United States v. Chauncey Randolph , 580 F. App'x 178 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4977
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHAUNCEY LAMONT RANDOLPH,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:13-cr-00285-CCE-1)
Submitted: July 29, 2014 Decided: July 31, 2014
Before NIEMEYER, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William S. Trivette, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Timothy Nicholas Matkins, Special Assistant United States
Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Chauncey Lamont Randolph pled guilty to possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924 (2012). The district court sentenced Randolph
in the middle of his Guidelines range to 100 months’
imprisonment. On appeal, Randolph’s counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
certifying that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but
questioning the substantive reasonableness of Randolph’s
sentence. Randolph has not filed a pro se supplemental brief,
despite notice of his right to do so. We affirm.
We review Randolph’s sentence for reasonableness,
applying a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). When reviewing a
sentence for substantive reasonableness, we examine the totality
of the circumstances and, if the sentence is within the
properly-calculated Guidelines range, apply a presumption on
appeal that the sentence is substantively reasonable. United
States v. Mendoza–Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216–17 (4th Cir. 2010).
Such a presumption is rebutted only if the defendant shows “that
the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the [18
U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors.” United States v. Montes–
Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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On appeal, Randolph’s counsel argues that Randolph’s
sentence is unreasonable because it is greater than necessary to
accomplish the goals of § 3553(a). We conclude that Randolph
has failed to overcome the appellate presumption of
reasonableness afforded his sentence. In arguing for a downward
variance at sentencing, defense counsel pointed out to the court
the impact of a single misdemeanor on Randolph’s Guidelines
range. Counsel further informed the court that Randolph would
seek employment in the culinary field upon release. The
district court acknowledged counsel’s arguments, but concluded
that a sentence in the middle of the Guidelines range was
appropriate “in order to protect the public,” “to reflect the
seriousness of the offense,” and in light of Randolph’s “long
criminal record.” Given the presumption of reasonableness that
attaches to a within-Guidelines sentence, we find no abuse of
discretion in the district court’s decision not to vary downward
and to impose a sentence in the middle of the Guidelines range.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record and find no other meritorious issues for appeal.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. This
court requires counsel to inform Randolph, in writing, of his
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Randolph requests that a petition be filed
but counsel believes such a petition would be frivolous, counsel
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may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Randolph. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid in the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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