In re: Timothy Richardson ( 2020 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-7
In re: TIMOTHY RICHARDSON,
Movant.
Argued: December 10, 2019 Decided: February 11, 2020
Before MOTZ and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Motion for authorization to file successive habeas petition denied by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Stanley F. Hammer, WYATT, EARLY, HARRIS & WHEELER, LLP, High
Point, North Carolina, for Movant. Jonathan Porter Babb, Sr., NORTH CAROLINA
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Respondent. ON BRIEF:
Kenneth J. Rose, Durham, North Carolina, for Movant. Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General,
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Timothy Richardson filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A), seeking
authorization from this court to file a second or successive application for a writ of habeas
corpus in order to challenge his capital sentence in North Carolina. He contends that he is
intellectually disabled and, therefore, ineligible for a capital sentence under the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. We deny the motion.
I.
Richardson was convicted and sentenced to death in 1995 for the kidnapping and
murder of Tracy Marie Rich. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal,
State v. Richardson, 488 S.E.2d 148 (N.C. 1997), and the United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari, Richardson v. North Carolina, 522 U.S. 1056 (1998). The underlying
facts and procedural history of his case are exhaustively set forth in the state court
decisions, as well as in this court’s prior decisions in Richardson v. Thomas, 930 F.3d 587
(4th Cir. 2019), Richardson v. Thomas, 718 F. App’x 192 (4th Cir. 2018), and Richardson
v. Branker, 668 F.3d 128 (4th Cir. 2012). 1
Richardson then sought post-conviction relief from his death sentence via a motion
for appropriate relief (MAR) in North Carolina state court, alleging that he is intellectually
disabled and, therefore, ineligible to be sentenced to the death penalty under Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). In Atkins, the United States Supreme Court held that the
1
Over the years, Richardson has raised numerous state and federal habeas claims
seeking relief from his death sentence. In this opinion, we only address Richardson’s prior
claim that he is intellectually disabled.
2
execution of an intellectually disabled individual violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on
cruel and unusual punishments, id. at 321, but left “to the States the task of developing
appropriate ways to enforce that constitutional restriction upon their execution of
sentences,” id. at 317 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Under North Carolina’s intellectual disability statute, Richardson was required to
demonstrate that he had (1) “[s]ignificantly subaverage general intellectual functioning,”
defined as “[a]n intelligence quotient of 70 or below on an individually administered,
scientifically recognized standardized intelligence quotient test administered by a licensed
psychiatrist or psychologist,” and (2) “[s]ignificant limitations in adaptive functioning,”
defined as “[s]ignificant limitations in two or more of [ten] adaptive skill areas.” N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-2005(a)(1), (2) (2001).
The MAR court held an evidentiary hearing to consider the claim. The court
considered Richardson’s IQ scores, expert testimony regarding the standard error of
measurement (SEM) generally recognized in such scores, and lay and expert testimony
about Richardson’s limitations in adaptive functioning. The court found that Richardson
had failed to prove that he was intellectually disabled and denied the claim on the merits.
In his petition seeking certiorari review by the Supreme Court of North Carolina,
Richardson argued that the lower court had “employed an overly restrictive construction
of § 15A-2005, one that is contrary to the Eighth Amendment as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia.” Richardson, 930 F.3d at 590
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Among other things, Richardson argued
that the court had considered only the numerical scores on his qualifying IQ tests, failed to
3
consider the SEM, and erred in the assessment of his adaptive limitations. See id. The
Supreme Court of North Carolina denied review. See State v. Richardson, 667 S.E.2d 272
(N.C. 2008).
In November 2008, Richardson filed his first petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), challenging the reasonableness of North
Carolina’s adjudication of his Atkins claim. Richardson again argued that the state court
had employed an overly restrictive construction of § 15A-2005, in violation of Atkins; gave
weight only to the raw IQ test scores; and failed to use the SEM to adjust the scores.
Richardson also argued that the state court’s findings regarding his adaptive limitations
were unreasonable. The district court denied Richardson’s intellectual disability claim on
the merits. We affirmed the intellectual disability ruling, and the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari review. 2
In May of 2014, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Hall v.
Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014), which considered a state prisoner’s appeal from the Florida
Supreme Court’s rejection of his Atkins claim. Hall argued that the Florida Supreme Court
had interpreted Florida’s intellectual disability statute too rigidly to comply with Atkins’
prohibition of the execution of the intellectually disabled, because it imposed a strict, cutoff
IQ score of 70 or less. Id. at 704. The Court agreed, holding that this “rigid rule,” which
foreclosed “all further exploration of intellectual disability, . . . . create[d] an unacceptable
2
See Richardson v. Branker, 769 F. Supp. 2d 896, 926-27 (E.D.N.C. 2011);
Richardson v. Branker, 668 F.3d 128, 151 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, Richardson v.
Branker, 568 U.S. 948 (2012).
4
risk that persons with intellectual disability [would] be executed, and thus [was]
unconstitutional.” Id. More specifically, the “Court agree[d] with the medical experts that
when a defendant’s IQ test score falls within the test’s acknowledged and inherent margin
of error, the defendant must be able to present additional evidence of intellectual disability,
including testimony regarding adaptive deficits.” Id. at 723.
In 2015, Richardson filed an amended MAR in North Carolina state court seeking
to overturn his death sentence in light of Hall. Richardson argued that the North Carolina
courts had similarly applied a rigid, cutoff score of 70 when it considered his claim and
had failed to consider the SEM and clinically-appropriate assessment measures of adaptive
deficits. The state MAR court denied Richardson’s motion. Of relevance here, the court
held that North Carolina had not “interpreted North Carolina’s statute to preclude
consideration of the [SEM] or to limit the introduction of evidence if the threshold showing
of an IQ score of 70 has not been met.” J.A. 1234. Accordingly, North Carolina’s statute,
unlike that in Florida, had been “interpreted consistently with Atkins.” Id. Second, the
court noted that Richardson had been “allowed to present evidence of his alleged deficits
in adaptive functioning in a full evidentiary hearing without restriction,” as well as
evidence “on the standard error of measurement,” id., and that the court had “considered
all of Richardson’s IQ test scores, without limitation, as well as evidence of his alleged
limitations in adaptive functioning,” id. at 1234-35. “Thus, Hall “ha[d] no effect on [the
court’s] prior determination that Richardson is not intellectually disabled,” id. at 1234, and
the court had, “[i]n effect, . . . already interpreted North Carolina’s law consistently with
Hall,” id. at 1235. Nevertheless, the state MAR court also considered Richardson’s
5
amended claim on the merits, including supplemental affidavits from the state’s expert
regarding Richardson’s intellectual-disability evaluation, and found that Richardson had
still failed to provide evidence sufficient to support a finding that he is intellectually
disabled. The North Carolina Supreme Court denied review, see State v. Richardson, 782
S.E.2d 736 (N.C. 2016), as did the United States Supreme Court, see Richardson v. North
Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 337 (2016).
Richardson then returned to federal district court, seeking to reopen the final
judgment on his original habeas petition under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in light of the Hall decision. Richardson again argued that the North Carolina
state court had imposed a bright-line, cutoff IQ score of 70 or below when it adjudicated
his claim and had failed to consider the SEM and his adaptive deficits. The district court
granted the motion, but certified an interlocutory appeal to this court. Because
Richardson’s Rule 60 motion was the functional equivalent of a § 2254 petition that could
not be filed absent prior authorization from this court, we vacated the order. See
Richardson, 930 F.3d at 589. In the interim, Richardson filed the present motion for an
order authorizing him to file a second or successive habeas application under 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b)(3), to which we now turn.
II.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) “greatly
restricts the power of federal courts to award relief to state prisoners who file second or
successive habeas corpus applications. If the prisoner asserts a claim that he has already
presented in a previous federal habeas petition, the claim must be dismissed in all cases.”
