United States v. Partlow , 372 F. App'x 353 ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4729
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL PARTLOW, a/k/a Chris Partlow, a/k/a
Christopher Wilson, a/k/a Chubby Partlow, a/k/a Chubby
Wilson,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
District Judge. (3:97-cr-00184-FDW-19)
Submitted: March 18, 2010 Decided: April 1, 2010
Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Claire J. Rauscher, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA,
INC., Matthew R. Segal, Asheville, North Carolina, Elizabeth A.
Blackwood, Research and Writing Attorney, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Edward R. Ryan, United States
Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, Amy E. Ray, Assistant
United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Michael Partlow appeals the district
court’s order revoking his supervised release and sentencing him
to fifteen months’ imprisonment and ninety-six months’
supervised release. On appeal, Partlow contends that the
district court’s sentence was procedurally unreasonable, as it
was based on two erroneous premises: (1) that supervised
release was not punitive in nature, and (2) that lowering
Partlow’s term of supervised release would create an unwarranted
disparity, as such reductions were not available to defendants
who did not violate their supervised release terms. We affirm.
Generally, we will affirm a sentence imposed after
revocation of supervised release if it is within the applicable
statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable. See United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006).
However, here, after the district court explained the sentence
it intended to impose, it specifically asked counsel whether
they saw any legal reason why the sentence could not be imposed.
Though Partlow’s counsel thus had the opportunity to object to
the district court’s explanation of the basis for its proposed
sentence, they failed to do so. Accordingly, our review is for
plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. White,
405 F.3d 208, 215 (4th Cir. 2005). To establish plain error,
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Partlow must show that: (i) an error occurred; (ii) the error
is plain; and (iii) the error affected his substantial rights.
See United States v. Smith, 441 F.3d 254, 271 (4th Cir. 2006).
An error affects substantial rights if it was so prejudicial as
to affect the outcome of the proceedings. United States v.
McClung, 483 F.3d 273, 276 (4th Cir. 2007). Even if Partlow can
establish plain error, however, correction of the error remains
within our discretion and should not be exercised unless the
error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.Here, we find that Partlow’s first assignment of error
is without merit. Though Partlow contends that the district
court mistakenly believed that supervised release was not a
punishment, this contention is belied by the record. Instead,
the district court correctly recognized that supervised release
had both punitive and rehabilitative aspects, and was therefore
not wholly punitive in the manner described by Partlow’s
counsel. Indeed, the district court’s notation of the
“transitional” purposes behind supervised release mirrors the
congressional intent previously recognized by the Supreme Court:
“Congress intended supervised release to assist individuals in
their transition to community life. Supervised release fulfills
rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by
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incarceration.” United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59
(2000). Accordingly, the district court did not commit
procedural error in noting the rehabilitative aspects of
supervised release.
Partlow next contends that the district court erred in
noting that it sought to avoid unwarranted sentencing
disparities that might arise if it changed the supervised
release terms for violators, while those individuals who did not
violate were forced to serve the full length of their term.
Partlow argues that, as the district court failed to recognize
that an individual under a term of supervised release may seek a
reduction in his term after the expiration of one year of
supervised release, this misstatement of the law rendered
Partlow’s sentence procedurally unreasonable.
However, even if the district court did not fully
account for applicable supervised release law in evaluating
Partlow’s argument, Partlow fails to demonstrate that any error
affected his substantial rights. The district court listed
numerous reasons for imposing the sentence it did, including the
nature of the crimes committed, the need for deterrence, and the
need to protect the public. Accordingly, because Partlow fails
to demonstrate that his substantial rights were affected by this
alleged error, we find his argument unavailing.
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Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately expressed in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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