United States v. Stephen Christian , 578 F. App'x 214 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4975
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
STEPHEN CARLOS CHRISTIAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:13-cr-00166-WO-1)
Submitted: June 26, 2014 Decided: July 10, 2014
Before SHEDD and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Clark Fischer, RANDOLPH & FISCHER, Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Kyle D. Pousson, Special Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Stephen Carlos Christian pled guilty to possession of
a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (2012), and possession
of a firearm by a person convicted of a crime punishable by more
than one year in prison, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2012). In his plea agreement, Christian reserved the right to
appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence found during a warrantless search of his vehicle. The
propriety of the suppression ruling is the sole issue Christian
raises on appeal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Christian argues that, pursuant to Arizona v. Gant,
556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009), the search of his trunk was
unconstitutional because he was already under arrest prior to
the vehicle search and was unable to access his vehicle. The
Government asserts that the search was justified by probable
cause independent of the Gant analysis. In reviewing a district
court’s denial of a suppression motion, “[w]e review the
district court’s legal determinations de novo and its factual
determinations for clear error.” United States v. Kelly, 592
F.3d 586, 589 (4th Cir. 2010). “Because the district court
denied [Christian’s motion], we construe the evidence in the
light most favorable to the government.” Id.2
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “the right of the
people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and
seizures” and requires “that searches be conducted pursuant to a
warrant issued by an independent judicial officer.”
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985). An established
exception to the warrant requirement is “for automobile
searches.” Kelly, 592 F.3d at 589. Under this exception,
police may search a vehicle without a warrant if it “is readily
mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains
contraband.” Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996).
If both conditions are met, police may conduct a warrantless
search “that is as thorough as a magistrate could authorize in a
warrant.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800 (1982).
Furthermore, such a search may cover all areas of the vehicle.
United States v. Bullock, 94 F.3d 896, 899 (4th Cir. 1996).
The gravamen of Christian’s objection to the search of
his vehicle is that it was not authorized in light of Gant. We
need not reach this issue because we conclude that officers had
probable cause to search the trunk. See 556 U.S. at 347; see
United States v. Dickey-Bey, 393 F.3d 449, 456 (4th Cir. 2004)
(“We need not . . . decide whether the search of [defendant’s]
automobile was properly incident to his arrest because we
conclude that the circumstances in this case provided officers
independent probable cause to search the automobile.”).
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Probable cause exists “where the known facts and
circumstances are sufficient to warrant a [person] of reasonable
prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696
(1996). Probable cause “is a ‘commonsense’ conception that
deals with ‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday
life.’” Kelly, 592 F.3d at 592 (quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at
695). In assessing whether probable cause exists, courts “must
examine the facts from the standpoint of an objectively
reasonable police officer, giving due weight to inferences drawn
from those facts by local law enforcement officers.” Id.(internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted).
Here, as the district court found, probable cause
clearly supported the search of Christian’s vehicle. During the
pursuit, an officer saw an object being thrown from Christian’s
vehicle and learned that the object recovered was a firearm. In
addition, the officer found marijuana on Christian’s person, and
Christian admitted that there was more marijuana in the vehicle.
Finally, the officer testified at the suppression hearing that
there was a very strong odor of raw marijuana emanating from the
vehicle. Based on the totality of the circumstances, there was
sufficient probable cause to support a warrantless search of
Christian’s vehicle. Thus, the district court did not err in
denying the motion to suppress.
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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