6
Tyl. v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 661 (2001); see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). If the claim “was not
presented in a previous petition, the claim must be dismissed unless it falls within one of
two narrow exceptions.” Id. The first exception is for certain claims that rely on “a new
rule of constitutional law,” that has been “made retroactive to cases on collateral review by
the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable” to the petitioner. 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b)(2)(A). The second exception is for claims that are based on a “factual predicate
[that] could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence,”
and which, “if proven and viewed in the light of the evidence as a whole, would be
sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error,
no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.”
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B). In order to obtain authorization to file a second or successive
habeas application, Richardson must make a prima facie showing that he satisfies these
requirements. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C); Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 530
(2005) (“[B]efore the district court may accept a successive petition for filing, the court of
appeals must determine that it presents a claim not previously raised that is sufficient to
meet § 2244(b)(2)’s new-rule or actual-innocence provisions.”).
A.
As noted above, the Supreme Court held in Atkins that the Constitution prohibits the
execution of intellectually disabled persons, but left “to the States the task of developing
appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (internal
quotation marks and alteration omitted). Richardson raised a claim of intellectual disability
under Atkins in his first federal habeas petition, challenging the state court’s adjudication
7
of his claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2005 and the Eighth Amendment, and the
judgment denying that claim is final.
Since then, the Supreme Court has expounded on the Atkins ruling in two cases,
making it clear that the state’s discretion in this area is not without limits. In Hall, the
Court held that a state cannot impose an IQ cutoff score of 70, which prohibits
consideration of the SEM and evidence of adaptive deficits. See 572 U.S. at 704, 723. And
in Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017), the Court held that the state court’s intellectual
disability determination, including the evaluation of adaptive deficits, must be informed by
the medical community’s current diagnostic criteria. Id. at 1048. This requirement that
the state be “informed by the medical community does not demand adherence to everything
stated in the latest medical guide. But neither does our precedent license disregard of
current medical standards.” Id. at 1049.
In his § 2244 motion, Richardson argues that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hall
and Moore announced new rules of constitutional law that should be applied retroactively
to cases on collateral review under the Teague framework. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288 (1989). “Under Teague, as a general matter, ‘new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new
rules are announced.’” Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1264 (2016) (quoting
Teague, 489 U.S. at 310); see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 728 (2016).
There are two exceptions to this “general bar on retroactivity.” Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264.
“First, new substantive rules generally apply retroactively. Second, new watershed rules
of criminal procedure, which are procedural rules implicating the fundamental fairness and
8
accuracy of the criminal proceeding, will also have retroactive effect.” Id. (internal
citations, quotations marks, and alteration omitted).
Richardson spends a great deal of time arguing that, in light of these Supreme Court
rulings, we should find that Hall and Moore announced new substantive rules of
constitutional law and, therefore, should be applied to cases on collateral review under the
Teague analysis. But in order to receive authorization to file a second or successive § 2254
petition, Richardson must do more than convince this court that Hall and/or Moore
announced new substantive rules that should be applied retroactively to cases on collateral
review. He must show that his claim “relies on a new rule of constitutional law” that has
already been “made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that
was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has adopted a narrow view of the plain language in §
2244(b)(2)(A). See Tyler, 533 U.S. at 662. The Court explained that the term “‘made’
means ‘held’ and, thus, the requirement is satisfied only if [the Supreme] Court has held
that the new rule is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” Id. “Quite
significantly, under this provision, the Supreme Court is the only entity that can ‘make’ a
new rule retroactive. The new rule becomes retroactive, not by the decisions of the lower
court or by the combined action of the Supreme Court and the lower courts, but simply by
the action of the Supreme Court.” Id. at 663 (alteration omitted). Thus, a “new rule is not
‘made retroactive to cases on collateral review’ unless the Supreme Court holds it to be
retroactive.” Id. The only exception to this requirement of an explicit holding is if we
must say that a combination of Supreme Court holdings “necessarily dictate retroactivity
9
of the new rule.” Id. at 666. “The relationship between the conclusion that a new rule is
retroactive and the holdings that ‘make’ this rule retroactive . . . must be strictly logical—
i.e., the holdings must dictate the conclusion and not merely provide principles from which
one may conclude that the rule applies retroactively.” Id. at 669 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(alteration omitted). The holdings must “permit no other conclusion than that the rule is
retroactive.” Id.; cf. United States v. Mathur, 685 F.3d 396, 401 (4th Cir. 2012) (We are
“not authorize[d] to read between the lines of a prior opinion to discern whether that
opinion, by implication, made a new rule retroactively applicable on collateral review. The
only way to make a new rule retroactive ‘is through a ‘holding,’ not through dictum.”)
