United States v. Shaun Isiah-Jeffrey Hinson ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4049
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
SHAUN ISIAH-JEFFREY HINSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:14-cr-00076-MOC-1)
Submitted: September 16, 2015 Decided: October 23, 2015
Before SHEDD and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Chiege O. Kalu Okwara, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Shaun Isiah-Jeffrey Hinson pleaded guilty to armed robbery,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d) (2012); brandishing a
firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) (2012); and robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a). The district court sentenced Hinson to 84 months of
imprisonment for the robbery counts, and the statutory mandatory
minimum of 84 months of imprisonment for the firearm offense, to
run consecutively, and Hinson now appeals. Appellate counsel
has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738(1967), questioning whether the Government breached the plea
agreement and whether the district court erred in accepting
Hinson’s guilty plea to the firearm charge. Hinson filed a pro
se supplemental brief raising additional issues. * Finding no
error, we affirm.
Counsel first questions whether the Government breached the
plea agreement by failing to move for a departure for
substantial assistance. As Hinson did not raise this issue in
the district court, we review this claim for plain error.
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 133-35 (2009). To
establish plain error, Hinson must demonstrate that a clear or
*
We have reviewed the issues raised in Hinson’s pro se
supplemental brief and conclude they lack merit.
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obvious defect occurred that affected his substantial rights and
that we should recognize the error because it “seriously affects
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. at 135 (alterations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
We construe a plea agreement pursuant to the principles of
contract interpretation. United States v. Davis, 689 F.3d 349,
353 (4th Cir. 2012). “[W]hile each party should receive the
benefit of its bargain, the government is bound only by the
promises it actually made to induce the defendant’s plea.” Id.(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, as the Government
reserved the discretion to determine whether to seek a departure
based on substantial assistance in the plea agreement, we
conclude that Hinson has failed to demonstrate that the
Government breached the agreement.
Counsel also questions whether the court erred in accepting
Hinson’s guilty plea to the firearm offense as Hinson now claims
that the firearm he possessed during the first robbery was not
real. In the context of guilty pleas, Rule 11(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure explains that “[b]efore
entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must determine
that there is a factual basis for the plea.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(b)(3). Because Hinson did not object to the factual basis
for his plea before the district court, our review is for plain
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error. United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342 (4th Cir.
2009). We conclude that the district court did not err in
accepting Hinson’s guilty plea, based on his stipulation to the
statement of facts demonstrating his guilt of the firearm
offense.
We have examined the entire record in accordance with the
requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. This court requires that counsel inform Hinson, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Hinson requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Hinson. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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