United States v. Robert Goins ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4071
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ROBERT EARL GOINS, a/k/a Robert Earl,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:12-cr-00669-RBH-3)
Submitted: August 11, 2014 Decided: August 18, 2014
Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
John M. Ervin, III, Darlington, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Arthur Bradley Parham, Assistant United States Attorney,
Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Robert Earl
Goins pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute a quantity of
cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 846 (2012). Goins negotiated a Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) agreement, in which the parties stipulated
that a 132-month sentence was appropriate. The district court
accepted the sentencing stipulation and sentenced Goins to 132
months in prison.
Goins appeals. His attorney has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
questioning whether the district court complied with Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11 and whether the sentence was reasonable. Goins has
filed a pro se supplemental brief raising an additional issue.
We affirm in part and dismiss in part.
Our review of the transcript of Goins’ Rule 11
transcript reveals that the district court complied with the
Rule, that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered, and
that Goins conceded his guilt. Accordingly, we affirm his
conviction.
We lack jurisdiction to review Goins’ sentence. A
defendant may appeal a sentence to which he stipulated in a Rule
11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement only if his sentence “was (1) imposed
in violation of the law, (2) [was] imposed as a result of an
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incorrect application of the Guidelines, or (3) is greater than
the sentence set forth in the plea agreement.” United States v.
Calderon, 428 F.3d 928, 932 (10th Cir. 2005); see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(a), (c) (2012). None of the exceptions applies here.
Goins’ sentence is below the statutory maximum of twenty years.
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Further, the sentence was not
imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the
Guidelines because it was based on the parties’ agreement rather
than on the district court’s calculation of the Guidelines
range. See United States v. Brown, 653 F.3d 337, 339-40 (4th
Cir. 2011); United States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 364 (7th
Cir. 2005). Finally, 132 months is the exact sentence set forth
in the plea agreement. Accordingly, we conclude that we may not
review Goins’ stipulated sentence. *
Pursuant to Anders, we have reviewed the record in
this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm Goins’ conviction but dismiss the appeal of his
sentence. This court requires that counsel inform his client,
in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
*
Because Goins’ sentence was based on the agreement and not
the Guidelines, we decline to address his contention in the
pro se brief that he was improperly determined to be a career
offender. We note, however, that he had more than enough
criminal history points to place him in criminal history
category VI.
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United States for further review. If Goins requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on his client. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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