(quoting Tyler, 533 U.S. at 663-64).
Hall and Moore do not address retroactivity, and no subsequent Supreme Court case
has held that Hall or Moore apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. Richardson’s
reliance upon Welch and Montgomery for his argument that we must conclude that the
Supreme Court has “made” Hall and Moore retroactively applicable to cases on collateral
review falls well short of Tyler’s narrow exception, and Richardson has pointed us to no
other combination of Supreme Court holdings that “logically dictate . . . no other
conclusion than that the rule is retroactive.” Tyler, 533 U.S. at 669 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring). Rather, the most that Richardson “can claim is that, based on the principles
outlined in Teague, [the Supreme] Court should make [Hall and Moore] retroactive to
cases on collateral review.” Tyler, 533 U.S. at 666. That is not sufficient. See, e.g., In re
Bowles, 935 F.3d 1210, 1219 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Hall did announce a new rule of
constitutional law, but the Supreme Court has not made that new rule retroactive to cases
10
on collateral review.”); In re Payne, 722 F. App’x. 534, 539 (6th Cir. 2018) (rejecting
petitioner’s claim that various Supreme Court decisions and orders “dictate that the
decisions in Moore and Hall are to be applied retroactively”); In re Henry, 757 F.3d 1151,
1159, 1161 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that “Hall made no mention of retroactivity,” no
“subsequent Supreme Court case [has] addressed the issue, much less made Hall
retroactive,” and “[n]o combination of Supreme Court holdings compels the conclusion
that Hall is retroactive to cases on collateral review”); Goodwin v. Steele, 814 F.3d 901,
904 (8th Cir. 2014) (denying motion for authorization to file a second or successive
application based upon Hall because, “[u]nder Tyler, [petitioner] has not made a prima
facie showing that the Supreme Court has held that Hall is retroactive”).
B.
In supplemental briefing, Richardson argues that we should also authorize him to
refile his intellectual disability claim based upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins –
which has been made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review by the Supreme
Court. We reject this claim as well.
Richardson’s attempt to raise a second intellectual disability claim based upon the
rule announced in Atkins is plainly barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). To circumvent this
bar, Richardson advances a creative, but meritless, argument that the Atkins claim that he
previously presented was not really “available” until the Supreme Court decided Hall and
the North Carolina legislature amended its intellectual disability statute after the Hall
decision was issued. At the outset, we note the obvious, logical problem with Richardson’s
argument that the Atkins claim he presented in his prior § 2254 application was previously
11
unavailable. This is because the argument is a transparent attempt on the part of Richardson
to circumvent § 2244(b)(2)(A)’s requirement that the “new rules” announced by the
Supreme Court in Hall and Moore must have been “made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” Id.
Richardson’s intellectual disability claim based upon the Supreme Court’s decision
in Atkins was presented in his prior § 2254 application, and it is barred by § 2244(b)(1).
And his attempt to dress up his Hall claim as an Atkins claim fails under § 2244(b)(2)(A).
