United States v. Larry Vaughn, Jr. ( 2020 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-4185
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LARRY DEAN VAUGHN, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Anderson. Bruce H. Hendricks, District Judge. (8:09-cr-00176-BHH-1)
Submitted: December 4, 2020 Decided: December 17, 2020
Before DIAZ, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Benjamin T. Stepp, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL
PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Peter M. McCoy, Jr.,
United States Attorney, Johanna C. Valenzuela, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Larry Dean Vaughn, Jr., appeals from the district court’s judgment revoking his
supervised release, sentencing him to 8 months’ imprisonment, and imposing an additional
18 months of supervised release, which included an order for Vaughn to complete inpatient
drug treatment. Vaughn’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning
whether Vaughn’s sentence is unreasonable. Vaughn filed a pro se brief, appearing to
contend that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We ordered supplemental briefing
on two issues: whether the district court violated Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319
(2011), and its progeny and whether the district court adequately addressed Vaughn’s
nonfrivolous arguments for a time served sentence of imprisonment. We now affirm the
district court’s judgment.
When formulating a sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) “precludes sentencing courts
from imposing or lengthening a prison term to promote an offender’s rehabilitation.”
Tapia, 564 U.S. at 332; see United States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 198-99 (4th Cir. 2012)
(holding Tapia applies to resentencing on revocation of supervised release). Accordingly,
it is error for a district court to impose a longer sentence than it otherwise would have for
the purpose of ensuring the defendant’s eligibility for a rehabilitation program while
incarcerated. Tapia, 564 U.S. at 321, 333-35. However, a district court is not prohibited
from considering a defendant’s rehabilitative needs or making treatment recommendations
during sentencing, so long as those needs are not the driving force in determining the length
of the sentence. See United States v. Alston, 722 F.3d 603, 608-09 (4th Cir. 2013); Bennett,
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698 F.3d at 198-99. Accordingly, for a Tapia claim to succeed, the sentencing court’s
reference to the defendant’s rehabilitative needs must be “causally related” to the court’s
sentencing determination. See United States v. Lemon, 777 F.3d 170, 174 (4th Cir. 2015)
(emphasis omitted).
Because Vaughn did not object to his sentence on this basis before the district court,
we review this challenge for plain error. See id. at 172. To demonstrate plain error, a
defendant must show “(1) that the district court erred; (2) that the error was plain; and (3)
that the error affected his substantial rights, meaning that it affected the outcome of the
district court proceedings.” Bennett, 698 F.3d at 200 (brackets and internal quotation
marks omitted). Even where a defendant satisfies these requirements, we need only correct
the error if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Here, although the district court commented that it wanted Vaughn to serve his
sentence of imprisonment before beginning the inpatient drug treatment, and remarked that
it did not want him released from custody until placement in a treatment center was secured,
we conclude that the district court did not impose a sentence of imprisonment or extend it
merely for the purpose of rehabilitation. Additionally, even assuming that the district court
erred, we would decline to exercise our discretion to correct the error because it does not
affect the fairness of the underlying judicial proceeding. Vaughn requested that the court
order inpatient drug treatment, and the district court imposed a sentence at the low-end of
the advisory policy statement range.
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Turning to the explanation of the sentence, “a district court, when imposing a
revocation sentence, must address the parties’ nonfrivolous arguments in favor of a
particular sentence, and if the court rejects those arguments, it must explain why in a
detailed-enough manner that this Court can meaningfully consider the procedural
reasonableness of the revocation sentence imposed.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d
202, 208 (4th Cir. 2017). An explanation is sufficient if we can determine “that the
sentencing court considered the applicable sentencing factors with regard to the particular
defendant before it and also considered any potentially meritorious arguments raised by
the parties with regard to sentencing.” United States v. Gibbs, 897 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir.
2018) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]here a court entirely fails to
mention a party’s nonfrivolous arguments in favor of a particular sentence, or where the
court fails to provide at least some reason why those arguments are unpersuasive, even the
relaxed requirements for revocation sentences are not satisfied.” Slappy, 872 F.3d at 209.
We conclude that the district court’s explanation in this case was sufficient.
Vaughn’s primary argument for a lesser sentence was his addiction and need for inpatient
drug treatment. The district court accepted this argument, ordered the requested inpatient
treatment, but then imposed a within-policy statement range term of imprisonment. The
district court appeared to believe that Vaughn needed more structure and the court’s
colloquy with counsel indicated that it was well aware of counsel’s arguments and was
engaged with the arguments. Additionally, the court’s comments that it had considered
cutting Vaughn loose indicate that counsel’s presentation changed the court’s sentencing
calculus. See Slappy, 872 F.3d at 210 (holding that district court’s explanation must be
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enough “to assure this Court that it considered the parties’ arguments and had some basis
for choosing the imposed sentence”).
Moreover, even if the district court’s explanation was insufficient, any error was
harmless. In Slappy, we found a procedural error was not harmless where “[t]he record
indicates that the court neither considered [defendant]’s arguments in favor of a within-
range sentence nor contemplated imposing anything other than the statutory maximum
sentence.” Id. By contrast, here, the district court considered Vaughn’s strongest argument
for a lesser sentence and rejected it, but accepted Vaughn’s request for inpatient treatment.
Thus, remanding for the district court to consider Vaughn’s secondary arguments would
not change the result in this case.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no other meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Vaughn, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Vaughn requests that
a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Vaughn.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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