated crime.      Absent substantive
    unreasonableness in the district court’s assessment, Williams’
    mere disagreement with it is no basis for vacating his sentence.
    See United States v. Howard, 
    773 F.3d 519
    , 531 (4th Cir. 2014).
    Because Williams has pointed to no procedural or substantive error
    that is not flatly contradicted by the record or otherwise without
    merit, he has not overcome the presumption of reasonableness
    accorded his within-Guidelines sentence.    Accordingly we affirm
    his sentence.
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    7