See, e.g., In re Bowles, 935 F.3d at 1216 (rejecting similar claim that Atkins only “became
available to [petitioner] when the Supreme Court struck down Florida’s rigid cutoff as
unconstitutional in Hall”); In re Bourgeois, 902 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 2018) (rejecting federal
prisoner’s argument that he should be allowed to file another Atkins claim, notwithstanding
§ 2244(b)(1) bar, because the Supreme Court’s decision in Moore “now makes his claim
viable”). 3
3
Richardson’s reliance upon the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decisions in In re
Johnson, 935 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. 2019) and In re Cathey, 857 F.3d 221 (5th Cir. 2017), do
not avail him. Cathey and Johnson involved states that applied a strict cutoff score of 70,
and habeas petitioners that had never presented an intellectual disability claim in a § 2254
petition, presumably because they had no score below the cutoff when they filed their first
habeas petition. Accordingly, the petitioners in Cathey and Johnson did not face the §
2244(b)(1) bar. The Fifth Circuit held that such a first-time Atkins claim could be brought
in a second or successive petition. The Eleventh Circuit, in contrast, rejected a similar
argument that Atkins was “previously unavailable” to a petitioner when he filed his first
habeas petition because then-existing state law would have doomed his petition, holding
that “[t]here is no futility exception to the AEDPA’s restrictions on second and successive
petitions.” In re Bowles, 935 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2019). We need not decide this
issue, however, because Richardson did file an Atkins claim in his first federal habeas
application, and he was granted the unfettered ability to present evidence of the SEM and
his adaptive deficits when his intellectual disability claim was adjudicated by the state
court.
12
Richardson’s argument that he should be allowed to file a second or successive,
intellectual disability claim under Atkins because it was not “available” to him until the
North Carolina legislature amended its intellectual disability statute in 2015 fares no better.
Section 15A-2005 of the North Carolina Code implemented Atkins’ directive that states
develop the framework to enforce its constitutional prohibition against the execution of the
intellectually disabled. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2005 (2001). Neither that statute, nor
any application of it, has been declared unconstitutional. See Hall, 572 U.S. at 715 (noting
that North Carolina’s statute could be, but has not been, interpreted as applying a bright-
line cutoff score). And the North Carolina court did not apply a bright-line cutoff score to
Richardson’s claim. Nevertheless, in the wake of Hall, the North Carolina state legislature
amended § 15A-2005 to clarify that intellectual-disability determinations include
consideration of the SEM and the defendant’s adaptive limitations under accepted clinical
standards. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2005 (2015).
To file a second or successive claim of intellectual disability, however, Richardson
must make a prima facie case that he can rely upon a new rule of constitutional law, made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. Changes in state law do
not authorize the filing of a second or successive federal habeas petition under §
2244(b)(2)(A). Cf. In re Bowles, 935 F.3d at 1217-18 (“Congress did not say that the claim
could proceed if it relied on any other type of change in case law. Congress knew how to
say that if it had wanted to.”). And when “conducting habeas review, a federal court is
limited to deciding whether a [state] conviction [or sentence] violated the Constitution,
13
laws, or treaties of the United States,” not whether there was an “error[] of state law.”
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 68 (1991). 4
C.
Richardson next seeks to file a second or successive claim on the ground that he is
actually innocent of the death penalty. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(B). We deny this
motion as well.
To file a second or successive habeas claim under § 2244(b)(2)(B), Richardson must
make a prima facie showing of (1) a “factual predicate for the claim [that] could not have
been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence,” and (2) that the new
factual predicate, “if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be
sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error,
no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.”
Id. (emphasis added).
Here, Richardson seeks only to challenge his eligibility for the death sentence, not
the determination that he is guilty of the underlying offense of murder. Thus, he “does not
fall within the narrow statutory exception in § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).” In re Bowles, 935 F.3d
at 1220 (internal quotation marks omitted). Richardson’s reliance upon Sawyer v. Whitley,
4
We note that the state has argued that Richardson’s attempt to file a second or
successive claim under Hall and Moore, like his claim under Atkins, is also barred under
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). We need not decide the precise scope of the term “claim” for
purposes of § 2244(b)(1) and (b)(2) in this decision because, even if we were to hold that
Richardson’s present-day Hall and Moore claims were not squarely “presented” in his prior
habeas application, Richardson has failed to make a prima facie showing that he satisfies
the requirements of § 2244(b)(2).
14
505 U.S. 333 (1992), provides him no avenue to file this claim. In Sawyer, the Supreme
Court held that “actual innocence” for purposes of the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”
exception to the procedural default of constitutional claims extends to claims that a
petitioner is “actually innocent” of the death penalty. See id. at 336. However, this “judge-
fashioned” exception in Sawyer did not survive Congressional enactment of AEDPA.
Hope v. United States, 108 F.3d 119, 120 (7th Cir. 1997). “The ‘actual innocence’
exception of the prior law was judge-made, and so its contours were appropriately judge-
fashioned and permissibly judge-expanded. The exception in [AEDPA] is graven in
statutory language that could not be any clearer.” Id.; see also Bowles v. Sec., 935 F.3d
1176, 1182 (11th Cir. 2019) (“AEDPA forecloses the Sawyer exception in all
circumstances, including § 2254 challenges to state death sentences.”); cf. Wright v.
Angelone, 151 F.3d 151, 164 n.8 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting “that other circuit courts narrowly
have interpreted the . . . language in § 2244(b)(2) to require that habeas petitioners
demonstrate actual innocence of the underlying crime to file a successive habeas petition
on the basis of newly discovered evidence. A claim of ‘innocence of the death penalty’
only is no longer sufficient to warrant review.”).
Richardson has also failed to make a prima facie showing that his claim otherwise
satisfies § 2244(b)(2)’s requirements. Richardson seeks to present a claim that he is
“actually innocent” of the death sentence, based upon a supplemental affidavit procured
from the state’s expert in 2014 and the American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed. 2013) (DSM-5). Even if Richardson could
demonstrate that the substance of the expert’s affidavit could not have been discovered by
15
due diligence at the time he filed his motion, he has failed to make the requisite showing
that the expert’s opinion “would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that . . . no reasonable factfinder would have found” him to be eligible for the death penalty
under the standards in existence at the time the state court adjudicated his claim. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(2)(B). In addition, the state’s expert’s opinion was unchanged. “[N]othing from
Hall v. Florida, or developments in the field of mental health, [had] affected his
conclusion” that “Richardson is not intellectually disabled.” J.A. 104. 5
D.
The balance of Richardson’s motion raises various constitutional challenges to §
2244’s limitations on the filing of second or successive federal habeas petitions. Among
other things, Richardson argues that our denying him the right to file a second or successive
intellectual disability claim based upon Hall, Moore, and the amended version of the North
Carolina statute, would violate several provisions of the United States Constitution,
including Article I, Article III, the Due Process Clause, the Eighth Amendment, and the
Equal Protection Clause. We have considered all of Richardson’s arguments and find them
to be without merit.
5
To the extent Richardson argues that he should be given the opportunity to prove
that he is intellectually disabled under the DSM-5, this argument also seeks to circumvent
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). In Moore, the Supreme Court referenced the DSM-5, which
was the medical standard in place when the state court considered the defendant’s claim of
intellectual disability. The Supreme Court in no way indicated that a state court’s
determination could be overturned based upon subsequently-issued medical standards, nor
has it made Moore retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. Rather, the Court
held only that the state court’s determination must be informed by current diagnostic
criteria. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1049.
16
The matter for decision today is whether Richardson’s motion for an order
authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive challenge to the state
court’s imposition of his death sentence satisfies the requirements set forth by Congress in
§ 2244(b). He has not done so. Moreover, Richardson has cited no authority to support
his claim that § 2244(b) is an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional power or that our
application of it would violate his constitutional rights. On the contrary, the Supreme Court
and this court have rejected similar challenges to the constitutionality of AEDPA’s
limitations on federal habeas relief. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996)
(holding that AEDPA’s restrictions on successive habeas petitions do not amount to an
unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, but rather “constitute a modified
res judicata rule, a restraint on what is called in habeas corpus practice ‘abuse of the
writ.’”); In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1197-98 (4th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the restrictions
on multiple motions for post-conviction relief “amount[] to an entirely proper exercise of
Congress’ judgment regarding the proper scope of the writ and [fall] well within the
compass of the evolutionary process surrounding the doctrine of abuse of the writ.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Bowles, 935 F.3d at 1182 (rejecting petitioner’s claim
that “any procedural obstacle to the consideration of a claim of intellectual disability must
cede to the categorical protections of the Eighth Amendment” and, thereby, his “invitation
to effectively declare part of AEDPA unconstitutional.”).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we deny Richardson’s motion for leave to file a second
or successive habeas petition.
17
MOTION DENIED
18